Sturrup v. Mahan, No. 174S14

• Docket Nº: No. 174S14
• Citation: 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877
• Case Date: January 21, 1974

Page 877

305 N.E.2d 877 261 Ind. 463 Warren B. STURRUP, By his guardian and next friend, Lamount
H. Sturrup, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Robert M. MAHAN, Principal of University Junior-Senior High
School, Phil N. Eskew, Commissioner of the Indiana
High School Athletic Association,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 174S14. Supreme Court of Indiana. Jan. 21, 1974.

Page 878

David S. McCrea, Bloomington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Harold J. Bell, Mark E. Bell, Bell & Bell, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee, Phil N. Eskew and Indiana High School Athletic Assn.

Len E. Bunger, Jr., Snyder, Bunger, Cotner, Harrell & Robertson, Bloomington, for defendant-appellee, Robert M. Mahan.

HUNTER, Justice.

This action was brought on behalf of Warren B. Sturrup by his appointed legal guardian against Robert M. Mahan, as principal of University Junior-Senior High School, Bloomington, and Phil N. Eskew, as Commissioner of the Indiana High School Athletic Association. Sturrup moved from Miami, Florida, to Bloomington, Indiana, in the [261 Ind. 464] summer of 1971, to live with his brother, due to alleged 'demoralizing and detrimental conditions' of his home and school environment in Florida. ¹ He was subsequently denied eligibility to participate in athletics at his new high school in Bloomington. Sturrup's ineligibility was founded on the rules of the IHSAA as interpreted by the defendants. ² These rules are as follows:

IHSAA Rule 12, Section 1

'No student, who has been enrolled as a high school student in any member school, shall be permitted to participate in any inter-school contest as a member of another member school until he has been enrolled in such school for one calendar year, unless the parents of such student actually change their residence to the second school district. In the latter case, the student will be

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as eligible as he was in the school from which he withdrew.'

Rule 22, Section 3 and 6

'Section 3--If a student transfers from one member school to another member school and his parents actually change their residence to the second school district, he shall be as eligible as he was in the school from which he withdrew.'

'Section 6--Unavoidable Change of Residence. A student who, because of unavoidable circumstances such as the death of the parents or guardian, finds it necessary to change residence from one school district to another in order to have a home, may be declared eligible by the Board of Control, provided the principal of each member school files a statement, with supporting evidence, with the Board of Control as proof that the change was necessary and that no undue influence was attached to the case in any way. If any action of a legal agency is to be submitted as evidence of unavoidable change of residence, such action should be taken prior to the student's enrollment in the new school.'

[261 Ind. 465] Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, restraining defendants from declaring him ineligible to participate in varsity athletics. The preliminary injunction was denied by the trial court.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, Third District, where the judgment was reversed in an opinion by Judge Hoffman, with Staton, J., concurring, and Sharp, J., dissenting with opinion.

Although the issue of Warren Sturrup's eligibility has been mooted by the passage of time, we have granted transfer in order to correct a fundamental error in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the above-mentioned IHSAA bylaws unconstitutionally burdened Warren Sturrup's fundamental right to travel among the states. More specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Warren Sturrup was denied equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals' constitutional analysis can be summarized as follows:

The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent reasonable classifications created by the State. The IHSAA bylaws constitute State action within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. Usually, a showing of reasonableness is sufficient to sustain a legislative or administrative classification. However, if the classification is based upon suspect criteria (race, religion, alienage) or impinges upon a fundamental right, mere reasonableness will not suffice. The burden shifts to the State to demonstrate a compelling State interest and a necessary relation between the classification and that interest. In this case the compelling State interest or high scrutiny model applies. Sturrup was exercising his fundamental right to travel among the states. The State has failed to establish a compelling State interest and the bylaws' necessary relation to the furtherance of that interest. Therefore, the bylaws deny Sturrup the equal protection of the laws.

[261 Ind. 466] We do agree with the Court of Appeals' assessment of equal protection methodology. However, we do not agree with its application in the case at bar.

The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' The threshold inquiry, whenever equal protection of the laws is alleged to have been denied, is whether there is a burden distributed by the State to one group and not another. If, and only if, dissimilar treatment exists, the equal protection analysis applied by the Court of Appeals is triggered. Otherwise, there is no need to proceed with

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the equal protection analysis, because the existence of an equal protection violation is precluded.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is largely predicated on the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, and Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274. In those cases durational requirements for receiving welfare benefits and for voting were struck down on the ground that such requirements impinged upon the fundamental right to travel interstate. The Supreme Court was entirely justified in invoking the standard equal protection methodology, not merely because there was a legislative classification and a fundamental right involved, but because those similarly situated...