Stuckey v. State

• Decision Date: 05 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2909,2909
• Citation: 784 A.2d 652,141 Md. App. 143
• Parties: Deante STUCKEY v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

784 A.2d 652

141 Md. App. 143

Deante STUCKEY v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 2909, Sept. Term, 2000.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

November 5, 2001.

Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Steven L. Holcomb, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Attorney General, Baltimore, and Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Attorney for Baltimore County, Towson, on the brief) for appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, SONNER, KARWACKI, ROBERT L. retired, specially assigned, JJ. DAVIS, Judge.

We are principally presented, upon this appeal, with the question of whether to overturn two manslaughter convictions which were the consequence of the reckless and wanton conduct of appellant Deante Stuckey. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found appellant not guilty of negligent driving and reckless driving and guilty of, inter alia, two counts of manslaughter by automobile, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.¹ Appellant was sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Correction for two consecutive ten year terms for manslaughter by automobile, concurrent terms of twenty years and five years for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, respectively, the sentences for possession of narcotics to run consecutive to one ten year term for manslaughter.

On this appeal, appellant asks us whether the trial court erred when it found him guilty of two counts of manslaughter by automobile after having found him not guilty of reckless driving and negligent driving. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and manslaughter by automobile.

We conclude that the court's acquittal of appellant on the reckless driving and negligent driving charges precludes a finding of guilt on the two counts of manslaughter by automobile and hence we are constrained to overturn the manslaughter convictions, obviating the need to consider the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the manslaughter convictions. We affirm appellant's convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2000, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a car driven by Irving Edlow and a car driven by appellant collided near the intersection of Smith Avenue and Maurlene Road in Baltimore County, Maryland. Edlow was killed in the accident, but his two passengers—wife, Joan, and friend, Molly Bleakman—survived. In the vehicle driven by appellant, passenger Dawn Johnson was killed, while appellant and passengers Damien Green and Tania Wise survived. Recovered from the car driven by appellant after the accident were fifty glass vials of crack cocaine and fifteen small packets of marijuana from under the "front left driver's seat on the floorboard"; a bag containing crack cocaine was found on the driver's seat.

Appellant was charged in a twenty-three count indictment with two counts of manslaughter by automobile, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, negligent driving, reckless driving, and related offenses.

Several witnesses described the events leading up to the collision. Baltimore County Police Officer Kevin Jones testified that, when he attempted to stop appellant who was driving a white Oldsmobile Intrigue in the 5800 block of Park Heights Avenue, appellant took off "at a high rate of speed." Officer Jones and an officer in a police cruiser gave chase.

Wise and Green were in the vehicle with appellant when appellant was stopped by the police. Wise testified that, when she saw a police officer behind the car, appellant "put his feet [sic] on the gas and took off" and continued to "ride the car faster, faster." Wise further testified, on direct examination, that she estimated the speed of their vehicle to be at least eighty miles per hour. Appellant changed lanes and he passed more than one dozen cars during the chase.

According to Green, appellant "was going kind of fast," as he eluded police. Despite Green's admonitions to slow down more than once, "[b]ecause [appellant] was driving fast," appellant continued to speed. While standing near the corner of Smith Avenue and Seven Mile Lane smoking a cigarette, Batina Davis observed appellant's vehicle traveling at "a high rate of speed." Davis estimated the car's speed in excess of seventy miles per hour.

Another witness, Howard Blaecman, was driving his car on Smith Avenue at the time of the chase and watched appellant's car pass him; he recalled turning to his passenger and commenting, "man, that is fast." Approximately five minutes after appellant's car passed him during the chase, Blaecman saw the same white car again at the scene of the accident.

The car that appellant was driving struck Edlow's car as Edlow was making a U-turn at the intersection of Maurlene Road and Smith Avenue. Joan Edlow testified that she did not see any cars coming as they were making the U-turn. After the collision, Wise and appellant kicked out the windshield and fled from the scene. Wise was apprehended by Officer Jones a short distance from the scene. Appellant was not apprehended until sometime later.

Baltimore County Police Officer William Pumphrey, who was qualified as an expert in traffic accident reconstruction, examined the scene and the vehicle driven by appellant. The posted speed limit on Smith Avenue, according to Officer Pumphrey, was thirty miles per hour. Unable to accurately determine the speed of either car at the time of impact, he stated that appellant had been "[g]oing at a high rate of speed." Inspection of the car driven by appellant revealed the baggie containing fifty vials of crack cocaine and fifteen small packets of marijuana on the floorboard under the driver's seat. A baggie containing crack cocaine was also found on the driver's seat.

Appellant was driving a rental car from Avis Rent-A-Car (Avis) at Baltimore-Washington International Airport. The car had been rented by Robert Hall and Howard Steptoe on February 11, 2000. Steptoe testified that, when Hall paid for the rental, he saw Hall give the keys to appellant. Thereafter, Steptoe saw appellant on at least two occasions with the car—once driving it and once standing next to it, with no one inside.

David Evans, an employee with Avis, testified that it is normal procedure that every car turned in and prepared for rental is a "quick turn around ... [in which] the car is ... regased, tires checked, fluids checked, vacuumed, windows cleaned, ashtrays emptied, all trash and everything is removed from the car." Evans further testified that the procedure includes inspection of the trunk, glove compartment, and the console area underneath the seats to reveal any property that may have been left by the previous renter. There was nothing to indicate that the procedure was not followed with the car Hall and Steptoe rented.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the trial court found appellant not guilty of the charges of reckless driving and negligent driving and guilty of the charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Also, based on appellant's recklessness, speed, and pre- and post-impact conduct, the trial court found appellant guilty of two counts of manslaughter by automobile. Additional facts will be supplied as needed in our analysis.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I

Relying on the fact that the trial court found appellant not guilty of reckless driving and not guilty of negligent driving, then finding appellant guilty of two counts of manslaughter by automobile shortly thereafter, appellant assigns error to the court's finding of guilt as to manslaughter because

[t]hese guilty verdicts cannot stand. Once the court had found [a]ppellant not guilty of negligent driving and not guilty of reckless driving, the court was precluded under: (1) Maryland common law; (2) Maryland common law double jeopardy principles; and (3) the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy principles, from finding [a]ppellant guilty of manslaughter by automobile.

Citing Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 54, 512 A.2d 358 (1986), he further posits that "inconsistent verdicts by a court in a criminal case are not ordinarily permitted as a matter of Maryland common law." He reminds us, citing Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 553, 337 A.2d 81 (1975), that, by contrast, inconsistent verdicts by juries in criminal cases are generally tolerated. Ultimately, or possibly as a backstop position, relying on Ferrell v. State, 318 Md. 235, 567 A.2d 937 (1990), double jeopardy's sibling, collateral estoppel, is offered as a bar to his two manslaughter convictions.

Of the multi-faceted assail on his manslaughter convictions, the Blockburger² test [or what has come to be known as the "required evidence" test variety of double jeopardy] appears to be the touchstone of appellant's argument. Procedurally, relief from a subsequent prosecution would be via the doctrine of autrefois acquit, normally interposed by way of a plea. Seizing upon our seemingly unconditional language that "appellant failed utterly to raise this issue [the double jeopardy claim] at the trial now under review and nothing is, therefore, preserved for appellate review," in Howell v. State, 56 Md.App. 675, 678, 468 A.2d 688, cert. denied, 299 Md. 426, 474 A.2d 218 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039, 105 S.Ct. 520, 83 L.Ed.2d 408 (1984), the State's principal argument is that the double jeopardy claim is not preserved.

In deciding whether there is merit to appellant's claim that his manslaughter convictions are barred by the findings of not...