Stuckey v. Stuckey
| Decision Date | 21 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-CA-00848-COA |
| Citation | 341 So.3d 1030 |
| Parties | Haley STUCKEY, Appellant v. Thomas STUCKEY, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN S. GRANT IV, Flowood
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW STEPHEN LOTT, Pascagoula
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.
GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In October 2014, the Jackson County Chancery Court granted Thomas and Haley Stuckey a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The chancellor adopted the parties’ written agreement for custody and property settlement, granted sole physical custody of the minor child to Haley, and granted joint legal custody of the child to both parties. Subsequently in 2018, Thomas sought modification of custody. Finding Thomas had met his burden of proving a material change in circumstances, the chancellor granted the motion.
¶2. Haley now appeals from the chancellor's judgment, arguing that the chancellor erred by (1) granting sole physical custody of the child to Thomas; (2) requiring her to pay child support; and (3) requiring her to submit to quarterly drug tests. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the chancellor's judgment.
¶3. Thomas and Haley were married on June 6, 2009. They had one child, S.S., before they separated on July 17, 2013.1 On July 24, 2013, Haley filed for a divorce from Thomas on the statutory ground of irreconcilable differences. On July 16, 2014, Thomas filed his answer and counter-claim for divorce. Thomas alleged that he was entitled to a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Alternatively, Thomas requested a divorce based on irreconcilable differences.
¶4. In October 2014, the parties agreed to divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The chancellor adopted the parties’ written agreement for custody and property settlement, granted sole physical custody of S.S. to Haley, and granted joint legal custody of the child to both parties.
¶5. In October 2017, Thomas filed a complaint for contempt, modification of custody, child support, visitation, and other relief. Thomas asserted in his complaint that material changes in circumstances that were adverse to S.S. existed, including: (1) Haley was suspected of prescription drug abuse; (2) Haley was cohabiting with her new fiancé, Adair Steelman, who was still married to another woman; (3) Steelman was potentially an alcoholic with a violent temper; (4) Haley was abusing alcohol; and (5) S.S. had numerous school absences and tardies. The parties ultimately resolved the matter, and in January 2018, the chancellor entered a final judgment reflecting such. Haley retained sole physical custody of S.S., and the parties shared joint legal custody. Thomas received additional visitation, and his child support payments were reduced from $1,031 per month to $850 per month.
¶6. In June 2018, Thomas filed another petition for contempt, modification of custody, child support, visitation, and other relief. Thomas again alleged that Haley was abusing drugs and was mentally and emotionally unstable. Thomas also alleged that Steelman—a married man who was potentially an alcoholic with a violent temper—had "angry outbursts" in the presence of S.S. In July 2018, the chancellor appointed Kimber Roten as the guardian ad litem (GAL). The chancellor also ordered both parties to submit to drug and alcohol testing and set a hearing for July 18, 2018. In the interim, Haley tested positive for suboxone
, an opioid withdrawal drug. She also admitted to the GAL that she previously had purchased drugs from friends and family without a prescription. At the hearing on July 18, Haley's attorney informed the court that she (the attorney) had a doctor's appointment that conflicted and that she did not want to proceed with the hearing without a court reporter.
¶7. The next day, July 19, 2018, Thomas requested that the chancellor grant an ex parte emergency hearing. The chancellor entered an emergency temporary custody order without notice to Haley, which granted Thomas’ request for emergency temporary physical custody of S.S. The chancellor set the matter for a hearing on August 17, 2018.
¶8. Shortly after, Haley filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to dissolve the ex parte emergency order. On August 6, 2018, the chancellor granted Haley's motion to dissolve the emergency ex parte order and reinstated the previous provisions of the divorce decree and final judgment.
¶9. On August 22, 2018, the chancellor held a temporary hearing. Haley had tested positive for a prescription medicine that she had not been prescribed. After questioning by the chancellor, Haley admitted to consuming someone else's Lortab
. The chancellor awarded Thomas temporary physical custody and terminated all child support payments. Haley was awarded visitation.
¶10. On May 21, 2019, Thomas filed a motion to suspend visitation because Haley failed to disclose her living arrangements and take the court-ordered drug tests. The chancellor suspended Haley's visitation after Thomas and the GAL expressed concern over Haley's erratic behavior. The chancellor further noted that Haley did not have a working phone number, and she failed to provide her work schedule or report for drug testing as ordered by the court.
¶11. The trial was held on October 9, 2019. The chancellor entered another temporary order that "maintained" physical and legal custody with Thomas and visitation with Haley. On July 2, 2020, the chancellor entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law as the final judgment, which awarded sole physical custody of S.S. to Thomas, visitation to Haley, and required Haley to pay child support and submit to quarterly drug tests.
¶12. Haley now appeals from the chancellor's judgment, arguing that the chancellor erred by (1) granting sole physical custody of S.S. to Thomas; (2) requiring her to pay child support; and (3) requiring her to submit to quarterly drug tests.
¶13. Stewart v. Stewart , 309 So. 3d 44, 68 (¶68) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Lee v. Lee , 154 So. 3d 904, 906 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) ). "Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic-relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Id . (quoting Dickinson v. Dickinson , 293 So. 3d 322, 326 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) ). "When reviewing a chancellor's decision, we will accept a chancellor's findings of fact as long as the evidence in the record reasonably supports those findings." Id . (quoting Mercier v. Mercier , 717 So. 2d 304, 306 (¶8) (Miss. 1998) ). The chancellor's "interpretation and application of the law" is reviewed de novo. Jones v. Jones , 332 So. 3d 365, 371 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Smith v. Smith , 318 So. 3d 484, 491 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) ).
¶14. Haley challenges the chancellor's modification of custody. Haley claims that Thomas failed to prove a material change in circumstances that adversely affected S.S. She also claims that the evidence failed to support certain factual findings made by the chancellor and that the chancellor erred in his Albright analysis when determining whether custody modification was in S.S.’s best interest.2
¶15. "A modification of custody requires the noncustodial parent to prove: (1) that a material change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody decree, (2) that the change adversely affects the child, and (3) that modification is in the best interest of the child." Stewart , 309 So. 3d at 83 (¶126) (quoting Powell v. Powell , 976 So. 2d 358, 361 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) ). In determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred, the chancery court "must consider the totality of the circumstances." Id . "Even though under the totality of the circumstances a change has occurred, the court must separately and affirmatively determine that this change is one which adversely affects the children." Id . (quoting Bredemeier v. Jackson , 689 So. 2d 770, 775 (Miss. 1997) ). "Any change in custody must be predicated on the conduct of the custodial parent that poses a danger to the mental or emotional health of the child." Id . (quoting Sullivan v. Beason , 37 So. 3d 706, 708 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ). Furthermore, "the party seeking the modification of custody bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial home." Croney v. Solangi , 328 So. 3d 749, 755 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Mabus v. Mabus , 847 So. 2d 815, 818 (¶8) (Miss. 2003) ). Our supreme court observed that "[a]bove all, in modification cases, as in original awards of custody, we never depart from our polestar consideration: the best interest and welfare of the child." Stewart , 309 So. 3d at 82 (¶127) (quoting Riley v. Doerner , 677 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996) ). The court further explained:
The test we have devised for custody modification need not be applied so rigidly, nor in such a formalistic manner so as to preclude the chancellor from rendering a decision appropriate to the facts of an individual case. In particular, it should not thwart the chancellor from transferring custody of a child from one parent to another when, in the chancellor's judgment, the child's welfare would be best served by such transfer.
Id . (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Riley , 677 So. 2d at 745 ).
¶16. Substantial deference is given to a chancellor's findings, as the chancellor "has the...
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