Stults v. Bd. of Com'rs of Allen Cnty.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1907
• Docket Number: No. 20,993.,20,993.
• Citation: 168 Ind. 539,81 N.E. 471
• Parties: STULTS v. BOARD OF C0M'RS OF ALLEN COUNTY.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

168 Ind. 539

81 N.E. 471

STULTS

v.BOARD OF C0M'RS OF ALLEN COUNTY.

No. 20,993.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 28, 1907.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Allen County; Edwin C. Vaughn, Judge.

Action by Joseph E. Stults against the board of commissioners of the county of Allen. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.E. V. Harris and H. C. Hanna, for appellant. E. G. Hoffman and Wm. N. Ballou, for appellee.

GILLETT, J.

Appellant, as coroner of Allen county, filed, in the form of an itemized bill, before the board of commissioners of said county, a statement of his own fees, and of the claims of other officers and persons, in and about the holding of an inquest and post mortem. The bill aggregated $43.50. The commissioners disallowed it, and appellant appealed. In the court below appellee filed a general denial and a special answer. Appellant, after unsuccessfully demurring to the latter answer, filed a reply thereto, and the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury. The trial resulted in a finding and judgment for appellee, and from such judgment appellant appeals, assigning as error that the court below erred in overruling said demurrer, and in overruling his motion for a new trial.

At the outset our jurisdiction is challenged by counsel for appellee, since the claim is less than $50. By Acts 1903, p. 280, c. 156 (section 1337f, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905), which is an amendment of the act of 1901, defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme and Appellate Courts (Acts 1901, p. 566, c. 247; section 1337a et seq., Burns' Ann. St. 1901), it is provided that “no appeal shall hereafter be taken to the Supreme or Appellate Court in any civil case where the amount in the controversy exclusive of interest and costs does not exceed $50, except as provided in section 8 of this act.” Section 8 of the act of 1901 (section 1337h, Burns' Ann. St. 1901), reads as follows: “Every case in which there is in question, and such question is duly presented, either the validity of a franchise, or the validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation, or the constitutionality of a statute, state or federal, or the proper construction of a statute, or rights guaranteed by the state or federal Constitution, and which case would be otherwise unappealable by virtue of section six or section seven, shall be appealable directly to the Supreme Court, for the purpose of presenting such question only.” If we have jurisdiction of this case, the proper construction of a statute must be in question, and duly presented, and, if so, the cause is appealable for the sole purpose of presenting such question. The statute which is supposed to require construction is Acts 1879, p. 105, c. 28, § 1 (section 7954, Burns' Ann. St. 1901). That section reads as follows: “Every coroner, as soon as he shall be notified that the dead body of any person supposed to have come to his death by violence or casualty is within his county, shall immediately proceed to inquire, upon view of the body, how and in what manner he came to his death.” The intendment of the statute as to the cases in which an inquest shall be held does not appear to stand in need of construction. Its language is its own best expositor in this respect. Counsel for appellant claim, however, that the statute is open to construction with reference to the point as to whether the determination of the coroner that a particular case is such as to warrant the holding of an inquest is conclusive against the county, or, in other words, as to whether his supposition as to the cause of death governs. They contend that this question should be answered in the affirmative, and they further contend, upon this hypothesis, that it appears that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to appellee's special answer, and that the case, as presented on the evidence, is one in which it is shown, without the slightest dispute, that appellant is entitled to recover. It appears to us that it may fairly be said that the statute is open to construction with reference to the power of the coroner conclusively to determine his authority to act, when the question arises in an action for his fees, and we are further of opinion that the special answer presents this question.

It is stated in the points in appellant's brief that the coroner acts judicially in holding an inquest, and that, having held an inquest upon the body of a person found dead within his county, his action, being of a judicial character, cannot be reviewed, and that therefore he is entitled to his fees. It is further contended in appellant's behalf that under the statute the discretion is vested in the coroner of determining whether an inquest should be held. We are of opinion that counsel are in error in their contention that the coroner acts judicially in holding an inquest. Judicial power is vested in the courts. It cannot, under the framework of the state government, reside elsewhere. Branson v. Studabaker, 133 Ind. 147, 33 N. E. 98;State ex rel. v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244, 4 L. R. A. 101, 10 Am. St. Rep. 143. An inquest is a mere finding, and does not establish rights, and therefore the authority lacks the first element of judicial power. The coroner stands as an ordinary ministerial officer in respect to his claims for allowances. While the fact that he has held an inquest may, in view of the presumption of the regularity of official action, create a presumption that he was warranted in so doing, yet, when his claim against the county is heard, the question is whether a case is made out for the allowance of his demand. Reg. v. Gloucestershire, 90 E. C. L. 804; County of Lancaster v. Mishler, 100 Pa. 624, 45 Am. Rep. 402; 9 Cyc. 995, and cases cited. The board of commissioners is required to pass on the claim, and the allowance of it by the board depends, under section 7846, Burns' Ann. St. 1901, upon whether it be found to be “just and owing.” Pfaff v. State ex rel., 94 Ind. 529. Of course, we recognize the proposition that it is not conclusive that an inquest should not be held because there is nothing in the superficial facts affirmatively to show that the person whose dead body is found came to his death by violence or casualty, since, at the same time, there may be nothing to speak negatively upon the subject. In other words, the cause of death may be shrouded in such mystery as to warrant the tentative assumption that death was occasioned by violence or casualty, and thus justify the holding of an inquest to subserve the public ends for which the statute was undoubtedly enacted. The supposition of death by violence or casualty, to which the statute refers, is undoubtedly the coroner's, and we think that he should hold an...