Stuckey v. Weinberger
Decision Date | 21 November 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 25487.,25487. |
Citation | 488 F.2d 904 |
Parties | Leonard P. STUCKEY, Appellant, v. Caspar W. WEINBERGER, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
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Leonard P. Stuckey in pro. per.
Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty. (argued), William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before CHAMBERS, MERRILL, KOELSCH, BROWNING, DUNIWAY, ELY, HUFSTEDLER, WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN, WALLACE, and SNEED, Circuit Judges.
ELY, Circuit Judge (with whom CHAMBERS, KOELSCH, WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN and SNEED, JJ., concur):
Stuckey appeals from the District Court's dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of his complaint seeking review of an administrative determination denying reopening, in part, of his claims for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
In 1954, Stuckey suffered a severe back injury. Shortly thereafter, in 1955, he filed a claim with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") for disability benefits. That claim was denied, both initially and upon reconsideration,1 because Stuckey failed sufficiently to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.2 The denial of benefits was reaffirmed after a hearing conducted at Stuckey's request. The SSA Appeals Council declined to review the decision of the hearing officer. Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Stuckey filed an action in the District Court. That court remanded to the SSA, upon the agency's request, for further consideration because Stuckey, after filing, entered a hospital for further treatment of his back. Upon remand, the SSA conducted a supplemental hearing at which Stuckey testified and was represented by counsel. On the expanded record, the prior denial of benefits was affirmed by both a hearing officer and the Appeals Council. Their decision was approved by the District Court when Stuckey renewed his court action.
In November, 1959, several months after the District Court's decision, Stuckey filed another claim for benefits. Two months after that, he filed a third. Both covered the same facts and were, in effect, identical to the first claim. Meeting a similar fate by the SSA,3 they were denied, both initially and upon reconsideration. The denial was affirmed by a hearing officer, and his decision became final when the Appeals Council declined Stuckey's request for review. The hearing examiner based his decision upon findings that res judicata4 precluded reconsideration of matters already decided by the District Court and that Stuckey's condition had not been materially changed since that decision was rendered.
In August, 1962, Stuckey filed yet another claim. This application, too, was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Local SSA officials declined to provide Stuckey the benefits he sought. The hearing examiner, reviewing the claim of Stuckey's request, affirmed the denial of benefits; he could find no justification for reopening the prior final decisions. After the Appeals Council declined to review the decision of the hearing officer, Stuckey sought judicial review. His suit was dismissed by the District Court.
Two more claims were filed in 1965. Both were denied by the SSA at the outset, and Stuckey did not seek review of those denials.
Finally, in 1966, Stuckey filed the application which, ultimately, led to this appeal. Like its numerous, virtually identical predecessors, this claim was denied in the first instance and, then, upon reconsideration. Stuckey then requested a hearing. At the hearing, the issue was different than it had been before. This time the question was whether Stuckey qualified for benefits under the terms of the Social Security Act as it had been amended in 1965. On the basis of the evidence adduced at the hearing,5 Stuckey was found to be disabled and entitled to benefits. The amount awarded was, however, severly restricted by the hearing officer. He ruled that under the amended provisions of the act, benefits could be awarded only from September, 1965. Further, he ruled that Stuckey's claim for benefits under the pre-1965 law was foreclosed by application of the principle of res judicata. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h); 20 C.F.R. § 404.937. Dissatisfied with that limited victory, Stuckey sought review by the Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council modified the hearing officer's decision. It agreed that Stuckey was disabled and was entitled to benefits under the 1965 amendments, but it disagreed with the determination that Stuckey's pre-1965 claims could not be reopened. The Council applied an exception to the general policies of finality and res judicata (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.956-404.958).6 Under that regulation, reopening was possible because Stuckey had presented "new and material evidence" within four years of the date when benefits were initially denied.7 It therefore reopened those of Stuckey's prior applications which fell within the four-year period and granted Stuckey part of the benefits he sought. The other claims were deemed not subject to reopening.8
