Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Butler, 46143

• Decision Date: 21 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 46143,46143
• Citation: 314 So.2d 567
• Parties: STUYVESANT INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation doing business in Florida, Petitioner, v. Alphonso BUTLER, a minor, by his father and next friend, Edward A. Butler, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 567

314 So.2d 567

1976 A.M.C. 1182

STUYVESANT INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation doing business in Florida, Petitioner, v. Alphonso BUTLER, a minor, by his father and next friend, Edward A. Butler, et al., Respondents.

No. 46143.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 21, 1975.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1975.

Joseph P. Milton of Toole, Taylor, Moseley, Gabel & Milton, Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Ralph E. Sistrunk and William T. Kaler of Sistrunk & Kaler, Jacksonville, for Alphonso Butler and Edward A. Butler.

John B. Culp, Jr. of the Law Offices of John B. Culp, Jr., Jacksonville, for Blue Star, Inc., respondents.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Butler et al. v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., reported at 297 So.2d 595 (Fla.App.1, 1974), which purportedly conflicts with State Liquor Stores #1 v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 243 So.2d 228 (Fla.App.1, 1971); Home Indemnity Co. v. Alday, 213 So.2d 13 (Fla.App.1, 1968); Continental Casualty Co. v. Borthwick, 177 So.2d 687 (Fla.App.1, 1965); Rakoff v. World Insurance Co., 191 So.2d 476 (Fla.App.3, 1966); Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 175 So.2d 581 (Fla.App.3, 1965); Winter Garden Ornamental Nursery, Inc. v. Cappleman, 201 So.2d 479 (Fla.App.4, 1967); and Graves v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 132 So.2d 393 (Fla.1961).

The opinion of the District Court succinctly sets out the facts of the cause as follows:

'Appellants (petitioners-herein) seek reversal of a summary judgment entered in favor of appellee (respondent-herein) in an action for injuries sustained by Alphonso Butler on a shrimping vessel insured by appellee.

'The injured plaintiff was 17 years old when working as a crewman aboard the vessel Blue Star. He and his father sued Corey Jervis as owner of the vessel. Appellee then and for almost a year undertook the defense of the action and in answering admitted the allegation that the vessel was owned by Jervis. It was later determined through discovery that the true owner was Blue Star, Inc., whereupon appellee's counsel were permitted to amend their answer and answers to interrogatories to deny that Jervis was the owner of the vessel and to allege therein that it was owned by Blue Star, Inc. Then the Butlers amended their complaint by adding Bule Star, Inc. and the appellee as defendants.

'Although the complaint was filed by appellants on October 10, 1969, it was not until three years later that appellee asserted for the first time as a defense and as basis for its motion for summary judgment and exclusionary clause, on which the court later based its summary judgment being reviewed herein, that reads as follows:

"It is hereby understood and agreed that this policy excludes any and all liability in respect to minors employed or otherwise on board this vessel and/or vessels."

Petitioner filed its answer on November 15, 1972, denyig, inter alia, that it had in full force and effect a policy of liability insurance which inured to the benefit of the plaintiff, as said was specifically excluded from those class of persons protected by said policy of insurance, as the plaintiff was a minor and minor crew members are expressly and unequivocably excluded from coverage. In March, 1973, petitioner insurance company moved for summary judgment on pleadings, depositions and affidavits. The trial court granted this motion for the reason that defendant's contract of insurance did not cover 'minors.'

The District Court of Appeal in its decision set out the following facts giving rise to the litigation:

'Appellant, Alphonso Butler, was part of an experienced three-man crew aboard the Blue Star at the time of the accident. He had already served on the crew of another shrimping vessel for a year and had advanced to second mate of the Blue Star at the time of the accident. The captain of the Bule Star knew that Alphonso was 17 years old when he hired him and knew him to be an able and experienced shrimper. Before hiring him, the captain stated that he had learned from Alphonso's previous captain that he was one of the best men that the latter had ever hd aboard his vessel. The Blue Star captain also stated that a person with Alphonso Butler's experience could be the captain of a shrimp boat.

