Sturdefant v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO: 4:16-CV-5163-RMP,: 4:16-CV-5163-RMP |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Washington |
| Parties | SHERYL STURDEFANT, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment from Plaintiff Sheryl Sturdefant, ECF No. 12, and the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), ECF No. 16. Ms. Sturdefant sought judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner's denial of her claims for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). The Court has reviewed the motions, the administrative record, and is fully informed. The motions were heard without oral argument. The Court grants in part Ms. Sturdefant's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 12, resulting in a remand of the case to the Commissioner, and denies the Commissioner's cross-motion, ECF No. 16.
Ms. Sturdefant applied for disability insurance benefits through an application filed on June 13, 2013. Administrative Record ("AR") 125-26.1 Ms. Sturdefant was 55 years old at the time that she applied for benefits. Ms. Sturdefant alleges that her onset date was October 1, 2008. AR 14. The parties do not dispute that Ms. Sturdefant's last insured date is December 31, 2010, meaning that Ms. Sturdefant must establish that she became disabled prior to the expiration of that status to secure the disability insurance benefits she seeks. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (c), (d). Ms. Sturdefant's application for disability insurance benefits was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Ms. Sturdefant timely requested a hearing.
A video hearing took place before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Laura Valente on July 21, 2015, presiding from Seattle, Washington, with Ms. Sturdefant, represented by attorney Chad Hatfield, participating from Kennewick, Washington.2Ms. Sturdefant responded to questions from her attorney and Judge Valente. Also testifying was Ms. Sturdefant's daughter Christina Hutchins. A vocational expert, K. Diane Kramer, was present but did not testify.
On August 7, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 9. Utilizing the five-step evaluation process, Judge Valente found:
Based on this finding, Judge Valente concluded that Ms. Sturdefant was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from October 1, 2008, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last insured.
The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Ms. Sturdefant's request for review on October 27, 2016. AR 1-6. Ms. Sturdefant now seeks judicial review.
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Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits only if the ALJ's determination was based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975); McCallister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence "means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decisions of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making a decision. Brawner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairments are of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experiences, engage in any other substantialgainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Step one determines if he is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied.
If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude any gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.
If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If the plaintiff is able to perform his previous work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant's RFC assessment is considered.
If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his residual functional capacity and age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is met once the claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in her previous occupation. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity, and (2) a "significant number of jobs exist in the national economy" which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).
A. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting all of Ms. Sturdefant's claims as groundless at step two of the sequential evaluation process
B. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of Ms. Sturdefant's medical provider
C. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Ms. Sturdefant's subjective complaints and lay witness testimony
The ALJ's determination that Ms. Sturdefant did not have any "severe" impairments ended at step two of the sequential evaluation process. Ms. Sturdefant contends that the ALJ erred when she concluded that Ms. Sturdefant's medically determinable impairments were not severe as of Ms. Sturdefant's last insured date. ECF No. 12 at 7.
Ms. Sturdefant has the burden of proving she had a severe impairment to satisfy step two of the sequential evaluation process. 42 U.S.C....
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