Studebaker v. Uribe
| Decision Date | 20 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 08-2805 ODW (FMO).,CV 08-2805 ODW (FMO). |
| Citation | 658 F.Supp.2d 1102 |
| Parties | Chad Russell STUDEBAKER, Petitioner, v. Domingo URIBE, Jr., Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Chad Russell Studebaker, Imperial, CA, pro se.
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the Petition, all of the records herein, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed. The Court approves and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment shall be entered dismissing the action with prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on the parties.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
On June 3, 2008, petitioner, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On September 26, 2008, respondent1 filed an Answer to the Petition ("Return"). On April 9, 2009, petitioner filed a Traverse to the Return ("Reply").
Having reviewed the allegations in the Petition as well as the matters set forth in the record the Return and the Reply, it is recommended that the Petition be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice.
On October 8 and 12, 2004,2 after a jury trial in the Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 03WF2364), petitioner was convicted of: (1) attempted murder (Cal.Penal Code §§ 187(a) & 664); (2) assault with a deadly weapon (Cal.Penal Code § 245(a)(1)); (3) unlawful taking of a vehicle (Cal. Vehicle Code § 10851(a)); and (4) street terrorism (Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(a)). (Clerk's Transcript ("CT") at 318, 321-22 & 432). The jury also found that petitioner committed the attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b) (1)(A)) and committed the attempted murder with a deadly or dangerous weapon and with willful premeditation and deliberation (Cal.Penal Code §§ 12022(b)(1) & 664(a)). (Id. at 319, 433-34 & 436). On May 13, 2005, the trial court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life plus a determinate term of six years and eight months in state prison. (Id. at 509-12).
Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal. (CT at 507). In an unpublished opinion filed on January 31, 2007, 2007 WL 264301, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. (Lodgment No. 7 ("Opinion") at 1, 2 & 23). Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on April 11, 2007, without comment or citation to authority. (Lodgment Nos. 8 & 9).
On June 29, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Orange County Superior Court, which was denied on July 31, 2007. (Lodgment Nos. 10 & 11).
On June 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant Petition.
The facts underlying petitioner's conviction are not in dispute in these proceedings.3 Accordingly, the court will quote directly from the California Court of Appeal's statement of facts in its opinion affirming petitioner's conviction.
[Petitioner] was an active member of "Public Enemy Number One," (PEN1) a white supremacist criminal street gang with a reputation for extreme violence. One Sunday, Francisco Espinoza, an immigrant from Nicaragua, drove his wife and two very young daughters in his car displaying a Nicaraguan flag decal.
Suddenly, [petitioner] emerged out of a side parking lot into the path of the Espinoza car, blocking it and forcing Espinoza to swerve quickly into the fast lane of the southbound traffic to avoid hitting [petitioner].
Espinoza regained control of his car and proceeded past the offending driver, shrugging his shoulders and lifting his palms up as if to inquire, "what is going on?" He then turned at an upcoming intersection as he originally planned. [Petitioner] suddenly sped up, went around Espinoza and cut him off as he entered the side street. Espinoza was forced to stop because [petitioner]'s car completely blocked his own. He could see [petitioner] reaching down between the seats before emerging from his car and approaching Espinoza. Fearing that his wife and daughters were in danger, Espinoza got out of his car and attempted to lead [petitioner] away. As he approached Espinoza, [petitioner] had one hand behind his thigh. Suddenly, he lunged at Espinoza, slashing the man's throat with a knife and severing a Star-of-David chain hanging there. [Petitioner] reached down, grabbed the Star-of-David and fled back to his car.
Espinoza yelled to have his wife call the police and ran after [petitioner], hoping to restrain him. As [petitioner] climbed into his car, Espinoza tried pulling him out; he broke off his efforts when [petitioner] turned and again slashed at him with the knife.[FN3]
[FN3] Espinoza noticed that [petitioner]'s shoes had red laces. This "fashion statement" became relevant once the gang expert testified PEN1 gang members often wore red shoelaces as a distinguishing marker.
Although getting dizzy from the loss of blood, Espinoza hurriedly returned to his car and attempted to follow [petitioner], but [petitioner] had already turned around at the end of the cul-de-sac, and was now driving directly at Espinoza's car. [Petitioner] crashed his car into Espinoza's vehicle, disabling it. But the collision also affected [petitioner]'s car, as his steering became unresponsive and he had to drive in reverse. When his car became fully dysfunctional, [petitioner] abandoned it and fled on foot.
Espinoza was bleeding extensively from his throat, and he needed immediate treatment as the gash was potentially fatal. The wound required extensive suturing, and it left a conspicuous scar and residual pain that Espinoza still suffered from at the time of trial.
Later that evening, [petitioner] visited a friend of his in Buena Park, departing in the night with the friend's mother's car. When the friend discovered he had left with her car, she phoned him and demanded he return it. He refused, keeping it for several weeks until abandoning it in the Lake Elsinore area near the home of a fellow PEN1 member. The authorities located [petitioner] in that home and arrested him, learning from him that he was en route to Mexico to avoid prosecution for the assault on Espinoza.
At trial, [petitioner] testified that Espinoza was the one who initiated the incident by cutting off [petitioner]'s car. [Petitioner] became enraged over this and only responded in the manner he did because of Espinoza's rudeness. He maintained that he never swung the knife until Espinoza attacked him in his own car, and he did so at that time to protect himself. He also denied stealing his friend's car, saying instead that she had given him permission to take it.
In his Petition, petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence, (Petition at 2) and raises the following claims for federal habeas relief:
1. Petitioner was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the other charges. (Petition at 5).
2. Petitioner's rights were violated by the admission of his prior convictions. (Id.).
3. The trial court abused its discretion by permitting gang expert evidence without proper foundation. (Id. at 6).
4. There was insufficient evidence to support the street terrorism conviction and the gang enhancement finding. (Id.).
5. The trial court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the gang expert's reliance on hearsay evidence. (Id.).
6. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 6a).
7. The trial court coerced the attempted murder verdict by its remarks to the deadlocked jury. (Id. at 6b).
This case is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 & 207, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 1400 & 1402, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003) (). As explained by the Supreme Court, AEDPA "places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings [embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—[¶] (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or [¶] (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an...
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