Stuckey, still unsatisfied, then filed his latest suit in the District Court. The court held (1) it had no jurisdiction to review the decision that several of Stuckey's claims would not be reopened, and (2) the decision of the Secretary was correct insofar as it allowed reopening and modified the disposition of the more recent claims. Stuckey appealed and now contends that all of his prior claims should have been reopened.9
At the threshold, we have the question of the correctness of the District Court's determination that there is no jurisdiction to review the denial of reopening. The Social Security Act does allow judicial review in some situations. It is now settled, however, that the relevant section of the Act provides no basis for jurisdiction here. In a similar case, Filice v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1963), we held:
The Cappadora court determined that the Social Security Act neither precludes review nor wholly commits decisions regarding reopening to the discretion of the Secretary. Although we entertain immense respect for our Brothers of the Second Circuit, we can not fully accept their conclusions.10
In Cappadora, it was stated:
356 F.2d at 6. While we basically agree with these quoted principles, we reject the broad scope of the Cappadora decision since we perceive, in the Social Security Act, convincing evidence that Congress did intend to bar judicial review of SSA decisions in certain cases. Section 405(h) of the Act provides in part that "the findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all . . . who were parties to such hearing." The obvious purpose of that language is to declare that res judicata principles are applicable to the findings and decisions of the SSA made in certain procedural contexts.11See, e. g., Leviner v. Richardson, 443 F.2d 1338, 1342-1343 (4th Cir. 1971); III K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.02 (1958 ed.; supp. 1971) hereinafter cited as Davis. We have concluded that the Congress intended, by this distinction, to commit irrevocably to agency discretion those decisions which are rendered after full and fair agency hearings and to which, accordingly, the application of the traditional concept of res judicata could not be fairly seen as unreasonable. Thus committed, these decisions are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts under both the Act and the APA.
We attribute this effect to § 405(h) for two reasons. First, by its broad, unambiguous terms, finality is applicable, without reservation, to all procedurally correct decisions and findings of the Secretary. That, of course, cannot be interpreted literally. Even as to judicial decisions, the doctrine of finality does not have such a broad application, for there are clearly some of such decisions to which res judicata cannot be applied. See Davis § 18.03; 1 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.405 11 (1965). Nevertheless, within the limits of the res judicata doctrine, § 405(h) reflects the policy of strict finality. That Congressional policy is, we think, that, in the interests of administrative efficiency, every claimant seeking benefits under the Social Security Act should be given only one opportunity12 to obtain the benefits accruing from an...
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45 522 Weinberger v. Salfi 8212 214
...e.g., Filice v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 443 (CA9 1963); compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (CA2 1966), with Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (CA9 1973) (en banc). In Cappadora, supra, Judge Friendly, in considering the application of § 405(g) and (h) to review of a decision not to ......
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...772, 775 (CA3 1972); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d, at 1007-1008; Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 617, 621 (CA6 1972); Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904, 909 (CA9 1973); Neighbors v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 511 F.2d 80, 81 (CA10 * The Salfi Court's treatment of the fi......
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Table of Cases
...1357, 1362 (7th Cir. 1984), § 205.16 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2008), 9th-08 Stuckey v. Weinberger , 488 F.2d 904, 909-11 (9th Cir. 1973), § 506.1 Studer v. Chater , 65 F.3d 176 (Table), No. 93-35772 (9th Cir. May 31, 1995)(unpub), § 1203.6 Stunkard v. Se......
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Table of cases
...1357, 1362 (7th Cir. 1984), § 205.16 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2008), 9th-08 Stuckey v. Weinberger , 488 F.2d 904, 909-11 (9th Cir. 1973), § 506.1 Studer v. Chater , 65 F.3d 176 (Table), No. 93-35772 (9th Cir. May 31, 1995)(unpub), § 1203.6 Stunkard v. Se......