Stutchin v. Town of Huntington, CV983580 ADS.
| Decision Date | 28 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CV983580 ADS.,CV983580 ADS. |
| Citation | 71 F.Supp.2d 76 |
| Parties | Burt H. STUTCHIN and Cheryl Stutchin, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON and Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Burt Stutchin, Hempstead, NY, Pro Se.
James F. Matthews, Huntington Town Attorney, Huntington, NY (Robert De Gregario, Special Assistant Town Attorney, Heidi Levine-Sorken, Assistant Town Attorney, of Counsel), for Town of Huntington.
Humes & Wagner, Locust Valley, NY (James A. Bradley, John Ritter, Jr., Linda S. Agnew, of Counsel), for Defendant Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor.
This case involves the constitutionality of the Village of Lloyd Harbor Code which provides that docks in Lloyd Harbor shall be limited in length to seventy-five (75) feet seaward, and that in no event shall the seaward end of the dock extend beyond the point where the mean low water depth exceeds two (2) feet. This Village Code provision effectively prevents boats with a draft of two feet or more from being moored to any dock in the Village. The Court will also consider the constitutional attack on the Town of Huntington Code (the "Town") limiting the length of docks to 100 feet.
The Court notes that it will discuss two "Lloyd Harbors" in this decision. The first "Lloyd Harbor" is an incorporated village in Suffolk County and consists of land in the Village. The second is a narrow tidal body of water which emanates from Huntington Harbor, which is also known as "Lloyd Harbor." In this opinion, the Court will refer to the Village of Lloyd Harbor as the "Village." The Court will refer to the body of water adjacent to the plaintiffs' property as "Lloyd Harbor," also referred to as the "Inner Harbor." This body of water is also within the Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor.
The complaint of the plaintiffs Burt Stutchin and Cheryl Stutchin (the "Stutchins" or the "plaintiffs"), challenges the Village of Lloyd Harbor's denial of a permit to build a 115-foot dock behind their waterfront property to accommodate their 36-foot Trojan vessel. The complaint also attacks the Town Code provision limiting dock length to 100 feet.
The Court has waded through the sea of motion papers from the parties: (1) a motion to dismiss the Amended Verified Complaint ("the complaint") by the defendant Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor; (2) a motion to dismiss the complaint by the defendant Town of Huntington; (3) a motion for summary judgment by the married plaintiffs; and (4) a cross-motion by the Village, which the Town adopts in its entirety, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, Rule 11 sanctions and attorneys' fees and costs. To assist the Court in deciding these motions, which raised issues of fact concerning, among other matters, the conditions present in Lloyd Harbor, the Court conducted a full-blown hearing.
As stated above, the plaintiffs' complaint flows from the Village's denial of their application for a permit to construct a 115-foot dock behind their waterfront property, in excess of the Village Code's maximum length. The plaintiffs raise various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, anchored in the state and federal constitutions. Specifically, the Stutchins contend that the Village's refusal to approve their application dampens their legal and constitutional rights to own and use their property and its riparian rights, constitutes a taking of their property for public use without just compensation, and violates their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs' two causes of action are: first, a Section 1983 challenge to the constitutionality of the Village and Town Codes at issue, and second, a Section 1983 "taking" cause of action for monetary damages. The plaintiffs' complaint also dives into State law, contending that the designation of Lloyd Harbor as a Critical Environmental Area failed to comply with certain procedural requirements of New York Law. The defendants respond that the plaintiffs' claims do not hold water, because their claims are not ripe for review, and the local laws being challenged are constitutionally and legally sound.
During the hearing, the Court stated what it believed to be the most important principle in the determination of the constitutionality of Local Law 1 of 1992:
THE COURT: The defendant village wants to show that it had a legitimate governmental purpose in making the laws that it did. That is one of the important tests. Did the village have a legitimate governmental purpose that would override the inconvenience of you in using — in not being able to use your boat at the dock. Did they have a legitimate governmental purpose that would trump your inconvenience?
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows:
The plaintiffs own real property located on the southern shore of Lloyd Harbor, a body of water located entirely within the Village, which itself is located in the Town. The Village has designated Lloyd Harbor as a Critical Environmental Area, so that any action affecting Lloyd Harbor is a "Type I action" under the State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), N.Y.E.C.L. art. 8.
The Stutchins own a 36-foot Trojan motorboat which draws at least 3 feet of water at anchor. The plaintiffs have been mooring their boat in the stream in Lloyd Harbor, and must travel between the vessel and their property in a dinghy. They wish to build a dock 115 feet in length on their waterfront property to allow them more convenient access to their vessel.
On July 25, 1997, the Stutchins received a permit from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") authorizing the construction and installation of a ramp and floating dock assembly, which stated that it was "contingent upon strict compliance with ... all applicable regulations" and the "obtaining [of] any other permission, consent or approval from the ... local government which may be required." On or about September 4, 1997, the plaintiffs received a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, which contained a similar proviso that "[t]his permit does not obviate the need to obtain other Federal, state or local authorizations required by law."
On or about February 4, 1998, the Stutchins applied to the Village for the required permit to construct a 115-foot dock adjacent to their property, with the expectation that their application would meet with smooth sailing. Their application ran aground, however, because Village of Lloyd Harbor Zoning Code § 205-104 B(1) allows only seasonal (April through October) floating docks in the district where the plaintiffs' residence is located, provided that the dock length does not exceed 75 feet and does not extend beyond the point where the mean low water depth exceeds 2 feet, whichever is closest to land. In or about January 1998, the Village denied the plaintiffs' permit application because their proposed dock assembly did not comply with the Village Code.
On or about January 26, 1998, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Village Board of Zoning Appeals, seeking a variance. As of August 20, 1999, the date of the closing arguments after the hearing, the plaintiffs' application for the variance was undecided and still pending before the Board of Zoning Appeals.
The plaintiffs have not yet applied for a permit from the Town of Huntington, another prerequisite to building the dock. Under Huntington Town Code § 137-22 D(4), the Town will not consider issuing a dock permit unless and until approval has been obtained from the Village. The Town Code provides that when the length of a proposed dock exceeds the 100-foot long maximum permitted under the Town Code, the applicant must apply for a variance pursuant to Section 137-26 A(1) of the Town Code.
On May 13, 1998, the Stutchins launched this lawsuit and on June 23, 1998 filed the complaint at issue.
The plaintiffs contend that they are not required to pursue variances or to obtain final determinations on their applications for dock permits, because the Village and Town dock construction ordinances are "unconstitutional, illegal and invalid." In this regard, the plaintiffs assert that the ordinances "do not promote the health, safety, welfare or morals of the general public; are not enacted in furtherance of a comprehensive land use plan; are not rationally related to achieving a permissible municipal goal; and are arbitrary and capricious." The plaintiff Burt Stutchin, Esq., pro se, summarized his position in his opening statement, as follows:
It's my contention, Judge, that there is no basis for the municipal regulation of the plaintiffs' riparian rights to the degree that they've imposed. As — Your Honor is obviously troubled by this two-foot limitation, as you rightfully should be, because it is a ridiculous limitation. And the intent of this limitation, whether the municipalities will admit it or not, is to preclude people from keeping any vessel larger than an inflatable raft or a dingy at a dock.
The question presented is whether the zoning ordinances in question here "bear[ ] anything other than a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective." Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1225 (2d Cir.1994) (). On the other hand, the defendants contend that the limitation of dock...
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