Stultz v. Reese Bros., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 2003
• Citation: 835 A.2d 754
• Parties: Steven STULTZ, Appellee, v. REESE BROTHERS, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

835 A.2d 754

Steven STULTZ, Appellee, v. REESE BROTHERS, INC., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 16, 2003.

Filed October 28, 2003.

Jeffrey B. Balicki, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

David B. Consiglio, State College, for appellee.

Before: HUDOCK, BENDER and TAMILIA, JJ.

TAMILIA, J.

¶ 1 Reese Brothers, Inc., appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Steven Stultz in the aggregate amount of $56,196.97 plus interest, awarded as a result of the trial court's finding appellant had violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act¹ (PHRA) by failing to hire appellee and make accommodations for his disability. The October 31, 2002 Order entering judgment made final the July 13, 2002 Order which denied appellant's motion for post-verdict relief.

¶ 2 Appellant raises the following issues for review:

A. Whether the lower Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by shifting the burden of proof to appellant to show that it was unable to provide a reasonable accommodation where appellee failed to request a specific accommodation?

B. Whether the lower Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by substituting its judgment as against the weight of the credible evidence regarding appellee's qualifications to perform the essential functions of the job with or without an accommodation?

C. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by measuring Appellee's damages over a two year period when the weight of the credible evidence shows that only two percent (2%) of appellant's work force is still employed after two years in the position of telemarketer?

D. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by holding th[at] Appellee satisfied his duty to mitigate his damages by applying for employment at one employer over a two year period?

Appellant's brief at 4.

¶ 3 In 1997, appellee, who is afflicted with a permanent and progressive eye disease known as retinitis pigmentosa, sought employment as a telemarketer with appellant. As a consequence, appellee interviewed with a recruiter named Ruby Snyder, an acquaintance of his who was aware of his visual impairment. At the conclusion of the meeting appellee was offered the position, but ultimately he was unable to begin employment as he was sentenced to one (1) year incarceration for a drug offense.

¶ 4 In June 1998, after completing his sentence, appellee again sought employment with appellant as a telemarketer. This time he interviewed with Diane Chamberlain, who met appellant in the reception area and guided him by hand to her office. Chamberlain inquired about the extent of appellee's visual impairment and what visual aids might be available to assist appellee in performing his potential job as a telemarketer. In an effort to respond to Chamberlain's query, appellee thereafter obtained from the Altoona Office of Blindness and Visual Services, and submitted for appellant's consideration, two catalogs advertising visual aid products. Chamberlain in turn forwarded these catalogs to the Pittsburgh branch of the company for review and to determine if the company could accommodate appellee's disability. ¶ 5 Susan Burgess, Vice President of Human Resources, received the catalogs and forwarded them to Michael Marchey, manager in the Information Technology Department, to consider possible accommodations. The trial testimony established unequivocally, however, that no one in the company probed into whether screen magnifiers or larger monitors would be sufficient to accommodate appellee's needs. Trial testimony also revealed no one from appellant company had contacted the Altoona Office of Blindness and Visual Services to inquire into or discuss ways to accommodate appellee's disability. Marchey instead contacted EIS International, the developer of the software program used by appellant, to determine if another software program could be installed in order to accommodate appellee. In response, EIS informed Marchey that software-driven visual aid products were not compatible with the software program currently in use by appellant, and if unauthorized software was installed the appellant's warranties would be voided under its existing license and maintenance agreements with EIS International. Upon receipt of this information, appellant unilaterally concluded no reasonable accommodation could be made for appellee and consequently, decided not to hire him.

¶ 6 On April 26, 2000, appellee filed suit alleging discriminatory hiring practices in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 951-63, and Chapter 44 of Title 16 of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code, 16 Pa.Code §§ 44.1 et seq. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of appellee in the amount of $30,458 plus interest, counsel fees and costs. Appellant's post-trial motions were denied on July 13, 2002, and judgment was entered October 31, 2002. This appeal followed.

¶ 7 Reese Brothers, Inc., first argues the trial court failed to apply and/or adhere to the correct standards of law in reaching its verdict. Specifically, in its first two issues appellant claims the court mistakenly shifted the burden of proof to it to affirmatively demonstrate it could not provide reasonable accommodation, and the court mistakenly held appellee is a "qualified individual with a disability." In that these claims are intricately related, we will address these challenges simultaneously.

¶ 8 The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against any employee because of a disability. See 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. As the underlying cause of action is based on alleged violations of the act, we turn to the decisions of the federal courts for guidance in interpreting it. While we are not bound by federal courts' interpretations of parallel provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., this Court may interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts. See, Imler v. Hollidaysburg American Legion Ambulance Service, 731 A.2d 169 (Pa.Super.1999),

appeal denied, 560 Pa. 706, 743 A.2d 920 (1999); Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir.1996). The PHRA and the ADA deal with similar subject matter and are grounded on similar legislative goals. Imler at 173-74. Moreover, the PHRA definition of "disability" is substantially identical to the definition of "disability" under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2), Definitions; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g), Definitions; 43 P.S. § 954(p.1)(1)-(3), Definitions.

¶ 9 Under the ADA, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against, "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a), Discrimination. A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined by the ADA as a person "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8), Definitions. A "disability" is: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2), Definitions.

¶ 10 Based on the statutory definitions, in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, he must demonstrate:

(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.

Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3rd Cir.1998). The term "discrimination" in this context encompasses not only adverse employment actions driven by prejudice but also includes an employer's failure to make reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff's disabilities. Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir.1999). Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability when the employer fails or refuses to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A), Discrimination.

¶ 11 It is not disputed that retinitis pigmentosa meets the statutory definition of "disability," and no one disputes the fact appellee was denied employment as a telemarketer due to his visual impairment. Hence, the first and third prongs of the test are satisfied and are not at issue. Appellant, however, challenges the trial court's conclusion that appellee is a qualified individual with a disability.

¶ 12 At the outset, we note that a trial court's findings of fact are accorded the same weight as a jury verdict and our scope of review is limited to examining whether the findings are supported by competent evidence. Jenks v. Avco Corp., 340 Pa.Super. 542, 490 A.2d 912 (1985). In making such an evaluation, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held a plaintiff must "`satisfy the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.' and, the plaintiff must be able to `perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodations.' " Taylor, su...