Stubbs v. Abel

• Decision Date: 02 June 1925
• Citation: 114 Or. 610,236 P. 505
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Parties: EDITH W. STUBBS, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. W. H. ABEL, HILDA WILLIAMS, AND BEN HUR LAMPMAN, ADMINISTRATOR WITH THE WILL ANNEXED OF THE ESTATE OF CLAIRE S. WILLIAMS, DECEASED, AND CLARENCE A. BEAN, SUBSTITUTED FOR DEFENDANT LINNIE SMITH, AND ALFRED C. ANDERSON, CARRIE G. ANDERSON, AND FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOQUIAM, WASHINGTON, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS, AND RICHARD C. WILLIAMS AND VERA WILLIAMS, HIS WIFE, SECURITY SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY, OF PORTLAND, A CORPORATION, CHANSLOR & LYON, A CORPORATION, AND QUIMBY & WILSON, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

236 P. 505

114 Or. 610

EDITH W. STUBBS, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. W. H. ABEL, HILDA WILLIAMS, AND BEN HUR LAMPMAN, ADMINISTRATOR WITH THE WILL ANNEXED OF THE ESTATE OF CLAIRE S. WILLIAMS, DECEASED, AND CLARENCE A. BEAN, SUBSTITUTED FOR DEFENDANT LINNIE SMITH, AND ALFRED C. ANDERSON, CARRIE G. ANDERSON, AND FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOQUIAM, WASHINGTON, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS, AND RICHARD C. WILLIAMS AND VERA WILLIAMS, HIS WIFE, SECURITY SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY, OF PORTLAND, A CORPORATION, CHANSLOR & LYON, A CORPORATION, AND QUIMBY & WILSON, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

Supreme Court of Oregon

June 2, 1925

In Banc.

On petition for rehearing.

For original opinion, see 233 P. 852.

Welsh & Welsh, of South Bend, Wash., and Stephen J Chadwick, of Seattle, Wash. (Harris, Smith & Bryson and Charles A. Hardy, all of Eugene, of counsel), for petitioner W. H. Abel.

Jay Bowerman, of Portland, for Hilda Williams and Ben Hur Lampman.

BROWN J.

W. H Abel, Hilda Williams, and Ben Hur Lampman have filed a petition for a rehearing of the above cause. This is a partition suit involving the construction of the will of Richard W. Williams, deceased, in so far as it pertains to the title of the property sought by the suit to be divided. For a statement of the pertinent facts and our conclusions therefrom, see our opinion filed February 24, 1925, reported in 233 P. 852, wherein we held that the testator, by his will, in language that ought not to be misunderstood, devised to Richard C. Williams and Claire S. Williams one-half of the real property involved in this suit, "subject, however to such disposition as I may hereafter make of any portion thereof."

Clearly the testator's disposition of that property is consistent with a defeasible fee in Claire S. Williams, as provided by subsequent clause in the will.

In their brief in support of their petition for rehearing the petitioners say, among other things:

"The opinion and decision of the court does not make it clear * * * that the language used in clauses 6 and 7 will have no application to the real property devised under the second clause of the will. While this property is not included in the subject-matter of the suit, expressions used in the opinion are of such general character that it might be claimed that a rule of property is established by the decision as the same now stands; it is therefore important that any final decision

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