Sturgis v. State of Washington

• Decision Date: 03 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 614-72C2.,614-72C2.
• Citation: 368 F. Supp. 38
• Parties: James STURGIS et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

368 F. Supp. 38

James STURGIS et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.

No. 614-72C2.

United States District Court, W. D. Washington, Seattle Division.

June 20, 1973.

Judgment Affirmed December 3, 1973.

Peter D. Francis, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiffs.

James B. Wilson, Seattle, Wash., for defendants.

Before WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, and EAST^* and McGOVERN^*, District Judges.

Judgment Affirmed December 3, 1973. See 94 S.Ct. 563.

McGOVERN, District Judge:

Plaintiffs seek to have this Court declare unconstitutional certain Washington State statutes which impose upon them a one-year durational residency requirement to qualify as residents for tuition purposes at the University of Washington. It is stipulated that each plaintiff is a registered full-time student at the University, and, with two exceptions, each plaintiff has established a bona fide domicile in the State of Washington within the meaning of RCW 28B.15.012.¹

That statute defines a resident student as one who has: (a) established a bona fide domicile in the State of Washington for other than educational purposes, and (b) established and maintained that domiciliary status for more than one year immediately preceding the commencement of the first day of the school term for which he registered at the State's institution of higher learning.

It is contended that the challenged statutes² require the plaintiffs to be treated differently for tuition purposes than other residents of the State, and thus, for no compelling state reason, they are deprived of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. They further contend that the statutes in question violate their constitutional rights to travel and to the due process of law.

The action is instituted under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act). Jurisdiction is vested in the Court under 28 U. S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and the Three-Judge Court was convened pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.

We find there to be no constitutional infirmity in the challenged statutes.

Plaintiffs argue that the discrimination created by the statutes in question infringe upon their basic constitutional rights and thus cannot be sustained in absence of a compelling state interest for the differentiation. They rest their arguments primarily on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). In Shapiro, the court declared unconstitutional certain State of Connecticut and District of Columbia statutory provisions which denied welfare assistance to persons who had not resided within the geographical boundaries of those jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding the application for the assistance. The Court reasoned that the classification served to limit the constitutionally protected right of the plaintiffs to travel, and that defendants had failed to prove that there was a compelling Governmental need for the discrimination. In Dunn, a Tennessee law creating a durational residency requirement of one year for purposes of qualifying residents to vote was held to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court held that it had the effect of creating a classification which resulted in the denial to some citizens of the fundamental constitutional right to vote and that it directly impinged on the exercise of a second fundamental right, the right to travel.

Dispositive of the arguments raised by plaintiffs here is the reasoning of the Court in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C.Minn.1970), affirmed without opinion, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971), which we adopt, and where the facts were almost identical to those at hand. In Starns, the University of Minnesota Board of Regents adopted a regulation which provided in part that:

"No student is eligible for residence classification in the University . . . unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior thereto."

In determining that the compelling state interest test was not the appropriate standard to apply in evaluating the classification, the Starns Court distinguished Shapiro in two respects, first, that:

"The Supreme Court found, based on weighty evidence, that the one-year waiting period for welfare assistance had as a specific objective the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who needed or may need relief. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 628-629, 89 S.Ct. 1322. The Court stated that such a purpose could not serve as a `justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.' Id. at 629, 89 S. Ct. at 1329." 326 F.Supp. at 237.

By contrast, the court in Starns, noted that there was no set of facts by which it could find that the tuition residency requirement was in any way designed to exclude or even deter an appreciable number of out-of-state students from attending the University of Minnesota and, for that reason, the compelling state interest test was held to be not applicable. As indicated by the record in that case,

"Of the approximately 50,000 students enrolled in the University (of Minnesota) . . . over 6,000 were non-residents."

Similarly, the total enrollment at the University of Washington for the Autumn Quarter of the 1972-1973 school year was 34,125 students, of whom 5,913 were classified as non-residents.

The record before us is devoid of evidence, or even a suggestion, that this tuition residency requirement was intended for any reason other than to cover the bare costs of providing for the students' costs of education. In fact, the only evidence before this Court which relates to the actual cost of higher education in the State of Washington shows that the fees for a non-resident student are directly related to the cost of educating that student. Thus, the non-resident student merely pays his way and no penalty can correctly be said to have attached to the non-resident status.

The second distinguishing feature found by the Court in Starns was said to be that:

"In Shapiro, the one-year waiting period for welfare assistance had the effect of denying the basic necessities of life to needy residents. Thus, the deterring effect on interstate movement by the use of the residency requirement was readily apparent." 326 F.Supp. at 238.

But that was not true in Starns, nor is it true here, because a person is not entitled to a higher education as a matter of right. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (March 21, 1973). Also, see the Washington State Constitution³ which makes provision only for the education of children. And, obviously, it cannot rightfully be said that a person without a higher education is a person without the basic necessities of life.

While plaintiffs claim that the Court is bound by Shapiro and Dunn to subject the challenged statutes to "close judicial scrutiny", it is observed that the residential classifications in those cases involved not only the right to travel, but also the right to the basic necessities of life and the right to vote. As already noted, the right to a higher education which is involved here is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that this is not a case of infringement of a fundamental right and therefore hold that the exacting standards of the compelling state interest test are not here applicable.

Instead, the constitutionality of the contested statutes must be viewed in the light of the traditional equal protection standard, i. e., is there a rational, reasonable, relevant distinction between the differentiated classes? If there is not, then the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.

Plaintiffs contend that they are foreclosed by the durational residency requirement from successfully controverting for a period of one year the presumption of non-residency, and that such a presumption is arbitrary, unreasonable and an invidious discrimination against them in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. We find there to be a rational basis for the classification and thus hold otherwise.

The evidence before this Court shows that the purpose of the differentiation is to afford residents of this State who have resided here for more than one year immediately preceding the commencement of the school term an opportunity to attend the University at a cost subsidized by the taxpayers of the State, while charging those who have not theretofore contributed tax dollars to the State the actual cost to the State of their education. The one-year waiting period thus serves to provide the state with a time period during which it may charge a realistic tuition rate in order to achieve a partial cost equalization. As the Court said in Starns:

"We believe that the State . . . has the right to say that those new residents of the State shall make some contribution, tangible or intangible, towards the State's welfare for a period of twelve months before becoming entitled to enjoy the same privileges as long-term residents possess to attend the University at a reduced resident's fee."

It appears to us that for the foregoing reasons, the distinctions drawn by the challenged statutes bear a rational, reasonable and relevant relationship to a legitimate state purpose and thus constitute permissible legislation. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), and McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).

It is the judgment of this Court that the statutes of the State of Washington which require a State University student to establish a one-year residency within the State in order for that person to qualify as a resident...