Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co.
Decision Date | 30 March 1912 |
Docket Number | 203 (C.C. 855). |
Citation | 195 F. 313 |
Parties | STROUT v. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Whipple Sears & Ogden and Dunbar & Rackemann, for plaintiff.
Coolidge & Hight, W. H. Coolidge, and C. A. Hight, specially, for defendants.
This case now comes before the court upon the United Shoe Machinery Company's motion to dismiss, because it appears upon the face of the record that the court has no jurisdiction; and upon the plea in abatement of all the defendants, raising the contention that the plaintiff is without capacity to sue in this jurisdiction.
1. In the motion to dismiss, the United Shoe Machinery Company urges that the court has no jurisdiction of the case, for the reason, appearing upon the face of the record, that the plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Maine, and the United Shoe Machinery Company, defendant, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New Jersey; and neither the plaintiff nor defendant is a citizen of the state of Massachusetts.
The writ shows that the plaintiff is 'Charles A. Strout, as he is the duly appointed trustee of the Goddu Sons Metal Fastening Company and a citizen of the state of Maine.'
'United Shoe Machinery Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey, and a citizen of the state of New Jersey, having an office and its principal place of business in Boston, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts and found in the district of Massachusetts.
'Sidney W. Winslow, of Orleans in the county of Barnstable commonwealth of Massachusetts.
'George W. Brown and Edward P. Hurd, both of Newton in the county of Middlesex, commonwealth of Massachusetts.
'Said Winslow, Brown, and Hurd being severally citizens of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, in the district of Massachusetts.'
The amount of damages claimed is $2,000,000.
The court, then, has before it a citizen of Maine suing a citizen of New Jersey in a civil action, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. The obvious contention is raised by defendant that in any ordinary civil action a citizen of New Jersey cannot be called to answer a suit by a citizen of the state of Maine in the United States Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff does not controvert this suggestion, but says that the action is brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Statute, the Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901. p. 3200), and that the declaration clearly presents a cause of action under section 7 of that act, which provides as follows:
'Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.'
It will be seen that, under this section, without respect to the amount in controversy, such action may be brought in the district in which the defendant resides or is found. And it is not denied that the defendants in the case at bar are found in the district of Massachusetts. It is contended, however, that the declaration does not clearly show that the action is brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; that it does not sufficiently appear by the writ and declaration that the case is confined to an action under this statute; that therefore the jurisdiction of the court does not affirmatively appear; and that, where threefold damages are sought by virtue of the statute, the declaration must state a case clearly and unequivocally authorized by the law. The substance of the declaration is stated sufficiently for the purposes of this case in the summary given by the defendant, as follows:
It is contended that this is not a declaration unmistakably under the Sherman Act; that this act is not referred to; and the presumption is that the cause is without the jurisdiction of the federal courts, unless the contrary affirmatively appears; but that the case must be treated as one based upon diversity of citizenship; and that therefore it must be dismissed as to the United Shoe Machinery Company. Upon examination of the declaration, it is found that there is not a word in it expressly stating that the action is brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. There is no mention of the act, or reference to it, in distinct terms. It is not even stated that the defendant became liable by force of the act. But it does appear from the declaration that the defendant company was formed with the plan of suppressing competition, and of maintaining a monopoly of the shoe machinery business; that in pursuance of such plan, the defendant acted in combination and conspiracy in restraint of plaintiff's trade; that the trade to be restrained was interstate; that certain things were done by the defendants to attain such restraint of the plaintiff's trade; and that thereby the competition of the plaintiff company has been destroyed, the monopoly of the defendant company sustained, and the plaintiff's property and business injured. I see no need of restating the whole of the declaration. A fair reading of it leaves no doubt that the action was brought under section 7 of the Sherman Act. No question can be left in the mind of the court that the pleader intended to state a case under that section. This is so clear that I cannot think it necessary to label the declaration as one brought under the provisions of the Sherman Act. The allegations make it plain that the action is clearly founded upon that act, and upon that alone, and that no common-law remedy, or other remedy of any kind, is sought.
The doctrine of the federal courts is unquestionably that in matters of pleading inferences from equivocal and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc.
...the nature of a suit brought under Section 15 (Section 7 of the Sherman Act) was expressed by the court in Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co., D.C.Mass.1912, 195 F. 313, at page 317, when it wrote: "It is not in its nature and substance a penal action; its vindication does not rest with th......
-
United Shoe MaChinery Co. v. La Chapelle
...... trade, which is not protected against the provisions of the. Sherman anti-trust act by the federal patent laws, it is not. necessary to pursue father the inquiry as to its unlawful. character. See U.S. v. Winslow (D. C.) 195 F. 578;. Strout v. U.S. Shoe Machinery Co. (D. C.) 195 F. 313. . . It. remains to determine whether the contract, the specific. performance of which is sought, is in direct aid of the. illegal combination amounting to monopoly of trade or. commerce among the several states, contrary to ......
-
Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated
...1015, 91 L.Ed. 1219; Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, 2 Cir., 6 F.2d 1000, 1009, 42 A.L.R. 503; Strout v. United Shoe Mach. Co., D.C., 195 F. 313, 317. 7 Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., supra, and cases cited therein; see also rule applying in civil action......
-
Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox F. Corp.
...Foundry & Pipeworks, 6 Cir., 1903, 127 F. 23, 64 L.R.A. 721, affirmed 203 U.S. 390, 27 S.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241; Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co., D.C.Mass., 1912, 195 F. 313; Harvey v. Booth Fisheries Co. of Delaware, D.C.Wash., 1915, 228 F. 782; Hansen Packing Co. v. Swift & Co., D.C.N.Y......