Sturgis v. Allegan County
| Decision Date | 03 October 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 147,147 |
| Citation | 72 N.W.2d 56,343 Mich. 209 |
| Parties | G. Ray STURGIS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF ALLEGAN, a Municipal Corporation, The Allegan County Board of Supervisors, Defendants and Appellants, The Allegan County Board of Education, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Dwight M. Cheever, Pros. Atty. Allegan County Bd. of Sup'rs, Allegan, Thompson Bennett, Kalamazoo, Co-Counsel.
Chester A. Ray, Allegan, for petitioner and appellee G. Ray Sturgis.
Before the Entire Bench.
Pursuant to the provisions of "the county school district act" 1 the defendant board of education on April 11, 1951, entered into a contract with plaintiff for his services as county superintendent of schools for the period beginning July 1, 1951, and ending June 30, 1955. The agreement referred to the fact that plaintiff's qualifications, powers and duties, and the salary payable to him by the State, were fixed by the statute. It was further specified that plaintiff should receive as a part of his compensation the sum of $1,500 per year and 'traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his official duties from the budget approved by the Board of Supervisors.'
It is not questioned that plaintiff has performed his duties as contemplated by the contract and statute. During the first four months of his tenure he was paid by the county board of education the sum of $125 per month. The board of supervisors, however, refused to honor the request of the board of education for the appropriation of money to pay the superintendent the amount fixed by the agreement in question, and in consequence further payments by the county were not made. In 1953 the sum of $1 was appropriated. Apparently it was the position of the defendant board of supervisors that the plaintiff's compensation as fixed by the board of education was subject to its approval.
Claiming that the county board of education was authorized by statute to fix compensation payable by the county in addition to the State salary, plaintiff, on the 30th of July, 1953, filed his petition in the circuit court for the county of Allegan asking that a writ of mandamus issue against the defendant board of education requiring the payment of the compensation fixed by said board, an for further and contingent relief against the other defendants. The board of education filed answer conceding plaintiff's right to the relief sought, but the other defendants, while admitting that plaintiff had been duly employed as county superintendent of schools, denied his right to be paid the sum of $1,500 per annum by the county for the reason that the board of supervisors had not specifically appropriated funds to cover said payment. The answer further denied that there was any duty on the part of said board to make the appropriation, and asserted further that it was within its legal rights in declining to honor the request of the county board of education to include in the budget therefor sufficient money to cover the compensation agreed to be paid to plaintiff in addition to the salary payable by the State.
The controversy was submitted to the trial court on the pleadings, but with the understanding that pertinent records of defendants should be available to the court for examination. After due consideration of the matter, the trial judge came to the conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought by him and entered an order directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus against the county board of education for the payment of salary due plaintiff from county funds, and further commanding that in the event said board of education being without sufficient funds to comply a further writ issue directing the other defendants to appropriate and make available sufficient funds for the required payment. From such order the defendant board of supervisors and the county of Allegan have taken an appeal, on leave granted, in the nature of certiorari.
The determination of the case involves a consideration of provisions of the county school district Act with reference to the powers of the board of education. Section 7 thereof, C.L.1948, § 388.177, Stat.Ann. 1953 Rev. § 15.167, defined the powers and duties of said board, containing, among other provisions, the following:
or school officers' meetings, pupils' mental and achievement tests, expenses incurred in the health and social service program of the office, and elections conducted by the county board of education, shall be paid by the county treasurer after the same have been authorized by the county board of education and amounts appropriated therefor by the county board of supervisors. The county board of education shall employ and contract with for a term of not to exceed 4 years a county superintendent of schools who shall have the qualifications and perform the duties as provided in this act: * * *
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'(g) The county board of education shall, previous to the second Monday of May of each year, make out and file with the county tax allocation board and with the county clerk of the county, or with the board of county auditors in counties having such board, the total amount required to carry on the lawful activities of the county board of education, which amount shall be assessed and collected at the same time and in the same manner as other county taxes are assessed and collected and paid out by the proper authorities of said county upon the direction of the county board of education.'
Subsequent amendments to other provisions of the statute do not affect that matters at issue here. Section 9a, referred to in section 7(d) above quoted, fixed the salary of the county superintendent of schools payable by the State. Other sections specified the qualifications of the superintendent and likewise his duties. It is apparent that the legislature intended to vest in the county board of education the power to appoint a qualified superintendent of schools to perform the duties imposed by law, and to provide for the payment of a salary by the State to said superintendent, with authority in the board of education to fix additional compensation to be paid by the county.
The power of the legislature with reference to matters pertaining to education has been repeatedly recognized. In Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N.W. 1002, 1004, after referring to certain constitutional provisions dealing with education, it was said:
'The Legislature has entire control over the...
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...the state at large.' Collins v. City of Detroit, 195 Mich. 330, 335—336, 161 N.W. 905, 907 (1917). See also Sturgis v. County of Allegan, 343 Mich. 209, 215, 72 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1955); Van Fleet v. Oltman, 244 Mich. 241, 244, 221 N.W. 299, 300 (1928); Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy......
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