'The insurance policy issued by the appellee providing coverage for accidents occurring aboard the Blue Star vessel confines coverage to inland and coastal waters of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, but not exceeding 150 miles off the mainland, and also to include all waters of the Gulf of Mexico.'

On appeal of this summary judgment, the First District Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was not a 'minor' within the exclusionary clause of the insurance policy at the time of the accident, and, therefore, was not excluded from coverage under the policy. The District Court reasoned, as follows:

'Appellant contends that although he was only 17 years old when the accident occurred, he was not a 'minor' within the exclusionary clause in the insurance policy. Appellant points to the absence of a definition in the policy for the word 'minor' and argues convincingly that the definition to be accorded should be determined in the context within which the word is used. That context is an insurance policy to provide coverage for injuries sustained by crewmen on board a shrimping vessel engaged in the fisheries industry on the high seas within 150 miles of the coast of North and South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, as well as all waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

'Appellant is correct in our judgment. In absence of a policy definition to the contrary, we believe the meaning to be given should be consistent with generally understood and accepted meaning of the word in the parlance of the maritime industry.

'When taken in the context of maritime law, a 'minor' is not necessarily the same as a 'minor' for other purposes. Federal statutes define an 'able seaman' as a person 19 years of age or more who has had at least three years of service. Thus, federal law contemplates that a 16 year old is eligible for employment as a seaman.

'The International Labor Organization in a proclamation in regard to age of seamen stated that children under the age of 15 years shall not be employed on vessels. The United States Navy permits a 17 year old to go to sea as a crewman. Thus, it appears to us that for the purpose of construing this insurance policy covering a fishing vessel, one need only look to the accepted nomenclature in the maritime industry in order to determine that a 17 year old, although a minor for some purposes, was contemplated as being within the class of persons covered by the policy.'

Judge Boyer specially concurred with the majority, completely agreeing with its rationale, and stating further that careful examination of the policy provision in question reveals that it is ambiguous on its face. He further noted that:

'. . . the policy provision does not purport to exclude 'coverage' or coverage for 'injuries'. It merely purports to exclude 'liability'. How one excludes liability is beyond my imagination. Further, the subject provision purports to exclude liability 'in respect to minors'. Rhetorically one might ask: Does the subject provision purport to exclude coverage for injuries To minors? Does it purport to exclude coverage for injuries resulting from the acts Of minors?'

The cases cited by petitioner for conflict state the general principle relative to construction of insurance policies that if the language of the policy is plain and unambiguous, the words must be given their commonly accepted meaning; and when the meaning of the policy provision is clear and free from doubt, it will be enforced as written and resort will not be made to extrinsic evidence for the purpose of arriving at a proper construction of the language used. These decisions do not conflict with the instant decision of the District Court since the policy provision in question was found to be ambiguous.

We agree that the policy provision in question is ambiguous in view of the circumstances of this cause, and we conclude that the District Court correctly decided that in the absence of definition in the policy of the term minor and in view of the nature of the policy--to provide coverage for injuries sustained by crewmen on board a shrimping vessel engaged in the fisheries industry on the high seas within 150 miles of the coast of North and South Carolina, Georgia and Florida--the term should be given meaning consistent with the parlance of the maritime industry. It would have been a simple matter for the insurance company to have merely stated that it would not insure one under a certain age but instead it chose to use the indefinite term of minority. As respondent herein asserts, the area covered in the policy includes the above enumerated states and confines it to the inland and coastal waters of these states but further provides that this means not to exceed 150 miles off the mainland. Respondent contends that to hold otherwise than that the youngest age at which a person is understood and accepted to have the status of majority in any of the jurisdictions covered by the policy, would produce the absurd result that a seaman aboard the vessel against whose injuries the assured had paid to be protected could sail from coverage to noncoverage just by crossing from international to territorial waters. It is common knowledge that fishing vessels often hire young crew members.

This Court has consistently adhered to the principle that contracts of insurance should be construed so as to give effect to the intent of the parties and if uncertainty is present in a policy, it should be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Harris v. Carolina Life Insurance Co., 233 So.2d 833 (Fla.1970); Winters v. Phillips, 234 So.2d 716 (...