Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1974
• Citation: 520 P.2d 29,112 Cal.Rptr. 805,11 Cal.3d 28
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 520 P.2d 29 Coreen STRUMSKY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 30009.

Page 805

112 Cal.Rptr. 805

11 Cal.3d 28, 520 P.2d 29

Coreen STRUMSKY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Respondent.

L.A. 30009.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 25, 1974.

As Modified April 24, 1974.

Robert G. Berrey, County Counsel, and Joseph Kase, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Edward H. Gaylord and Martin E. Weekes, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, as amici curiae for defendant and respondent.

Linley, McDougal, Meloche & Murphy and Donald L. Meloche, El Cajon, for plaintiff and appellant.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

In the instant case we confront a question concerning judicial review of adjudicatory determinations of administrative agencies which we were not called upon to reach in Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242. That question, whose presence was expressly noted by us in Bixby (id. at p. 137, fn. 2, 93 Cal.Rptr. at p. 238, 481 P.2d at p. 246) is this: When, upon judicial review of an administrative order or decision pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is claimed there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion in that the findings are not supported by the evidence, what is the proper scope of review when the respondent agency is a local agency or a state agency of local jurisdiction?

If anything has remained consistently clear in the checkered history of the judicial review of administrative decisions under section 1094.5, it has been the answer to the foregoing question. Subdivision (c) of that section provides that when a claim of unsupported findings is made, abuse of discretion (which under subdivision (b) is established if the findings are not supported by the evidence) is shown In cases in whch the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the Weight of the evidence; In all other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by Substantial evidence in light of the whole record. It has been veritable gospel, at least since the decision of this court in Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 59 P.2d 119--which is the fountainhead from which all subsequent law of judicial review of administrative decisions, including section 1094.5 itself, has sprung--that with respect to orders or decisions of local agencies or state agencies of local jurisdiction the court Is not authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, and therefore that the proper scope of review with respect to such orders or decisions is that of substantial evidence in light of the whole record. It is this axiom which is challenged here today.

After solemn and extended consideration we have concluded that there no longer exists any rational or legal justification for distinguishing with regard to judicial review between, on the one hand, local agencies and state agencies of local jurisdiction and, on the other, state agencies of legislative origin having statewide jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hold that the rule of judicial review applicable to adjudicatory orders or decisions of the latter class of agencies--which was reaffirmed and explained by us in Bixby--is also applicable to adjudicatory orders or decisions of agencies in the former class. That rule is as follows: If the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court, in determining under section 1094.5 whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. If, on the other hand, the order or decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial court's inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.

As we explain below, we have concluded that the order and decision in the instant case does affect a fundamental vested right; accordingly the independent-judgment standard stated above is here applicable. Because the trial court in denying the writ considered itself bound by existing law to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new determination under rule we announce today.

I

Plaintiff Coreen Strumsky appeals from a judgment denying her petition for a writ of mandate sought to review and set aside the decision of the Board of Retirement (Board) of defendant San Diego County Employees Retirement Association denying her certain death benefits.

Plaintiff is the widow of Richard D. Strumsky, who died in 1968 following surgery to correct a congenital narrowing of the aorta. At the time of his death Mr. Strumsky was a sergeant in the San Diego County Marshal's office and was in charge of its El Cajon branch; he had been employed by the county for 21 years and for many years had been a 'safety member' (see Gov.Code, § 31469.3) of the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association.

Pursuant to the provisions of the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (Gov.Code, § 31450 et seq.), plaintiff made application to the Board for the service-connected death allowance established by section 31787 of the Government Code. That section provides in substance and as here relevant that the surviving spouse of a member who dies as the result of an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of his employment is entitled to elect, in lieu of the normal death allowance established by section 31781.1, ¹ a lifetime allowance amounting to half the member's salary at death. In the case of Mrs. Strumsky, the service-connected death allowance would be almost three times the nonservice-connected death allowance of $181.03 per month.

The Board held a hearing on the question of service-connection. Five witnesses testified, and documentary evidence, including the written reports of four doctors, was introduced. The evidence established clearly that decedent had suffered from hypertension since boyhood due to a congenital narrowing of the aorta; that this condition was aggravated by progressive arteriosclerosis which had become advanced at a point one year prior to his death; and that the unsuccessful surgery was undertaken in order to correct the aortal narrowing or coarctation and thus relieve the severe hypertension which it and the arteriosclerosis had combined to bring about. There was, however, considerable conflict in the evidence concerning the extent to which the stress and tension inherent in decedent's occupation and his personal attitude toward his job affected the development of the arteriosclerosis. On this point the evidence ranged widely from an opinion that the stress and tension of decedent's employment was responsible only to 'an infinitesimal extent' for his condition, to an opinion that the arteriosclerosis may have been substantially related to chronic tension. The theory supporting the latter view was that the hypertension caused by decedent's congenital condition was supplemented and exacerbated by occupational tensions and that the heightened hypertension caused by this combination brought about the arteriosclerotic condition.

The Board by a vote of four to three denied Mrs. Strumsky's application for a service-connected death allowance. Her request for a rehearing was denied, and she thereupon sought review of the decision by administrative mandate. (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5.) The trial court denied the writ, finding that 'the findings of respondent Board are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.' The court also made the following supplemental finding of fact: '7. That the Court, if this were a case in which the Court was authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, would find that the death of the decedent safety member Richard D. Strumsky was service-connected in nature.'

The court thus concluded that there was no prejudicial abuse of discretion committed by the Board and that the alternative writ of mandate theretofore issued should be discharged and the petition for the peremptory writ denied. Judgment was entered accordingly. This appeal followed.

II

In Bixby v. Pierno, Supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, at pages 144--147, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242, we explained the considerations which counsel in favor of fuller judicial review in cases involving vested, fundamental rights. The essence to be distilled is this: When an administrative decision affects a right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise 'vested,' and when that right is of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its 'effect . . . in human terms and the importance . . . to the individual in the life situation,' then a full and independent Judicial review of that decision is indicated because '(t)he abrogation of the right is too important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive administrative extinction.' (Id. at p. 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. at p. 244, 481 P.2d at p. 252.)

This reasoning, of course, applies with equal force to all administrative decisions of an adjudicatory ² nature--regardless of the administrative agency involved. It has been held inapplicable, however, in the case of agencies which fall into two categories. The first of these categories is comprised of agencies of constitutional origin which have been granted limited judicial power by the Constitution itself. (See, for example, Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 234 P.2d 981; Covert v. State Board of Equalization (1946) 29 Cal.2d 125, 173 P.2d 545; Ishimatsu v. Regents of University of California (1...