Stuart v. Gagnon
| Decision Date | 17 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-C-42.,84-C-42. |
| Citation | 614 F. Supp. 247 |
| Parties | Earl S. STUART, Jr., Petitioner, v. John R. GAGNON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Steven P. Weiss, Asst. State Public Defender, Madison, Wis., for petitioner.
Jerome S. Schmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Earl S. Stuart, Jr., for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Stuart contends that he was denied due process of law during his trial for armed robbery in 1980. Since the Court does not agree with the petitioner's claim that the actions of the district attorney and trial court deprived him of his right to a fair trial, the Court will deny his petition.
On the evening of October 14, 1979, three disguised, armed men robbed Lee's Drug Store in Glenwood City, Wisconsin. The owner of the pharmacy, Charles Rasmussen, did not recognize any of the robbers. Rasmussen's daughter identified one of the robbers, who had held a shotgun to her back during the episode, as being Robert Weed. LaDonna Christianson, a store employee, identified Richard Verduzco as the robber who carried the shotgun. Verduzco and Fred Weed, Robert Weed's younger brother, were identified by Roger Kelm, a customer who entered the store during the robbery. Like Christianson, Kelm believed that Verduzco was the man who wielded the shotgun during the robbery. Two other persons present during the robbery, Dr. Phil Limberg and Patricia Voeltz, were unable to identify any of the robbers. The robbers fled the scene after taking both money and drugs from the store.
On October 27, 1979, the petitioner was seen placing an object in the garbage dumpster behind a Burger King restaurant in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The police were called and retrieved the discarded object — a gun. Stuart admitted placing the gun in the dumpster but stated that he did so as a favor to Fred Weed.
Soon after the investigation into the drug store robbery had begun, Fred Weed agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials in exchange for not being prosecuted for the robbery. Due to the information provided by Fred Weed, Robert Weed and the petitioner were charged with the robbery.
Thereafter, Robert Weed entered into a plea agreement with the District Attorney of St. Croix (Wisconsin) County, Eric J. Lundell, in exchange for a specific sentence recommendation. Their agreement subsequently was rejected by the Circuit Court of St. Croix County, and Robert Weed's confession was suppressed. The district attorney then requested and obtained immunity for Robert Weed in order to use his statements as evidence against Stuart.
Richard Verduzco was never arrested nor questioned about the drug store robbery. Although he initially was charged with the crime, the charges were dropped when the district attorney determined that Robert Weed had been the man holding the shotgun during the robbery, not Verduzco.
Due to the immunity given to Fred and Robert Weed, the petitioner was the only person tried for the drug store robbery. The primary evidence introduced against him was the testimony of the Weed brothers that Stuart was the third robber in addition to themselves. The State also introduced the testimony of Esther Drinkman, who stated that she had seen Stuart leaving a farm on the night of the robbery. According to the Weed brothers, the robbers had abandoned their car at that farm after the crime. Drinkman's testimony differed significantly, however, from that she had given at the preliminary hearing, particularly with respect to the number of cars she had seen leaving the farm.
In his defense, the petitioner sought to introduce two matters into evidence to demonstrate that he did not participate in the robbery and that either Verduzco or Donald Bell, a former partner of the Weeds in other criminal ventures, had. First, Stuart sought to admit the results of a polygraph test he had taken which indicated that he was being truthful when he denied robbing the drug store. Second, Stuart sought to obtain immunity for Bell, who had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about this crime.
The trial court refused to admit the polygraph evidence because the district attorney had not signed a stipulation to admit the results of the test. The trial court also refused to grant immunity to Bell, but allowed him to appear as a defense witness and plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when asked about the crime.
The trial concluded on June 26, 1980, following which the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to thirteen (13) years imprisonment. On May 20, 1981, the petitioner filed a post-conviction motion raising certain issues concerning his conviction and sentence. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 26, 1981, and, on November 10, 1981, the court entered a written order denying the post-conviction motion. The court's decision was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and review of that decision was denied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
At the June 26, 1981 hearing on petitioner's post-conviction motion, District Attorney Lundell and defense counsel testified concerning the latter's proposals for a stipulation for the admission of the polygraph results and for a grant of immunity for defense witness Bell. With respect to the polygraph, the district attorney testified that the polygraph examination was originally his idea. Both Lundell and defense counsel testified, however, that neither party wished to enter into a stipulation prior to the examination because they had agreed that the purpose of the test was to facilitate evaluation of the case against Stuart and to provide leverage for a possible plea bargain. The first request for a stipulation to admit the test results came after the test was completed.
The district attorney gave the following reasons for refusing to stipulate to the admission of the test results: (1) the stipulation was requested only after the test had been taken; (2) the State had not participated in selecting the examiner or drafting the questions used; (3) he believed that Stuart was "polygraph-proof," i.e., that Stuart knew certain tricks that would prevent detection of any lies he told; (4) Stuart was a convicted felon, and therefore not entitled to much credibility; and (5) he was convinced that Stuart had committed the crime, and any test indicating otherwise would be specious. Although defense counsel suggested the possibility of a second examination, hoping to resolve some of the objections to the first test, the district attorney did not follow up on the proposal.
With respect to the Bell immunity matter, the district attorney stated that he refused to request immunity for Bell because the district attorney had obtained from Bell a signed statement denying his involvement in the crime. The district attorney also testified that there was no evidence linking Bell to the crime, and that Bell did not fit the physical description of any of the robbers described by the witnesses.
Finally, as an explanation of why he did seek immunity for the Weed brothers in order to secure his case against Stuart, the district attorney testified as follows:
The petitioner claims that the district attorney's decisions to seek immunity for the Weed brothers, not to request immunity for Bell, and to refuse to stipulate to the admissibility of the polygraph results were tactical determinations which denied Stuart his right to a fair trial. The petitioner further claims that, given the improper nature of the district attorney's decisions, the trial court had a duty to ensure a fair trial by doing any or all of the following: (1) admitting the polygraph results; (2) granting immunity sua sponte to Bell; (3) denying the district attorney's motion for immunity for the Weed brothers; and (4) intervening in the district attorney's decision not to charge Verduzco.
Conversely, the respondent contends that the explanations advanced by the district attorney demonstrate that he acted well within the parameters of his discretionary authority. The respondent also claims that the trial court was neither obligated nor empowered to override those decisions. For the following reasons, the Court must reject the petitioner's arguments and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
A defendant in a criminal trial has a fundamental right to a fair opportunity to defend against the charges brought against him. This "fair opportunity to defend" is the essence of the concept of due process of law, some elements of which are the right to call witnesses in one's behalf, the right to examine adverse witnesses, and the right to assistance of counsel. Chambers v. Mississippi, ...
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