Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 December 1951 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STRYKER v. REPUBLIC PICTURES CORPORATION et al. Civ. 18256. |
David J. Sachs, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Loeb & Loeb, Los Angeles, Herman F. Selvin, Los Angeles, of counsel, for respondents.
The problem posed by this case is whether a general and special demurrer to the complaint was or was not rightly sustained. The demurrer was sustained with leave to the plaintiff to amend, but plaintiff elected not to amend on the theory that none of the grounds set forth in the demurrer were well taken. The question at issue is not primarily one of the law of privacy, as plaintiff would have us believe, but rather one of the law of pleading, based upon rules of law inherent in the substantive law of privacy. If, in the case before us, the plaintiff has in fact a perfectly good cause of action under the law for violation of his right of privacy we cannot assume he has any such right or cause of action based thereon unless his complaint sets it forth in a manner not vulunerable to a demurrer.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff Louis B. Stryker, as a member of the marine corps, participated in the invasion and occupation of Iwo Jima in 1945 against the Japanese who at the time held the island; that at that time the plaintiff was a staff sergeant and was generally known among the invading forces as 'Sergeant Stryker.' The complaint goes on to aver that subsequent thereto, in the year 1949, the defendant produced a motion picture play entitled the 'Sands of Iwo Jima' which it caused to be exhibited throughout the United States and elsewhere for defendants' personal gain; that the picture depicts, in part actual facts and occurrences, and in part is based on fiction; that the picture reenacts and depicts certain incidents, circumstances and conditions encountered by the plaintiff Stryker, while he was serving as an enlisted man in the marine corps in its campaigns against the Japanese army in World War II on the islands of Iwo Jima and Guadalcanal; that the defendants advertised that the motion picture reenacted certain incidents of the life and activities of the plaintiff. The complaint proceeds to allege that the defendants did not consult with the plaintiff or at any time seek or obtain his consent or permission to use any portion of his past life, activities or name as a theme for publication or exploitation; that at no time had plaintiff given his consent to defendants, or any other persons, to use his past life, activities or name as a plot for the said or any other motion picture photoplay; that as a direct result of the unauthorized and wrongful producing, showing and exhibiting of said motion picture photoplay, and the consequent violation of the right of privacy of the plaintiff, the said plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $150,000.00.
It will be noted from the allegations of the complaint that it is based on the theory first, that plaintiff's actual activities as a member of the marine corps could not be publicized at all as they invaded his rights of privacy as an individual and secondly, that the activities ascribed to him, whether based on fiction or on fact, likewise invaded his right of privacy under the law. In short, the plaintiff rests his cause of action on the theory that the mere use of his name along with a reenactment of a part of his life history, in part real and in part fictionalized for private gain, ipso facto, without more, spells out an invasion of his right of privacy.
The special demurrer to the complaint sought to elicit from the plaintiff to what extent, if any, the plaintiff claimed that the picture represented fictitious activities, on his part, rather than his actual activities. This request on the part of the demurring party defendant it seems plain should have been supplied by him unless he is correct in his contention that none of his activities as a sergeant of the marine corps were subject to publication by way of a motion picture on the theory it invaded his rights of privacy.
The so-called independent right of privacy which is recognized in this state is not an absolute right 'to be let alone' and to live one's life in utter privacy freed at all times from the prying eyes of the public or of a public recountal of the facts thereof. The right of the individual to privacy of his 'private' life is a limited right in that it is always subject to the right of the public to a disclosure thereof where there is a proper warranted public interest as to the facts of his life. The dividing line between the individual right and the so-called public right is not easily drawn and must be determined in every instance by the facts of each case. The general test, in large measure, is whether the public interest in obtaining or having disclosed to it the information outweighs the protection of the individual's personal interest and desires. See 48 Col.L.Rev. 713, 717. Accordingly, it is well established in this state that the so-called right of privacy to borrow apt language from Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 806 at page 809, permits 'limited scrutiny of the 'private' life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a 'public figure." See also, Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2d 304, 95 P.2d 491; Rest., Torts, § 867, comment d.
In the complaint before us as has been stated it is alleged that the plaintiff was a sergeant in the marine corps. We think that men who are called to the colors subject their activities in that particular field to the public gaze and may not contend that in the discharge of such activities their actions may not be publicized. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind.App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306, 88 N.E.2d 55, 14 A.L.R.2d 743. This does not imply that their personal activities, unrelated to their activities in defense of the colors are necessarily open to public gaze. A politician running for public office, in effect offers his public and private life for perusal so far as it affects his bid for office. Not so a man called to the colors. The distinction...
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...publicity. Indeed, the inapplicability of New York's law to this jurisdiction has already been noted. (Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp. (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 191, 196, 238 P.2d 670. Cf. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 281, 239 P.2d 630.) Finally, I disagree with thos......
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