Sturdivant v. Indiana Protections & Advocacy Services, Cause No. IP 01-1717-C-T/K (S.D. Ind. 9/26/2003)
| Decision Date | 26 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP 01-1717-C-T/K.,CAUSE No. IP 01-1717-C-K/T. |
| Parties | LINDA STURDIVANT, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA PROTECTIONS & ADVOCACY SERVICES; GARY RICHTER, in his individual capacity; and THOMAS GALLAGHER, in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the summary judgment motion of the Defendants Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services ("IPAS"), Gary Richter and Thomas Gallagher. IPAS is a state agency which employed the Plaintiff, Linda Sturdivant, for twenty-four years before she was terminated April 2, 2001. Defendants Richter and Gallagher each supervised Plaintiff during various time periods from 1995 through her termination. They both participated in the decision to terminate her employment.
Sturdivant has filed suit claiming that IPAS discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the State of Indiana's comparable statutory scheme. She pursues Richter and Gallagher, individually, under the retaliation provisions of the ADA and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff claims to be disabled as a result of manic depression and a bipolar disorder, diagnosed in 1975, as well as gestational diabetes, which was diagnosed in 1988. The Defendants seek summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. For all of the reasons set forth in this opinion, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
. . . the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings, but must instead submit evidentiary materials setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The non-moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587 (1986). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the non-moving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which that party relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255 (1986). Only factual disputes which have a bearing on the outcome of the lawsuit, in light of the substantive law, will preclude summary judgment. JPM, Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996).
Sturdivant started with IPAS, a state agency charged with advocacy on behalf of citizens of Indiana with disabilities, in December of 1977 as an administrative secretary. Her diagnosis of manic depression and bipolar disorder predated her employment. She was diagnosed with diabetes in 1988. In 1995 she began reporting directly to Gallagher, the Executive Director of IPAS. In October of 1997, Sturdivant began reporting to Richter, who was the agency Support Services Director. Richter, in turn, reported to Gallagher.
On October 12, 2000, Sturdivant sent Richter a memo requesting an accommodation for her diabetic condition and renewing an accommodation request she had made previously in March of 1997 which dealt with her psychological condition. Specifically, Sturdivant sought an accommodation to limit the use of her hands-such as reduced typing and paper handling responsibilities. She also sought a separate office or partition from other clerical employees and the office reception area so that she could better maintain her focus and limit her stress.
In response to this memo, Richter met with Sturdivant and the agency's ADA coordinator On October 16, 2000, to discuss the request for accommodation. Richter then drafted a memo summarizing the meeting and the plan agreed to by everyone at the meeting. This plan included the intervention and analysis by Vocational Rehabilitation to identify potential reasonable accommodations to assist Sturdivant. During the October 16 meeting, Sturdivant provided the name of a physician for IPAS to contact regarding confirmation of her disabilities and identification of any physical limitations. At that time, or shortly thereafter, she also requested that she be sent to a psychiatrist of the State's choosing for an evaluation.
On November 8, 2000, Richter sent a written memorandum to Sturdivant with a copy of the written response Sturdivant's physician had provided to Richter's earlier request for identification of physical limitations and potential accommodations. The job requirements of Sturdivant's position with IPAS did not exceed the limitations and recommendations for accommodations in the undated written response to Richter from Sturdivant's physician. Sturdivant had not provided the name of any other physician, psychologist or psychiatrist to Richter for evaluation of her request for accommodation.
On February 8, 2001, Richter sent a written memorandum to Sturdivant reminding her to obtain permission from him if she sought to make up lost time by working late. On February 17, 2001, the Protection Advocacy Services Commission and Mental Illness Advisory Council met for their quarterly meetings. Part of Sturdivant's job responsibilities included the production of minutes from the meetings of the Protection Advocacy Services Commission and the Mental Illness Advisory Council. On February 28, 2001, Richter sent a request by e-mail to Sturdivant requesting that she complete a new roster for the Commission. The Commission roster was a list of seventeen names and addresses.
On March 1, 2001, Richter received the diagnostic assessment of Sturdivant from Vocational Rehabilitation. The aforementioned assessment made recommendations to Richter regarding changes in Sturdivant's mail duties to accommodate her disabilities. Among other things, it suggested the purchase of filing bins and an electric envelope opener. On March 8, 2001, Sturdivant's mail duties were assigned to other employees at IPAS. Sturdivant did not think that the assessment from Vocational Rehabilitation adequately addressed accommodation for her psychological conditions. On that same date, Richter made a final written response to Sturdivant's request for accommodation.
On March 12, 2001, Richter sent a written memorandum to Sturdivant that established time lines for her to complete the preparation of Commission minutes, Council minutes and the new Commission roster. The next day Richter sent a second memo to Sturdivant reminding her of the need for her to obtain permission from him in order to make up lost time by working late. On March 16 Richter issued a written reprimand to Sturdivant for failing to produce the Commission minutes, Council minutes and membership roster by the end of the day on March 15, 2001. By March 19, 2001, Sturdivant had still not completed the requested Council minutes or Commission roster. On that date, Richter issued a pre-deprivation memorandum to Sturdivant as a result of her repeated failure to complete her job tasks with respect to the minutes and roster.
A pre-deprivation meeting with Sturdivant occurred on March 20 and involved both Richter and Gallagher. At that time, Sturdivant was provided an opportunity to explain her failure to complete the assigned tasks. On March 22, 2001, Richter imposed a three-day suspension on Sturdivant for a continuing failure to complete the Council minutes and Commission roster. During this time period, Sturdivant was having problems with her computer.
On March 30, 2001, Sturdivant submitted a bi-weekly attendance report for payroll purposes. In that report, which she provided to Richter, Sturdivant claimed to have made up 5.25 hours of regular time during non-business hours. Richter had not provided Sturdivant with permission to do so. On April 2, 2001, both Richter and Gallagher met in person with Sturdivant. At that time she was terminated from her employment with IPAS. Both Richter and Gallagher claim that they terminated Sturdivant due to her repeated failure to follow reasonable and standard instructions and direction with respect to completing work assignments and following work procedures.
The first two counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint allege discrimination on the part of IPAS in violation of the ADA. Both counts allege that IPAS discriminated against Plaintiff by refusing to engage in meaningful, interactive discourse regarding reasonable accommodation to her disabilities, refused to provide or allow reasonable accommodation and discharged her because of her disabilities. The distinction Plaintiff attempts to draw...
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