Sturgeon v. State

• Decision Date: 18 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-9805-CR-307.,49S00-9805-CR-307.
• Citation: 719 N.E.2d 1173
• Parties: Charles D. STURGEON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

719 N.E.2d 1173

Charles D. STURGEON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49S00-9805-CR-307.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

November 18, 1999.

John Pinnow, Greenwood, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Garrard, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Charles D. Sturgeon raises interesting questions about when the motive to fabricate arises for purposes of Indiana Evidence Rule 801, what proof is necessary to warrant a change of judge in criminal cases, and others. Ultimately, we find these claims unavailing.

Facts and Procedural History

Sturgeon was found guilty on three counts: murder, felony murder, and robbery as a class A felony. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for murder, with a twenty year consecutive sentence for robbery, entered as a class B felony. The court also merged the conviction for felony murder with the murder conviction.

On March 4, 1995, Sturgeon, James Coffman, and several of their co-workers went to the Puck Around bar and the Bungalow Inn after work. At some point, Sturgeon called his girlfriend, Leslie Hauk, and she came to the Bungalow Inn. Sturgeon also called Gregory Anderson and asked him to pick up some drugs for the group.

Later that evening, Sturgeon and Coffman drove to Sturgeon's house. Sturgeon went inside, while Coffman remained in his car, sleeping. Sturgeon again called Anderson, and Anderson came to the house. When Anderson arrived, Sturgeon told him that he planned to rob Coffman, who had about $800 in cash on him. Coffman eventually awakened and went into Sturgeon's house. Anderson made two drug runs for Sturgeon and Coffman, then left.

The next morning, Sturgeon again called Anderson requesting drugs. Anderson went to Sturgeon's home and Sturgeon, Coffman, and Hauk were there when he arrived. Hauk gave Anderson money, and Anderson left to get drugs. When Anderson returned, no one answered the door and the cars that had been in the driveway were gone. That evening, Sturgeon went to Anderson's home and told him that Hauk had a fight with Coffman, during which Hauk stabbed Coffman with a knife and Coffman took the knife from her. Sturgeon said that he had then had to "mess [Coffman] up." (R. at 1446-47.)

Over the next two days, Sturgeon did not go to work, but Anderson saw him driving Coffman's car. After making another drug run for Sturgeon, Anderson went to Sturgeon's home. Telling Anderson, "you can handle this," Sturgeon allowed Anderson to enter his home, where Anderson saw Coffman's dead body on the floor. (R. at 1453-54.) Sturgeon then asked Anderson to help him move the body out of the house. The two men carried the body to Coffman's car and placed it in the trunk, hitting the legs with a tire iron or crowbar in order to make the body fit. Sturgeon drove the car away. On Wednesday, March 18, 1995, Coffman's son located the car in a parking lot about one block from the office where Coffman and Sturgeon had worked; he found Coffman's body inside.

Coffman had some twelve stab wounds in the right side of his back and five or six blunt force injuries to his head. The head injuries were caused by an object with a distinctive geometric shape, consistent with a crowbar. The wounds on Coffman's head and back had occurred about the same time and were likely inflicted by two people. The combination of wounds caused Coffman's death. No money was found in the car.

Later, two police detectives went to Sturgeon's house to question him. When they arrived, Sturgeon and several friends were cleaning the living room and taking up the carpet. After some questioning, Sturgeon consented to a search of his home. The search revealed blood on top of a table and blood spatters on a wall calendar which were consistent with a beating or stabbing. The blood on the table matched Hauk, while the blood stains on the calendar matched Coffman. An evidence technician also located swipe marks on the wall and it appeared that someone had cleaned the storm door.

On Sunday, March 5th, Hauk was arrested for driving while intoxicated after causing a traffic accident. She had blood on her pants and shoes and a blood stain on the back of her t-shirt. The blood matched both Hauk and Coffman. The police also found a bloody knife in the back of her car; the blood on the knife matched Coffman.

