Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S. Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:10 CV 467,2:10 CV 467 |
| Parties | KURT STUHLMACHER, KELLY STUHLMACHER, Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., TRICAM INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiffs Kurt Stuhlmacher and Kelly Stuhlmacher ("the Stuhlmachers") filed a complaint in Indiana state court alleging that Mr. Stuhlmacher was injured while using a ten-foot Husky ladder manufactured by defendant Tricam Industries, Inc. ("Tricam") and sold by defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. ("Home Depot"). (DE # 1 ¶¶ 4-7.) They have alleged claims of "negligence-strict liability," "negligence-failure to warn," negligence, breach of the warranty of merchantability, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and loss of consortium. Defendants removed the case to federal court. (DE # 2.) Defendants then filed joint motions to dismiss the Stuhlmachers' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (DE ## 6-9.) The Stuhlmachers have filed a response (DE # 10), and defendants have filed a joint reply. (DE ## 11-12.)
The Stuhlmachers allege that Mr. Stuhlmacher was properly using a ten-foot Husky ladder on October 31, 2008, while constructing the roof of a porch on a house. (DE # 1 ¶ 4.) They allege that while he was on the ladder, the rivets holding the supportarm on one side of the ladder failed causing the ladder to collapse. (Id.)Mr. Stuhlmacher alleges that he attempted to prevent his fall by grasping an overhead beam, causing serious injury to his left shoulder. (Id.) He then fell off the ladder and landed on top of it causing extensive injuries to his penis and lower back. (Id. ¶ 5.) He was treated at Pinnacle Urgent Care in Crown Point, Indiana for his injuries. (Id.) The Stuhlmachers claim that Mr. Stuhlmacher has incurred substantial medical expenses from his fall and that he continues to suffer from pain and discomfort which require him to abstain from sexual activity. (Id. ¶ 6.)
The Stuhlmachers allege that Tricam and Home Depot continued to manufacture and sell the defective Husky ladders even after they were put on notice of serious injuries resulting from the ladders. (Id. ¶ 7.) They allege that defendants have been subject to numerous complaints and lawsuits arising from personal injuries caused by use of Husky brand ladders. (Id.) They allege that defendants continue to manufacture and sell the ladders without warning consumers or recalling the ladders. (Id.)
The Stuhlmachers plead that defendants "failed to properly package or label the [ladder] with reasonable warnings about the dangers of the [ladder]" and failed to give reasonably complete instructions about the proper use of the ladder. (Id. ¶ 21, 23.) They also plead that defendants knew that the ladder "was likely to be dangerous when used in the manner employed by the plaintiff and had no reason to believe that the plaintiff would have realized the dangerous condition." (Id. ¶ 22.) They claim that by exercisingreasonable diligence, defendants could have made warnings or instructions available to consumers. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Defendants argue that the Stuhlmachers' complaint, particularly counts I, IV, and V, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because it "is largely comprised of legal conclusions and mere recitals of the elements of the claim at issue without sufficient factual enhancement necessary to state claims for relief." (DE # 7 at 3-4.) Defendants contend that the Stuhlmachers have not alleged specific facts to support their claims that defendants failed to "properly package, give instructions, warn of inherent risks or advise on proper use of the ladder." (Id.) They state that the Stuhlmachers have not alleged "what warnings or instructions were insufficient and what warnings or instructions should have been given." (Id.)
Further, defendants take issue with the Stuhlmachers' request for "punitive damages due to the Defendants' malice, fraud, gross negligence, and oppressiveness." (Id. at 4; DE # 1 at 8.) Defendants contend that this request is not properly pleaded because, as they state, claims of "fraud and/or malice" must be plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).1 (DE # 7 at 4.)
In response, the Stuhlmachers argue that their complaint should be evaluated according to Indiana pleading standards because it was filed in state court prior toremoval to federal court and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c)(1) the federal rules only apply after a case is removed. (DE # 10 at 3.) They argue that under Indiana pleading standards they do not have to plead facts for each element of a claim. (Id.)The Stuhlmachers further contend that defendants improperly moved to dismiss the complaint as they should have moved under Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement instead. (Id. at 4.) The Stuhlmachers also contend that their complaint is not subject to Rule 9 standards because they are not alleging fraud under Rule 9(b) or special damages under Rule 9(g). (Id. at 5.) The Stuhlmachers argue that defendants' motion to dismiss is a vexatious motion filed for the purpose of delay, and because of this, the court should order defendants to pay the Stuhlmachers' reasonable attorney fees for responding to the motion. (Id. at 6.)
Defendants counter that federal courts routinely apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) in evaluating the sufficiency of complaints after removal. (DE # 11 at 2.) Therefore, they argue that Rule 8 and the Twombly and Iqbal standards provide the basis for evaluating their motion to dismiss. (Id. at 2-3.) They argue that they were not required to move for a more definite statement before moving to dismiss the complaint. (Id. at 3.) They also contend that the Stuhlmachers are basing their claim for punitive damages in part on the defendants' alleged fraud and allegations of fraudulent conduct are subject to Rule 9(b). (Id. at 4.)
The court must first determine whether the complaint should be evaluated under federal or state standards. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c)(1) provides that theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a civil action after it has been removed from state court. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 437 (1974) (); Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2007); Deloria v. Scerpella, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15906 (7th Cir. July 15, 1991) (unpublished).
In Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., the plaintiff filed his complaint in state court and the defendant removed it to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss. 125 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1997). In considering the motion, the district court judge applied the state court's heightened pleading standards. Id. at 417. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that "it is rudimentary" that pleading requirements in the federal courts are governed by the federal rules and stated that "federal courts may not impose heightened pleading requirements except where such requirements are found in the federal rules." Id. at 417-18. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit and federal district courts have applied federal law when considering Rule 12(b)(6) motions in removed actions. See e.g., Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 2003); Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1999); Caldwell v. Jones, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
Some Seventh Circuit case law can be read to suggest that state law governs the standards for complaints filed in state court. In Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., the plaintiffargued that the defendant should be seen to have admitted certain allegations in the complaint because it did not sufficiently deny them as required by state law. 527 F.3d 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit determined that the answer should be evaluated based on state law and reasoned:
Normally, we are guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when addressing the sufficiency of pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 8(b), but because [the plaintiff's] complaint and [the defendant's] answer were filed in Illinois state court before this action was removed, we must apply Illinois's standards.
Id. (citing Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2001)). A district court has interpreted the reasoning in Romo, relied upon in Ciomber, to apply only "to the literal form and sufficiency of the pleadings, i.e., service or timeliness," and refused to extend it to mean that state law governs the substantive sufficiency of the pleadings as evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). See e.g., Harris v. City of Seattle, No. C02-2225P, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3553, at *5-7 n.5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2003). The court finds this interpretation of the limits on Romo and Ciomber to be persuasive. Further after Ciomber, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal rules applied when evaluating the substantive sufficiency of a complaint in a removed action. Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) ().
In fact, numerous courts that have considered whether federal or state standards should be used to evaluate the substance of a complaint after removal have determinedthat federal law applies. Henderson v. Food Lion, Inc., Nos. 90-2048, 90-2076, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 96, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1991) (unpublished); Sibel Prods. v. Gaming Partners Int'l Corp., No. 09-cv-87, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119703, at *6-7 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2009); Lin v. Chase Card...
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