Strynar v. Rahill

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Strynar v. Rahill, 793 A.2d 206 (R.I. 2002)
• Decision Date: 28 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-247-Appeal.,2000-247-Appeal.
• Parties: Irving A. STRYNAR v. Jack RAHILL, Treasurer for the City of Pawtucket et al.

793 A.2d 206

Irving A. STRYNAR v. Jack RAHILL, Treasurer for the City of Pawtucket et al.

No. 2000-247-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 28, 2002.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and FLANDERS, JJ.

Marybeth Holland O'Hearn/Robert D. Goldberg, Pawtucket, for Plaintiff.

Frank J. Milos, Jr./Dean J. Wagner/Michael F. Horan, Pawtucket, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This appeal challenges the exclusivity of the statutory injured-on-duty (IOD) scheme for compensating municipal police officers who become incapacitated in the course of their employment. The plaintiff, Irving A. Strynar, a former detective with the City of Pawtucket's (city) Police Department, appeals from a Superior Court order granting a motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The plaintiff apparently suffered from "severe emotional distress," which he alleged constituted a "work-related injury." He averred that defendants, who include the city's treasurer, police chief, and other municipal officials, improperly delayed in granting him his request for IOD benefits. As a result, he alleged, defendants forced him to use vacation and sick time, for which they did not credit him upon his eventual receipt of IOD benefits. In due course, defendants sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. General Laws 1956chapter 19 of title 45 (the IOD statute), they argued, provides the exclusive remedy for municipal police officers who have alleged an incapacity to work because of an injury suffered in the line of duty. The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, a single justice of this Court ordered the parties to show cause why we should not decide this case summarily. Because the parties have not done so, we proceed to decide the appeal at this time. In Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 260 (R.I.1996), this Court held that, with respect to work-related personal-injury claims, the IOD statute provides the exclusive remedy for municipal police officers seeking redress from their municipal employers, fellow officers, supervisors, and other municipal officers. The plaintiff argues that defendants are not immune from a civil action under Kaya because their alleged misconduct against him was intentional. He suggests that this Court's holding in Kaya only applies to negligence actions, but not to actions such as this one that are based upon alleged intentional misconduct. The defendants respond that, according to Kaya, the IOD statute provides the exclusive remedy for municipal police officers with respect to all work-related personal-injury claims against their superiors and other municipal officers — including claims for intentional misconduct — and that, therefore, any civil action seeking common-law remedies against such defendants for this type of alleged misconduct is barred.

We are of the opinion that Kaya controls the outcome of this appeal. In Kaya, a police officer filed suit against the city and other municipal officers for injuries he suffered in the course of his employment. He alleged that the defendants acted "negligently, willfully, and intentionally" in failing to provide him with the proper riot gear when his superior officer dispatched him to disperse an unruly crowd. Kaya, 68 A.2d at 258. This Court concluded that the IOD statute was intended to provide the exclusive remedy for claims against the police officer's employer, fellow officers, superior officers, andofficers of the municipal corporation. Id. at 260. Thus, under Kaya, the exclusivity of the statutory IOD remedy also applies to claims of intentional misconduct.

The plaintiff next contends that the IOD statute violates the federal and state constitutions because it does not give police officers an "opt out provision" such as the one that is available to employees under workers' compensation law. See G.L. 1956 § 28-29-17. Contrary to defendants' assertion, however, the record shows that, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11, plaintiff provided notice to the attorney general of these proceedings. Nevertheless, the only state constitutional provision that plaintiff cites is article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution, guaranteeing "a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one's person." The plaintiff argues that, without an "opt out provision," the IOD statute violates this provision. Here, however, with respect to a limited class of defendants (municipalities, fellow police officers, superiors, and municipal officials), the IOD statute provides municipal police officers with a certain remedy, available under law, for all the work-related personal injuries and wrongs that municipal police officers may suffer that incapacitates them for police work. Although the IOD statute provides an alternative remedy to the common-law claims that otherwise would arise out of such injuries — even though in some respects it may not afford as desirable or as complete a remedy to the incapacitated police officer as the common law might allow — it is no less a certain remedy, available under law, for all the injuries and wrongs that it covers. Therefore, the IOD statute does not violate article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution.

Furthermore, because plaintiff does not specify how the IOD statute allegedly violated his due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — much less set forth his reasoning in support of this constitutional claim — we are unable to address this asserted erroron the merits. By failing to brief this assertion properly, he has waived that specification of error. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. The State Crime Laboratory Commission, 788 A.2d 1129, 1132 n. 1 (R.I.2002).

The plaintiff's next contention is that the motion justice should have treated the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as one for summary judgment because the parties presented evidentiary matters to the court that were not contained within the pleadings. The plaintiff also asserts that the court erred in fully dismissing his complaint because the defendants had only moved for a partial dismissal. This Court applies the same legal standard as the trial justice when reviewing the grant or denial of a Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I.2000). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will only be granted `when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim.'" Id. (quoting Bruno v. Criterion Holdings, Inc., 736 A.2d 99, 99 (R.I.1999) and Folan v. State, 723 A.2d 287, 289 (R.I.1999)). A dismissal motion that relies on evidence outside of the pleadings, however, must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 298-99 (R.I.2001).

Contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, however, the motion justice granted the defendants' ...