Stuck v. Aikens

• Decision Date: 22 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. S90-409.,S90-409.
• Citation: 760 F. Supp. 740
• Parties: Fred C. STUCK, Plaintiff, v. James E. AIKENS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

760 F. Supp. 740

Fred C. STUCK, Plaintiff, v. James E. AIKENS, et al., Defendants.

No. S90-409.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

February 22, 1991.

Fred C. Stuck, pro se.

David A. Arthur, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

An inmate contends that his transfer, through no fault of his own, to a prison with greater security and restrictions violated his constitutional rights. The various state and prison officials that he has sued have moved for dismissal or summary judgment. The plaintiff has filed his response, supporting affidavit, and exhibits in opposition to the motion. As per its order of October 25, 1990, this court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment as a matter of law.

I.

Plaintiff Fred Stuck is an inmate at the Indiana State Prison ("ISP"), serving a life sentence for second degree murder. In July, 1990, he was assigned to the K Dormitory, now known as the Lakeside Correctional Unit ("LCU"), which is located outside of the walls of the ISP and is a Security Level 2 Unit.

Mr. Stuck alleges that his assignment to K dormitory was a "minimum" security classification, but because he was confined, his assignment could not have been "minimum security" within the meaning of Indiana statutes.¹ He contends, however, that his assignment afforded him the following privileges: "more frequent visits than the general population, extra phone calls, the opportunity to earn extra money, temporary leave away from prison, as well as this is a position of trust which reflects favorable upon an offender when appearing for parole release consideration." The record does not confirm Mr. Stuck's portrayal of the confinement conditions at K dormitory upon his assignment to that unit.

On May 17, 1989, DOC Commissioner James Aikens issued Executive Directive # 89-20² with respect to security classifications of inmates. Attached to Executive Directive # 89-20 was a list of criteria for qualification for Security Level 2 classification.

On January 25, 1990, the DOC adopted new criteria, different from those of Executive Directive # 89-20, for assignment to LCU and other Security Level 2 assignments. The new criteria were set forth in Executive Directive # 90-1 and were to be effective February 1, 1990. As part of the newly adopted criteria, an offender must be free from ever having been convicted of "a Class B offense involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury as defined by IC XX-XX-X-XX, including the instant offense", in order to be eligible for assignment to a Security Level 2 Unit.

Pursuant to the new criteria, DOC officials reevaluated the security classification of inmates at the LCU and other Security Level 2 Units. It was determined that Mr. Stuck was no longer eligible for assignment to LCU or any other Security Level 2 Unit, and he was transferred from LCU to the main ISP facility. His Classification Hearing Summary states that the basis for transfer was, "Executive decision, sentence restriction".

II.

Mr. Stuck brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that by changing his security classification, the defendants (1) violated his right to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) discriminated against him on the basis of his being in a specific class of individuals in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sues (1) James E. Aikens, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"); (2) John Nunn, the DOC's Director of Adult Institutions; (3) Norman G. Owens, the DOC's Director of Classification; (4) Richard Clark, Superintendent at ISP; and (5) Timothy F. Todd, Unit Manager at ISP's Lakeside Correctional Unit.

In support of their summary judgment motion, the defendants submitted the affidavit of Norman Owens, a March 13, 1990 Classification Hearing Report regarding Mr. Stuck, and the Criteria for Consideration for Offender Assignment on Security Level-2, in effect at ISP between February 1, 1990 and October 1, 1990.

The defendants principally argue that Mr. Stuck had no liberty interest in maintaining his security classification. The defendants also state that Mr. Stuck's status was altered in the course of the adoption of a new classification system and not in an attempt to punish him. They note that before the change, Mr. Stuck had a security classification of "medium", not "minimum" as he asserts in his complaint. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's constitutional and statutory claims must fail as a matter of law because he has not established a legal right to procedural due process.

In response, Mr. Stuck contends that Indiana law establishes his liberty interest in a particular security classification. Specifically, he maintains that IND. CODE 11-10-1-2³, 11-10-1-3⁴, and XX-XX-X-X⁵ and Volume II of the DOC's Manual of Policies and Procedures⁶ obligated the defendants to afford him an interview and opportunity for a pre-deprivation review with his participation, before reclassifying his security status. Mr. Stuck has submitted the following materials with his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment: (1) his own affidavit; (2) Section 2-00 Custody, Security, Control of Volume II of the Manual of Policies and Procedures of the DOC, adopted August, 1974; (2) IND. CODE 11-10-1-2, 11-10-1-3, and 11-10-1-6; (3) Executive Directive # 90-1; (4) Executive Directive # 89-20; (5) Mr. Stuck's Reclassification Approval Record of February 8, 1980; and (6) letters from various individuals commending Mr. Stuck on his performance on prison work projects.

III.

A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists for trial and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Accident Ins. Co. of America, 909 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir.1990). If that showing is made and the motion's opponent would bear the burden at trial on the matter that forms the basis of the motion, the opponent must come forth with evidence to show what facts are in actual dispute. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 249, 112 L.Ed.2d 207 (1990). If he fails to do so, summary judgment is proper. Tatalovich v. City of Superior, 904 F.2d 1135, 1142 (7th Cir.1990). A genuine factual issue exists only when there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the motion's opponent. Hines v. British Steel Corp., 907 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir.1990). Summary judgment should be granted if no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the motion's opponent. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Baucher v. Eastern Indiana Production Credit Ass'n, 906 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir.1990).

The parties cannot rest on mere allegations in the pleadings, Koclanakis v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir.1990), or upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Mestayer v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins. Corp., 905 F.2d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir.1990). The court must draw any permissible inferences from the materials before it in favor of the nonmoving party, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Hanes and Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990), as long as the inferences are reasonable. Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir.1990). The non-moving party must show that the disputed fact is material, or outcome-determinative, under applicable law. Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir.1989).

A.

Mr. Stuck has not demonstrated a fact issue that would affect the defendants' entitlement to judgment on his due process claims. While he cites the court to various statutory procedures that the defendants may or may not have afforded him during their reclassification of his security assignment, those statutes and policies create no liberty interest and, therefore, afford no cause of action on his due process claim.

The Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary governmental deprivations of "life, liberty, or property." Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.1990). To demonstrate a liberty interest, however, an individual must establish that he has "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). Liberty interests deserving of constitutional protection "may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the states." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). A state may create a liberty interest by its statutes. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2540, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976); Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1465 (7th Cir.1989); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir.1982). The crucial focus is not the source of the liberty interest, but whether a person has a legitimate interest at stake. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). Although courts look to procedural guarantees granted by contract, ordinance, statute, or regulation in determining whether a property interest exists, the right to those procedural guarantees is not itself a property right. Farmer v. Lane, 864 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir.1988).

Before one can assert procedural due process...