Studdard v. Evans

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HALL; BELL, P. J., and PANNELL
• Citation: Studdard v. Evans, 135 S.E.2d 60, 108 Ga.App. 819 (Ga. App. 1964)
• Decision Date: 06 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 40424,40424,3
• Parties: Ralph N. STUDDARD et al. v. Randall EVANS, Jr

Page 60

135 S.E.2d 60

108 Ga.App. 819

Ralph N. STUDDARD et al. v. Randall EVANS, Jr.

No. 40424.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Jan. 6, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

A petition of an attorney, alleging that the defendants knowingly induced a client to claim falsely that he had never employed the attorney, and conspired with the client in writing a letter to the attorney in which he repudiated the employment of his attorney, and knowingly sought to establish falsely, by a motion to dismiss the client's suit against the defendants, that the client had never employed the attorney nor authorized him to bring the suit, states a cause of action in tort for interference with the attorney's right of enjoyment of his property in his employment contract with the client.

The plaintiff, an attorney, sued the defendant railroads and their trainmaster for damages allegedly caused by their intentional, wilful, and malicious injury to him, and for conspiracy to commit a wrongful act against the plaintiff. The petition alleged: An employee of the defendant railroads employed the plaintiff to represent him in a claim for injuries sustained in the course of his employment, and bring suit if necessary, against the railroads. The contract between the attorney and client was entered into in McDuffie County. The plaintiff presented the claim to the railroads and upon their refusal to pay filed suit on behalf of the client. The plaintiff advised the client of all of his actions with respect to claim. Thereafter the defendant trainmaster, acting as agent for the railroads, and with full knowledge of the existing situation and the filing of the suit, entered into a conspiracy with the client to violate the contract of employment of his attorney and to allow the trainmaster to write a letter for the client to the plaintiff, with copy to be sent to the railroads, pretending that the client did not know about the filing of the suit until he read it in the newspaper (which both the client and the trainmaster knew was false) and pretending that the client had not employed the plaintiff to represent him in said matter, and pretending that the plaintiff had no authority to bring the suit, and stating that the client wished the suit stopped immediately, and all of which was known by both the trainmaster and the client to be false. The client and trainmaster further conspired to conceal the fact that the trainmaster had written the letter for the client. The trainmaster and client proceeded to carry out the plans in which they had conspired, and which were induced by the trainmaster, and the trainmaster wrote and the client signed the letter, and they mailed the letter to the plaintiff and a copy to the railroads. The trainmaster reported this to the railroads and made a record of it. Thereafter the railroads, acting on information furnished them by the trainmaster, made a written motion in the Superior Court of Richmond County, challenging the authority of the plaintiff, as attorney, to bring the action and to represent the client in an action against them, and seeking a dismissal of the action for the pretended reason that the plaintiff was not authorized to bring the action for the client. Duning the hearing on the motion the railroads were aided and abetted by the client, but after the court ruled that the client was required to answer and name the person who wrote the letter for him, he testified that the trainmaster wrote the letter. After hearing all the evidence the court entered a written judgment declaring that the plaintiff had been employed by the client and was authorized to bring the suit, and refusing to dismiss the suit; and no appeal was taken from this judgment. Thereafter the client, as a result of the wrongful acts of the defendants, stated in open court that he refused to cooperate with the plaintiff, forcing the plaintiff to dismiss the suit. The defendants' conduct was intentional, in bad faith, for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff and of benefitting the railroads, and resulted in actual damages of $2,848.23--one third of the amount sued for on behalf of the client--and which is a reasonable amount as attorney's fees in the case.

The plaintiff prayed for judgment of $10,000.00, including actual damages of $2,848.23 and punitive damages of $7,151.77.

The defendants assign error on the trial court's overruling of their general and special demurrers to the petition.

Stevens & Stevens, Robert L. Stevens, Thomson, Fulcher, Fulcher, Hagler & Harper, William Fulcher, Julian H. Stewart, Augusta, for plaintiff in error.

Randall Evans, Jr., Thomson, for defendant in error.

HALL, Judge.

1. The defendants demurred on the ground that the petition shows on its face that the Superior Court of McDuffie County does not have jurisdiction of the cause of action under Code § 94-1101. Subsequent to the filing and certifying of the bill of exceptions an amendment to the petition was offered and allowed setting out the county where various acts stated in the petition allegedly took place. Since the trial court had jurisdiction in allowing the amendment to the petition (Ware v. Martin, 208 Ga. 330(3), 66 S.E.2d 737), the ruling excepted to in the bill of exceptions, not going to the petition as amended, cannot become the 'law of the case.' In view of the amendment, the assignment of error in this bill of exceptions as to jurisdiction has become moot and reversal would not benefit the plaintiff in error. Gillon v. Johns, 105 Ga.App. 599, 600, 125 S.E.2d 70.

2. The defendants concede that a client who employs an attorney and afterwards discharges him has an obligation to pay the attorney quantum meruit for services rendered and, therefore, the client's refusal to pay the attorney would be wrongful; and that a third person who induces the client to refuse to pay the attorney would be a wrongdoer and subject to liability if the inducement resulted in a wrong to the attorney. But the defendants contend that this petition fails to allege that the client has refused to pay the plaintiff attorney for his services, and therefore does not show that the attorney has been wronged. We cannot agree with this contention. The fact that the plaintiff has not been paid reasonable attorney's fees for his services is inherent, it seems to us, in the allegations that the client disavowed the employment of the attorney and that the plaintiff has been damaged in an amount which he alleges is reasonable amount as attorney's fees. And since the petition alleges a wilful tort the failure to allege a demand upon the client for payment is immaterial. Code § 3-106; Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Bennett & U. Co., 120 Ga. 1012, 1014, 48 S.E. 398; 98 C.J.S. Work & Labor p. 775, § 39; 86 C.J.S. Torts p. 974, § 51. Moreover, whether the petition is construed to show that the defendants induced a breach of the client's obligation to pay for the attorney's services quantum meruit, or is construed to show only that the defendants' acts interfered with the attorney's property right in the contract of employment, a cause of action is set forth.

The right of the attorney to practice law is property and the attorney is said to have a 'property' in his fees and emoluments by the common law or by contract expressed or implied with his client. Ex parte Law, 15 Fed.Cas. 3, Cas.No.8,126; 35 Ga. 285, 293, 294; 2 Encyclopedia of Georgia Law 551, § 119.

'The right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie.' Code § 105-1401. 'In all cases he who maliciously procures an injury to be done to another, whether it is an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer, and may be sued either alone or jointly with the actor.' Code § 105-1207. 'When the law requires one * * * to forbear the doing of that which may injure another, though no action be given in express terms, upon the accrual of damage the injured party may recover.' Code § 105-103.

While liability for procuring the breach of a contract or interfering with the performance of a contract is based upon property rights in the contract (Luke v. DuPree, 158 Ga. 590, 597, 124 S.E. 13), the existence of a valid contract is necessary to create liability. Charles v. Simmons, 215 Ga. 794, 797, 113 S.E.2d...