Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun. Authority

• Decision Date: 18 November 1994
• Citation: Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun. Authority, 646 A.2d 734, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
• Parties: Clarence L. STUMPP, Appellant, v. STROUDSBURG MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 734

646 A.2d 734

166 Pa.Cmwlth. 554

Clarence L. STUMPP, Appellant, v.STROUDSBURG MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs April 12, 1994.

Decided Aug. 10, 1994.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Nov. 18, 1994.

Ronold J. Karasek, for appellant.

Michael Mancuso, for appellee.

Before COLINS and FRIEDMAN, JJ., RODGERS, Senior Judge.

COLINS, Judge.

Clarence L. Stumpp(Stumpp) appeals from the June 22, 1993 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County(Common Pleas) sustaining preliminary objections filed by the Stroudsburg Municipal Authority (Authority) in response to Stumpp's appeal of his termination by the Authority.

Stumpp was employed initially, as manager of the Authority (a local agency that provides water service for the Borough of Stroudsburg and its environs) and subsequently, pursuant to the Authority's February 7, 1992 letter, as an Authority filter plant operator.This letter in effect demoted Stumpp from the position of manager to that of plant operator allegedly because of past incidents and general conduct problems, which the Authority averred made it impossible for Stumpp to "effectively continue working in the capacity of Manager."The letter also requested that Stumpp advise the Authority if he wished to retain the plant operator position until his retirement.

In spite of the representations made in the foregoing letter, on September 17, 1992, Stumpp's employment was terminated by the Authority.Stump appealed to Common Pleas on October 16, 1992, asserting that the termination was a local agency adjudication.On January 29, 1993, the Authority filed preliminary objections to Stumpp's appeal, alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(1).On February 8, 1993, Stumpp filed an answer and new matter and, subsequently, on March 10, 1993, filed an amended answer to these preliminary objections.Additionally, the parties submitted briefs in support of their respective positions.

Common Pleas, by order and opinion dated June 22, 1993, sustained the Authority's preliminary objections and dismissed Stumpp's appeal, stating that it was unaware of any statute giving the Authority the power to contract and that, therefore, the Authority "could not enter into an employment contract, thus creating a property interest, with the Appellant."Based on this rationale, Common Pleas concluded that: (1) Stumpp's termination was not an adjudication from a local agency; (2) Stumpp therefore had no right of appeal from his termination; and (3) Common Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

Before us for determination is the question of whether Common Pleas erred in concluding: (1) that the Authority was not empowered by the legislature to enter into an employment contract with Stumpp; (2) that Stumpp was an at will employee without a property interest in his employment and, therefore, (3) that Stumpp's termination was not a local agency adjudication and hence was not appealable to Common Pleas.

Stumpp first argues that Common Pleas erred in sustaining the Authority's preliminary objections and in concluding that Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction over this matter.In this regard, Stumpp contends that the Authority's February 7, 1992 letter gave him a reasonable expectation of continued employment as a filter plant operator until his retirement, on which representation he justifiably relied.He further avers that although Common Pleas decided that no statute empowers the Authority to enter into employment contracts, the Authority, acting as a Borough agency pursuant to The Borough Code, Act of February 1, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1656, as amended, 53 P.S. § 45101-48501, can enter into employment contracts.Alternatively, Stumpp argues that even if we find his reliance on the foregoing statutory authority misplaced, basic common law principles of contract (e.g. implied contract, good faith, promissory estoppel) are applicable and render the Authority's termination action an adjudication that was appealable to Common Pleas.

Next, Stumpp maintains that his discharge "may have been the result of age discrimination and/or ill will/malice" which, if proven, would clearly constitute a violation of his "personal rights, privileges and immunities," an area encompassed by the term "adjudication," notwithstanding the Authority's position that an adjudication is narrowly limited to property rights.

Finally, Stumpp argues that Common Pleas, prior to its peremptory determination of the subject matter jurisdiction issue raised by the Authority, should have directed that a complete record be made since, in the present case, there was "no agency record at all."

Upon review, we agree that the Authority's February 7, 1992 letter reaffirmed the continued availability of Stumpp's position as a plant operator until his retirement, if he chose to retain it.The terms of this letter were so unequivocal as to give Stumpp an expectation of continued employment pursuant to what could be deemed, in effect, an implied contract.Specifically, the letter stated, "[i]f you wish to retain this position [of Plant Operator] until you retire, please advise the Authority Board so that we can schedule an executive session to discuss your salary."The record indicates that in accordance with the letter, Stumpp accepted the demotion from his former managerial position.The record also indicates that the Authority then scheduled an executive session establishing Stumpp's salary and that Stumpp was advised that he would have his filter plant operator position until he retired.

We also take issue with Common Pleas' reasoning that a municipal entity such as the Authority had no power to enter into an employment contract with Stumpp because the statutory provisions creating water supply districts were repealed on April 28, 1978, effective June 27, 1978.In Pavonarius v. City of Allentown, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 116, 629 A.2d 204(1993), this Court unequivocally reaffirmed that "[a]n individual employed by a local agency is an at-will employee and does not enjoy a property right in her employment unless she has an expectation of continued employment guaranteed by contract or statute."Id. at 121, 629 A.2d at 207(emphasis added).The Court further noted that because Pavonarius had a property right to continued employment, she also had a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as a statutory right in Pennsylvania to a due process hearing before being discharged.

Analogously, in the present case, the wording of the Authority's February 7, 1992 letter to Stumpp contained an offer of continued employment for a specific term, with only salary terms to be determined.Once Stumpp accepted this offer, a contractual relationship was created giving Stumpp a property right to continued employment and, therefore, a right to have a due process hearing prior to being terminated, regardless of the reason for the termination.Pavonarius.

Further, the contractual nature of the Authority's letter to Stumpp renders without merit the Authority's argument that there was no adjudication from which Stumpp may appeal.This Court adopted a similar rationale in Wortman v....