I. Evidence of Prior Statement

The State called Gregory Anderson to testify at trial about events surrounding Coffman's murder. Anderson testified that Sturgeon told him "Hauk had started to mess with Coffman and that he [Sturgeon] had to mess [Coffman] up." (R. at 1446-47.) Sturgeon also said that "[Hauk] had started this" and "he had to finish it." (R. at 1454.) Anderson further testified that he helped Sturgeon move the body from Sturgeon's home to the trunk of Coffman's car. On cross-examination, the defense impeached Anderson with inconsistencies between his trial testimony and a police statement given on March 11, 1995. The defense also implied that Anderson's testimony was influenced by favorable treatment from the State.¹ In response, the State offered Anderson's March 11th statement as evidence of a prior consistent statement. Sturgeon contends that the testimony was inadmissible under the prior consistent statement rule because, at the time Anderson made the statement, he had a motive to fabricate.

Under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is "consistent with the declarant's testimony, offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, and made before the motive to fabricate arose...." Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B); see also Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 882-83 (Ind.1994). We review trial court rulings on the admissibility of arguably hearsay statements for abuse of discretion. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 511 (Ind.1997).

Sturgeon clearly challenged Anderson's credibility with inconsistencies between Anderson's prior statement and his trial testimony. Sturgeon further implied that Anderson's testimony was influenced by favorable treatment from the State. Also, Anderson's police statement was consistent with his trial testimony and offered to rebut Sturgeon's charges of recent fabrication and improper influence. The remaining question is whether Anderson's statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose. Since Anderson was involved in the circumstances of the crime both before and after the crime occurred, Sturgeon asserts that Anderson had motive to shift blame away from himself and toward Sturgeon when questioned by the police. (Appellant's Br. at 32.)

Sturgeon relies upon Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620 (Ind.1998), and Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1997). In Bouye, the trial court admitted a prior statement by the defendant's co-conspirator implicating the defendant in a murder. The co-conspirator had already been arrested in connection with the murder when he made the statement. Bouye, 699 N.E.2d at 624-25. A few months later, the co-conspirator pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify against Bouye. Id. at 625. After being impeached by the defendant at trial, the co-conspirator's second statement was admitted and was identical to his trial testimony. Id. Bouye objected to the admission of his co-conspirator's prior statement, asserting the statement was made when the co-conspirator had a motive to fabricate. This Court agreed the "statement was made after his motive to fabricate arose and, therefore, the statement... does not qualify under Rule 801(d)(1) for exclusion from the definition of hearsay evidence." Id. at 626.

In Thompson, the court admitted a statement made by the defendant's alleged co-conspirator, Percy, through the testimony of Percy's friend. Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at 232. This statement implicated the defendant in a murder and was offered to rebut the defendant's charge of improper motive. Id. at 232 n. 8. Although this Court determined the statement was inadmissible on relevancy grounds, we also noted:

To be admissible under [801(d)(1)(B) ], Percy's motive to fabricate had to have arisen after the prior statement was made. Arguably this prerequisite is not satisfied here. Percy's motive to implicate Thompson arose instantaneously because Percy essentially admitted to an accomplice role in the murders; Percy had every reason to shift culpability to Thompson while minimizing his own involvement.

Id.

The State contends Anderson's statement was given before his motive to fabricate arose because the statement was given before the State levied charges against him. (Appellee's Br. at 12.) In so contending, the State relies on Evans, 643 N.E.2d 877. In that case, Evans sold drugs to Decker. Decker's statement implicating Evans was admitted at trial to rebut charges of improper motive. Id. at 881. Decker made the statement after he had been arrested, but before reaching a plea agreement with the State. Id. The defendant objected to the statement as hearsay. Id. We disagreed and held the statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). In so holding, we stated: "Decker's statement to the police came before he reached a plea agreement with the State and so satisfies all of the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." Id. at 883. Based on this reasoning, the State now argues Anderson's statement was given before a motive to fabricate arose because the statement was made before the State levied charges against Anderson and well before he pled guilty or entered into a plea bargain.

We cannot agree with the State that Evans stands for the proposition that a motive to...