Strunk v. Hahn
| Decision Date | 20 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 16305,AFL-CI,L,No. 753,P,753,16305 |
| Citation | 797 S.W.2d 536 |
| Parties | 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2185 Russell STRUNK and Dean Moore, Individually and as officers, Agents, and Representatives of a Class Consisting of the Membership of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,ocal Unionlaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joseph L. HAHN, Rebecca G. James, Patsy Northcutt, Nancy Fox, Rose Gambon, Barbara Johnson, Sharon Sue Truitt, and Fran Albright, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Douglas W. Greene, III, Montgomery, Twibell, Upp & Greene, Springfield, James G. Walsh, Jr., Jolley, Walsh, Hager & Gordon, Kansas City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald W. Jones, Hulston, Jones & Sullivan, John C. Scully, Rossie D. Alston, Jr., National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Springfield, for defendants-respondents.
Appellant (hereafter Union) 1 brought this action against respondents seeking to recover from each respondent a monthly service charge 2 equal to the regular monthly dues of union members. Respondents are employees of a public body; namely, the Board of Public Utilities of the City of Springfield (herein called Board of Utilities). The Union is the certified bargaining representative of all Office Unit and all Physical Unit employees of the Board of Utilities. Respondents are not members of the Union but are employed in the two bargaining units represented by Local 753. 3 Summary judgment motions were filed by the Union and by respondents. The trial court sustained respondents' summary judgment motion, overruled the Union's summary judgment motion and pursuant to Rule 74.01(b) 4, ruled the judgment to be final and appealable. The Union appeals from that judgment. This court affirms.
No specific reason was assigned by the trial court for its decision. 5 In this court tried case, the primary concern of the appellate court is the correctness of the result that is reached. Randel v. McClanahan, 760 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Mo.App.1988). This court is to sustain the judgment if the result reached was correct on any tenable basis. Broadstreets, Inc. v. Shippee, 695 Initially, the Union filed a lawsuit naming Pat C. Cepowski and Joseph L. Hahn as defendants in Greene County Circuit Court case number CV186-401-CC4. 6 A second lawsuit was filed and given case number CV186-750-CC2 naming employees in the Office Unit as defendants. The two cases were consolidated on December 11, 1986. A first amended petition filed May 11, 1987, contains a caption which continued to name Cepowski and Hahn as defendants. 7 A reading of the first amended petition reveals no allegations directed toward defendants Cepowski and Hahn. The prayer for relief in the first amended petition seeks no relief against them. As such, the petition fails to state a cause of action against Cepowski and Hahn. To commence a lawsuit (or to continue a lawsuit against parties initially named), requires the filing of a petition. Rule 55.01. While each averment of a pleading is to be simple, concise and direct with no technical forms of pleading being required, Rule 55.04, a pleading does have to contain (1) a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Rule 55.05. In the record before this court, there is no petition or other pleading showing that the Union is entitled to relief as against Cepowski and Hahn. From all that appears in this record, the claims against Cepowski and Hahn were abandoned. Appellants' statement of facts asserts that respondents were employed in two bargaining units, although they were not members of the Union. The brief also sets forth parts of the "Joint Statement of Intent" for both bargaining units; namely, the Physical Unit and the Office Unit. The motion for summary judgment filed by the Union and the supporting affidavits make no reference to Cepowski and Hahn. Accordingly, this court affirms the trial court's summary judgment in so far as it relates to any purported claim by plaintiffs against Cepowski and Hahn because, from the record before this court, there was no pleading showing the Union was entitled to relief and no demand for judgment for relief. Rule 55.05.
S.W.2d 521, 522 (Mo.App.1985); David v. Shippy, 684 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Mo.App.1985).
The law review comment 8 "[t]hat private sector [labor law] precedent is not automatically transferable to the public sector, and ... what is legal under Taft-Hartley in a General Motors plant is not necessarily legal under state public employee labor legislation in public institutions" is as true today as when the comment was made in 1971. The statutes granting bargaining rights, of a sort, to public employees have been noted as having a "long and tortuous history." State ex rel. Bd. of Pub. Utilities v. Crow, 592 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo.App.1979). In City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1252, 206 S.W.2d 539, 546 (banc 1947), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the City of Springfield could not make collective bargaining contracts covering wages, hours and working conditions with labor unions representing its employees. The court held that public employees had the constitutionally protected right to peaceably assemble and present their views to any public officer or legislative body concerning their pay and working conditions, but such rights were not to be confused with or equated to collective bargaining as that term is usually understood in the private sector. See Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo.banc 1982). Further development of the Public Sector Labor Law in Missouri occurred after the City of Springfield adopted its own charter on March 17, 1953, in accordance with the provisions of MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1945).
After that charter was adopted, a declaratory judgment was sought as to whether unions could enter into collective bargaining agreements with the Board of Utilities relating to wages, hours and working conditions of the Board of Utilities' employees. The Missouri Supreme Court in Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Mo.banc 1958), followed Clouse, saying:
[Section] 29, Art. I, Constitution, does not confer any collective bargaining rights upon public officers or employees in their relations with municipal government.... [U]nder the present charter of the city the whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions in the city's public utilities involves the exercise of legislative powers and cannot become a matter of bargaining and contract. 9
The first Public Sector Labor Law was enacted in 1965 and substantially amended in 1967. 10 Early interpretation of the law concluded that:
[T]his act does not purport to give to public employees the same rights to union activities as those enjoyed by employees in private industry....
State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Mo.1969). In examining the history of Public Sector Labor Law in Missouri, a subtle but significant difference is noted between the 1965 legislation and the 1967 legislation. Section 105.520, RSMo 1965 Supp., read:
Any public body may engage in negotiations relative to salaries and other conditions of employment of the public body employees, with labor organizations. Upon the completion of negotiations the results will be reduced to writing and presented to the governing or legislative body in the form of an ordinance or resolution for appropriate action. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the 1965 legislation, in using the term "negotiations," used a term commonly used in the private sector of employer-labor relations.
The 1967 legislation seemed to take a step backward when it retreated from the word "negotiations" and, in lieu thereof, mandated that the "public body ... shall meet, confer and discuss such proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment...." Section 105.520 RSMo, 1967 Supp. Thus, the 1967 legislation (and indeed the legislation now in effect) goes no further than to codify constitutional rights; i.e., the constitutional right of all citizens, including public employees, to "peaceably assemble and organize for any proper purpose, to speak freely and to present their views and desires to any public officer or legislative body" as enunciated in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. at 1246, 206 S.W.2d at 542. Curators Finally, in Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 12 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the City of Moberly was not authorized to enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with a public employee labor organization and, thus, even after a city enacts an ordinance adopting the provisions of a memorandum of understanding with the union, the city could unilaterally change the ordinance (and hence the terms and conditions of employment) without prior union approval. "We hold only that this ordinance did not result in a collective bargaining contract which could be changed only with union approval." Sumpter, at 363 n. 4. Sumpter v. City of Moberly did not hold that the legislative action taken upon receipt of the written results of the discussions had no binding effect, but rather held that "[t]he ordinance, just as any city ordinance, governs and is binding until changed by appropriate action." Sumpter, at 363 n. 4.
of Univ. of Mo. v. Public Serv. Emp. Loc. No. 45, 520 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Mo.banc 1975); 11 State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, supra, at 41
The foregoing review of the history of Public Sector Labor Law in Missouri is necessary, in part, because perusal of the record in this case shows that the following was not placed in evidence: (a) Joint Statement of Intent which both parties agree was the foundation of the Union's claim, and (b) any evidence that...
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