Stuart's Heirs v. Coalter

• Decision Date: 07 February 1826
• Citation: 25 Va. 74
• Parties: Stuart's Heirs, & c. v. Coalter
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

25 Va. 74

Stuart's Heirs, & c. v. Coalter

Supreme Court of Virginia

February 7, 1826

[Syllabus Material]

This was an appeal from the Staunton Chancery Court, where Thomas S. Coalter, filed his bill against Robert Stuart, Reuben Withers, John Coalter, Francis Adair, William Adair, James Adair, and John Adair. The case stated is briefly as follows The land in question was owned by the heirs of John Switzer who sold it to John Coalter, the brother of the complainant. A conveyance was made by some of the heirs to John Coalter, but the others had never parted with the legal estate. The bill, however, states, that all the heirs either have made, or are ready to make, a conveyance at any time. It also alleges, that although the contract was made solely in the name of the said John Coalter, and the title papers taken in his name, yet the purchase was for the benefit of the complainant, as well as the said John: that the complainant has been put into peaceable possession of his undivided part of the said land, his right to which is not contested by his brother; that he has since discovered that a part of the boundary is disputed by some of the coterminous tenant, viz: Stuart, Withers, and the representatives of Adair: that the complainant wishes to obtain a partition of the said land with his brother; but this cannot be effected, in consequence of the uncertainty produced by this contest of the boundary: that he also wishes to have the question of boundary settled, but he has not the legal estate, by which he could go into a Court of a Law, and if he had, it would require a multiplicity of suits to settle all the questions. He therefore prays, that the true boundary may be settled and adjusted; that he may be quieted in his possession within that true boundary; and that a partition may be made, between the complainant and his brother.

The representatives of Adair answered, contending that their boundary line was the true one; and John Coalter acknowledged that the contract, though made in his name, was principally for the benefit of Thomas S. Coalter; and declared his willingness to make partition with the complainant.

The Chancellor decided in favor of the complainant, and the defendants appealed to this Court.

Decree reversed.

Wickham, for the appellants, made four points:

1. The bill is nothing more than an ejectment brought in a Court of Chancery. It is not competent for a person having an equitable title, to sue in equity one who holds an adversary title, asserting the legal title in his trustee.

2. The appellee has not only brought one ejectment in equity, but he has brought several ejectments in one suit, for distinct tracts of land, held by distinct titles.

3. If such a suit could be maintained, it must be on averment and proof, that the trustee refused to bring an ejectment, in his own name. But here, there is no such averment or proof. The trustee never objected to assert his legal title.

4. The Switzers are not before the Court. They claim a part of the legal title, and ought to be made parties.

Leigh and Johnson, for the appellee.

The jurisdiction may be sustained on two grounds:

1. The plaintiff comes with an equitable title, which could not be asserted in a Court of Law. The assignee of a bond could bring a suit in equity before our Statute; yet, he might have called on the legal owner to bring a suit against the obligor. A cestui que trust may injoin an execution against his trustee, in a suit brought by a third person; and he is not required to use the name of the trustee.

The object in coming into this Court, was, to ascertain what the subject was to be divided. Tenants in common have an original right to go into a Court of Equity for partition.

2. On the ground of a bill of peace, the appellee had a right to resort to equity. Mitf. 127. Lord Tenham v. HerbertAtk. 484. Mayor of York v. Pilkington & al. 1 Atk. 282.

It is objected, that Switzer's heirs ought to have been parties. If this objection were just, the only consequence would be, that the cause must be sent back, to have them made parties. But it was not necessary. They have sold their interest, and have nothing to claim.

JUDGE CARR. JUDGE GREEN. JUDGE COALTER. JUDGE CABELL was of opinion that the decree should be reversed; which was entered as the decree of the Court.

OPINION

JUDGE CARR

The Judges delivered their opinions. ^[*]

JUDGE CARR.

