Stull v. Hoke
| Decision Date | 14 November 1997 |
| Citation | 326 Or. 72,948 P.2d 722 |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
| Parties | Barry Joe STULL, Petitioner on Review, v. Mary M. HOKE, Nancy C. Antal and Brownstein, Rask, Sweeny, Grim, Kerr & DeSylvia, Respondents on Review. CC 940503716; CA A86270; SC S43523. |
Barry Joe Stull, petitioner on review, filed the petition pro se.
Donald W. McEwen and Christine Coers-Mitchell, of McEwen, Gisvold, Rankin, Carter & Streinz, L.L.P., Portland, filed a brief on the merits on behalf of respondents on review Antal and Brownstein, Rask, Sweeny, Grim, Kerr & DeSylvia.
Lindsey H. Hughes, of Hallmark, Keating & Abbott, P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.
Richard S. Yugler, Maureen Leonard, and Jason Ring, Certified Law Student, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
The primary issue in this case is when a civil action is deemed commenced, for purposes of the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff who files the complaint is an indigent person who is incarcerated in a prison facility. For the reasons explained below, we hold that, in these circumstances, the action commences when the complaint is received by the court.
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Columbia River Correctional Institution, delivered a complaint to the prison law librarian on April 11, 1994, with the intent that it be mailed to the Multnomah County Circuit Court for filing. The hand-written complaint charged defendants Hoke, Antal, and the law firm of Brownstein, Rask, Sweeny, Grim, Kerr & DeSylvia (Brownstein) with, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress fraud, and conversion. 1 Included with the complaint was an "Affidavit of Poverty" and an application for deferral of filing fees. On April 13, 1994, the Multnomah County Circuit Court Administrator (the administrator) received the complaint and fee-deferral application. More than six weeks later, on May 31, 1994, the circuit court granted the fee-deferral application, and the complaint was stamped "filed" by the administrator. Defendant Hoke was served on June 4, 1994, and defendants Antal and Brownstein were served on June 10, 1994, with summonses and copies of the complaint.
Defendants Antal and Brownstein moved to dismiss the action on the ground that they had not been served properly, ORCP 21 A(5), and the circuit court granted that motion as to those defendants. 2 Defendant Hoke moved to dismiss the action, inter alia, on the ground that plaintiff's action was not commenced within the applicable statutes of limitations, ORCP 21 A(9). The circuit court granted that motion as to defendant Hoke.
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that all the claims at issue on appeal involving all three defendants were time barred, because the action was not commenced until May 31, 1994, the date on which the administrator stamped the complaint "filed." Stull v. Hoke, 141 Or.App. 150, 917 P.2d 69 (1996). We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ORS 12.020 governs the commencement of actions for purposes of statutes of limitations. Under that statute, an action is not deemed commenced until it has been "filed." There are three possible answers to the question when plaintiff's complaint in this case should be deemed filed: (1) when the complaint was delivered to an authorized prison official with the intent that it be filed with a court (April 11); (2) when the complaint was received by the court (April 13); or (3) when a court clerk "filed" the complaint after a fee-deferral application had been granted (May 31). 3
As a preliminary matter amicus Oregon Association of Defense Counsel (OADC) asserts that plaintiff argued only the first alternative at trial and in the Court of Appeals and, consequently, that he failed to preserve the second alternative for review in this court. Amicus Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) agrees that plaintiff failed to argue in the Court of Appeals, in the alternative, that his action was "filed" and thereby commenced at the time that it was first received by the trial court. We find that the issue was preserved sufficiently under the standards set out in State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 766 P.2d 373 (1988), because plaintiff raised and preserved the broader legal issue--whether the trial court erred in holding that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Under the rationale in Hitz, a specific alternate argument regarding that issue can be raised for the first time in this court.
In order to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that all plaintiff's claims were time barred, this court must determine, as one part of that inquiry, at what point the action is deemed to have been commenced. ORS 12.020 governs the commencement of an action for purposes of statutes of limitations. Therefore, the question is one of statutory interpretation. In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties. Consequently, we consider all three of the alternative possible answers to the question when this action should be deemed to have been commenced. 4
In construing a statute, this court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). To discern legislative intent, this court first looks to the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. If the intent of the legislature is clear from text and context, then we proceed no further. Ibid.
ORS 12.020 provides:
"(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, for the purpose of determining whether an action has been commenced within the time limited, an action shall be deemed commenced as to each defendant, when the complaint is filed, and the summons served on the defendant * * *."
"(2) If the first publication of summons or other service of summons in an action occurs before the expiration of 60 days after the date on which the complaint in the action was filed, the action against each person of whom the court by such service has acquired jurisdiction shall be deemed to have been commenced upon the date on which the complaint in the action was filed." (Emphasis added.)
The text of subsection (1) makes clear that an action must be both "filed" and a "summons served" before the action shall be deemed "commenced." The text of subsection (2), in turn, provides that, when a summons is served within 60 days of the filing, then the action shall be deemed "commenced" upon the filing. Under any of the three proposed interpretations of when the filing occurred in this case, service occurred within 60 days of that filing. Thus, plaintiff's action is deemed to have "commenced" on the date that it was "filed." 5
The term "filed" is not defined in reference to ORS 12.020(1). It does, however, have a well-defined legal meaning and, therefore, we typically use that meaning in interpreting the term when used in a statute. See Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or. 247, 253, 864 P.2d 1319 (1994) ( principle). This court has consistently interpreted the term "filing" to mean that filing of a document "occur[s] when [the] document is given to a clerk with the intention that it be filed." See Blackledge v. Harrington, 289 Or. 139, 143, 611 P.2d 292 (1980) (); see also Charco, Inc. v. Cohn, 242 Or. 566, 571, 411 P.2d 264 (1966) (); Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 415, 406 P.2d 539 (1965) (); Bade v. Hibberd, 50 Or. 501, 503-04, 93 P. 364 (1908) (). See also Black's Law Dictionary, 628 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[f]iling with the court" to mean the "[d]elivery of legal document to clerk of court or other proper officer with intent that it be filed with court"). 6
Applying that well-established legal meaning to the facts of this case rules out the possibility that filing occurs only after the court grants a fee-deferral application and stamps the complaint "filed." That is true because an indigent claimant "intends" that his or her complaint be filed at the time that the complaint is delivered to a court, which is the same time when a claimant who is able to pay a filing fee is able to have a complaint filed. However, this meaning leaves open to question whether an incarcerated pro se claimant's "giving" of a complaint "to a clerk" occurs upon delivery to a prison official with the intent that it be filed with a court, or only upon delivery to and receipt by a court clerk.
OADC argues that ORS 21.110 provides contextual support for its contrary interpretation that "filing," as used in ORS 12.020, occurred only after the trial court granted plaintiff's fee-deferral application. ORS 21.110 governs filing fees for civil actions and appeals in circuit courts and now provides in part:
"A paper or pleading shall be filed by the clerk only if the required fee is paid or if a request for a fee waiver or deferral is granted by the court."
OADC argues that that provision deems a "filing" to occur only after a filing fee is paid or a fee waiver or deferral is granted. OADC argues that the legislature intended the term "filed" in ORS 12.020 to have that same meaning. We disagree.
For purposes of this case, even assuming that the present version of ORS 21.110 provides contextual support for OADC's position, it did not exist at the time...
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