Stuyvesant Town v. Ligham
Decision Date | 14 February 1955 |
Docket Number | No. A--89,A--89 |
Citation | 17 N.J. 473,111 A.2d 744 |
Parties | STUYVESANT TOWN, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Petitioner, v. Chester K. LIGHAM, State Rent Control Director, Respondent. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Weisman, Newark, for petitioner (Weisman & Freedman, Newark, attorneys).
Harold Kolovsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent (Grover C. Richman, Jr., Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, attorney; Anthony Zoppi, Deputy Atty. Gen., on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is a proceeding on petition for declaratory judgment comparable to the matter of Brookchester, Inc., Section I. v. Ligham, 17 N.J. 460, 111 A.2d 737. The declaratory relief sought by the petitioner herein, Stuyvesant Town, Inc. a New Jersey corporation, and resisted by Chester K. Ligham, Director of the Office of Rent Control of the State of New Jersey (hereinafter referred to as the State Director), parallels that sought by the petitioners in the Brookchester, Inc., case, supra, and the salient features herein are for purposes of disposition of this matter identical thereto. The petition in the present case was filed in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, in lieu of prerogative writ, under R.R. 4:88--10, and was certified prior to hearing there on our own motion.
The present matter involves questions disposed of by us in the Brookchester, Inc., case, supra. However, an additional question is presented in the present matter, concerning an alleged conflict between the police power of the State (as exerted in the State Rent Control Act of 1953, L.1953, c. 216, N.J.S. 2A:42--14 et seq., N.J.S.A., no question relating to the amendments thereto effected by L.1954, c. 260, effective December 22, 1954, being advanced herein) and provisions of the National Housing Act, namely Title VI, sec. 608, of the Act of June 27, 1934, c. 847, as added May 26, 1942, c. 319, sec. 11, 56 Stat. 303, and the amendments and supplements thereto (see 12 U.S.C.A., sec. 1743). This is a question of importance and of general public significance and deserves consideration even though in respect to other matters the facts in this case should present a case exactly parallel to that just decided and would call for a like decision; because if the State has no right of control in the matter the declaration of invalidity of the State Director's orders insofar as they subject the petitioner's property to state rent control should not be qualified but should be absolute.
The pleadings and affidavits on file in this case show that the following are the uncontradicted facts.
Stuyvesant Town, Inc., the petitioner herein, was incorporated in 1946 under and by virtue of the statutes of this State, commonly known as the General Corporation Act, R.S. 14:1--1 et seq., N.J.S.A., and the several supplements thereto and acts amendatory thereof. Its purpose was expressly stated in the certificate of incorporation to be 'to create a private corporation to provide housing for rent or sale.'
The certificate of incorporation authorized Stuyvesant Town, Inc.
It provided for the issuance of stock, including 100 shares of preferred stock. The certificate of incorporation provided in this respect:
It also contained the following express terms:
'Sixth: The corporation shall not without prior approval of the holders of a majority of the shares of preferred stock, given either in writing or by vote at a meeting of the preferred stockholders called for that purpose (a) assign, transfer, dispose of or encumber any real or personal property, including rents, except as specifically permitted by the terms of the mortgage, (b) remodel, reconstruct, demolish or substract from the premises constituting the project and subject to such mortgage, (c) Permit the occupancy of any of the dwelling accommodations of the corporation except at or below the rents fixed by the schedule of rentals provided hereinafter, (d) consolidate or merge the corporation into or with any other corporation; go into voluntary liquidation; carry into effect any plan of reorganization of the corporation; redeem or cancel any of its shares of preferred stock, or effect any changes whatsoever in its capital stock; alter or amend the certificate of incorporation or fail to establish and maintain reserves as set forth in this certificate of incorporation.'
'Eighth: The following provisions are hereby adopted for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation and in regulation of the powers of the corporation, the directors and stockholders:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The affidavits filed demonstrate that these provisions of the corporate charter were required by the Federal Housing Commissioner to qualify the petitioner as an applicant for mortgage insurance under Section 608 of the National Housing Act, ante.
The affidavits show without contradiction that the petitioner acquired mortgage insurance from the Federal Housing Administration and constructed its rental housing accommodations (completing the project late in 1947) in accordance with its charter and the regulations promulgated by the Federal Housing Commissioner; and that maximum rent schedules applicable to this project have been approved by the preferred stockholder, I.e., by the Federal Housing Commissioner. The petition asserts, and the answer filed by the State Director admits, that section 608 of the National Housing Act, ante, expired in 1950, but the controls and restrictions imposed thereby upon projects covered by insured mortgages remain in effect until the mortgages insured thereunder have been fully paid and satisfied.
The State Director further admitted in his answer herein that the original rules and regulations adopted by him 'excepted from the operation of the Act (I.e., the State Rent Control Act of 1953, ante) certain classes of rental property, one of which classes included the rental property of the petitioner.'
Subsequently the State Director adopted rules and regulations referred to as Change No. 5 and Change No. 7, the pertinent provisions of which are set forth in our opinion in the Brookchester, Inc., case, supra, and are also included in the pleadings and affidavits on file in this case. The effect of these rules and regulations was to subject the petitioner's rental property to state rent control.
The questions involved in this matter, raised by the petition for declaratory judgment and answer thereto, include the...
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