Stultz v. State
| Decision Date | 31 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 46550,46550 |
| Citation | 500 S.W.2d 853 |
| Parties | Carlos Don STULTZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Malcolm Dade (Court-appointed), James H. Miller, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., W. T. Westmoreland, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder with malice. The jury assessed punishment at death.
Appellant first contends that the imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The death penalty was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, and Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. However, the record reflects that, subsequent to the Supreme Court's opinion, appellant's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by order of the Governor of Texas, dated January 15, 1973. This question is moot.
Appellant's remaining contention is that the trial court erred in admitting over objection the testimony of a psychologist and two psychiatrists concerning the results of his mental examination. Appellant urges a constitutional right to the presence of his attorney at such examinations. Although neither the record nor appellant's brief clearly discloses the precise constitutional basis for such a claim, we take it that appellant relies upon the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel. On either ground, we find appellant's claim to be without merit.
The State's right to examine a defendant who raises the issue of insanity in defense is not challenged. Article 46.02, Section 2(f)(1), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., provides, in part, that 'the court may, at its discretion appoint disinterested qualified experts to examine the defendant with regard to his present competency to stand trial and as to his sanity . . ..' See Gephart v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 414, 249 S.W.2d 612. Relying instead upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), appellant argues that a psychiatric examination constitutes a 'critical stage' of a criminal proceeding at which an accused is entitled to the presence and assistance of counsel.
We are unable to comprehend the function an attorney is to perform if his presence at a psychiatric examination were to be required.
This Court held in Blankenship v. State, 432 S.W.2d 945, 946--947, that 'a mental examination is not a confession, and therefore would not be subject to the requirements and rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.' However, this appears to be a case of first impression in this jurisdiction on the precise constitutional issue raised here.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered a similar issue in United States v. Williams, 456 F.2d 217 (1972). There, a court-appointed psychiatrist testified for the defense that Williams had an irresistible impulse to steal mail. In rebuttal, the prosecution called a second psychiatrist who had also examined Williams, and who testified that, while Williams was an anti-social personality, he was nevertheless criminally responsible. On appeal, Williams contended that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated because the psychiatrist examined him without the presence of defense counsel and without giving Miranda warnings and employed his answers as a basis for the ultimate expert opinion that he was criminally responsible.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court rejected Williams' contention and concluded that 'the advantages...
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