Sturges v. the Fourth Nat'l Bank of Chicago.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CRAIG
• Citation: Sturges v. the Fourth Nat'l Bank of Chicago., 75 Ill. 595, 1874 WL 9302 (Ill. 1874)
• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Parties: WILLIAM N. STURGESv.THE FOURTH NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO.

75 Ill. 595

1874 WL 9302 (Ill.)

WILLIAM N. STURGES

v.THE FOURTH NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. T. D. MURPHY, Judge, presiding.

The opinion of the court states the material facts of the case, except the agreement between the parties was, that Sturges, the defendant, would pay all drafts drawn by his agents, equal to the cost of the grain at Washington, Iowa, where they were cashed, the grain to be shipped to the defendant.

Messrs. HARDING, MCCOY & PRATT, for the appellant.

Messrs. HOWE & RUSSELL, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by The Fourth National Bank of Chicago, in the Superior Court of Cook county, against Wm. N. Sturges, as acceptor of a bill of exchange, as follows:

“FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WASHINGTON, IOWA.

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                ¦$1611.13.¦WASHINGTON, IOWA, Oct.   9 th,   1872.¦
                +------------------------------------------------+
                

Pay to the order of H. S. Clark, cashier, sixteen hundred and eleven dollars and thirteen cents, value received, and charge the same to account of

E. BLAIR.

To W. N. STURGES, Chicago, Ills.”

“Indorsed: Pay T. J. Mapes, Esq., cashier, or order, for collection for First National Bank, Washington, Iowa.

H. S. CLARK, Cashier.”

The declaration contained one special count upon an acceptance of a bill of exchange, also the common counts.

It is insisted by appellant that the proof does not sustain the special count, and was not admissible under the common counts; that the proof only shows an agreement to accept the draft, and not that it was accepted.

It appears, from the evidence, that Blair was buying grain for appellant in Iowa, and appellant desired to effect an arrangement by which drafts drawn by Blair for grain purchased could be cashed at the First National Bank of Washington, Iowa. Appellee effected the arrangement with the Iowa bank, and appellant agreed to pay the drafts when presented by appellee.

This draft was cashed by the Bank at Washington, Iowa, and sent to appellee, and it was proved by two witnesses that, after the draft had been drawn, appellant agreed to pay it.

Appellee had not only the promise of appellant to pay the draft, before it was drawn, but also the agreement to pay it, after it had been drawn; this was clearly sufficient to support the special count of the declaration.

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