The bill states, that John Switzer died intestate, seised and possessed of a tract of land within the Beverley manor, in the county of Augusta: that the heirs of said Switzer entered upon the said land, and remained in possession thereof, until a few years since, when they sold it to a certain John Coalter, a brother of the plaintiff's: that some of the heirs made a deed to the said John, (which is exhibited,) and the others have either executed deeds, or are ready to do so at any time: that although the contract was made with the heirs by the said John, and the conveyances taken to him, the purchase was for the benefit of the plaintiff, as well as the said John: that accordingly, the plaintiff has been put into possession of his undivided part of the said land, his right to which is not disputed by his brother: that since the purchase, the plaintiff has had the land surveyed, a plat of which is exhibited: that this plat, as he believes, correctly describes the boundaries of the land; but he discovers, that a part of the boundary is controverted by some of the coterminous tenants, to wit: Robert Stuart, Reuben Withers and the heirs and devisees of Neil Adair: that the plaintiff is desirous of making partition with his brother, but cannot, because of the uncertainty caused by this dispute about the boundary: that he is anxious also, to have the question of boundary settled, but not having the legal title, cannot go into a Court of Law; and if he could, it would require a multiplicity of actions. He therefore prays, that his brother John, and the coterminous tenants, may be made defendants: that the true boundary of the land may be settled: that the defendants be compelled to deliver to him any land within the boundary, of which they may be found in possession; and that partition be decreed between himself and his brother.

The defendant John Coalter answers, stating that his interest in the land is one seventh part: that he wishes a partition: is ready to convey, & c.

The coterminous tenants answer, shewing various objections to the plat, and pretensions of the plaintiff; deducing their titles, which seem entirely distinct, and unconnected with each other; and each one contending for his lines, as heretofore established and understood.

Evidence was taken, surveys had; and the Chancellor, on hearing, established certain lines; from which decree, the appeal is taken.

It was contended in the argument, that this was a case, of which equity had no jurisdiction. This question will of course be considered first, as jurisdiction precedes discretion; and before we undertake to decide what ought to be done in a cause, we should always ascertain whether we can rightfully do any thing. I will not quote authorities to shew, that where a general demurrer would hold to a bill, the Court, though the defendant answers, will not grant relief upon the hearing of the cause. The doctrine is too well settled. To deny it, would be to say, that however unfit the cause for equity, the defendant, by failing to demur, could oblige the Court to entertain jurisdiction. Nor can I conceive, that in deciding the question of jurisdiction, we should be influenced at all by the case made by the evidence. It is the province of the bill to state the case. It is from this we must judge. If the evidence fit the case stated in the bill, it could of course have no influence. If it made a different case, so far from giving jurisdiction where the bill did not, it would prevent a decree, where the bill was perfect; for the allegation and the proof must " jump together."

The bill places the jurisdiction on three grounds: 1. That the plaintiff wants partition, and cannot have it without the aid of equity. 2. That there is a trust between the plaintiff and his brother, who has the legal estate; which the plaintiff not having, cannot try the question of boundary, at law. 3. That if he could, there must be a multiplicity of suits, to avoid which, equity takes jurisdiction.

I will first shew, from authority, the general rule, that equity cannot hold plea of land titles; and then enquire, whether the plaintiff's case falls within, or is taken out of, that rule.

In Welby, appellant, v. The Duke of Rutland, respondent, 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 575, the bill charged, that the plaintiff and those under whom he claimed, had been in possession of the manor of Denton, for more than one hundred years: that the defendant had set up a claim to it, and exercised several acts of ownership, which might hereafter bring a cloud upon the plaintiff's estate, and prevent his selling it. The bill therefore prayed, that the defendant might set forth his claim, and produce his title papers: that the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses might be perpetuated, and proper issues directed to try the defendant's claim to the minor, & c. The defendant pleaded and answered. The case was heard and dismissed by Lord Chancellor Apsley; and on appeal to Parliament, the appeal was dismissed, and the decree affirmed. In the discussion of the case, the law on the subject was laid down in the clearest and stongest manner. It was said, " the general practice of Courts of Equity, in not entertaining suits for establishing legal titles, before they have been tried at law, is founded upon clear reasons; and the departing from that practice, then there is no...