Stymiest v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, CIV 14-3001

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: CHARLES B. KORNMANN
• Decision Date: 18 March 2014
• Docket Number: CIV 14-3001
• Citation: Stymiest v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, CIV 14-3001 (D. S.D. Mar 18, 2014)
• Parties: MATTHEW DAVID STYMIEST, Petitioner, v. ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE, Respondent.

MATTHEW DAVID STYMIEST, Petitioner, v. ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE, Respondent.

CIV 14-3001

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA CENTRAL DIVISION

Filed: March 21, 2014

Dated: March 18, 2014

OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND

Matthew Stymiest ("Stymiest") was charged in federal district court with assault resulting in serious bodily injury arising out of an assault which took place within the exterior boundaries of the Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota, CR 08-30006. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced on September 24, 2008, to 110 months custody. He challenged his conviction and sentence, contending that he was not an Indian for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2009), holding that, although Stymiest was not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe (he is not eligible to enroll because he does not have the requisite percentage of Indian blood), enrollment is not the only means of establishing Indian status nor is it necessarily determinative.

The Eighth Circuit held in Stymiest's direct criminal appeal that jurisdiction is proper under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 if "the defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government or both." United States v. Stvmiest, 581 F.3d at 762 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846)). The evidence at trial showed that Stymiest's grandfather was an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota. Stymiest thus has some Indian blood, although he lacks the necessary quantum of Indian blood for tribal enrollment.

I instructed the jury that, in determining whether Stymiest was recognized as an Indian by a tribe, they may consider factors including "tribal recognition formally or informally through subjecting the defendant to tribal court jurisdiction" and "whether the defendant holds himself out as an Indian." The Eighth Circuit held that "the district court properly identified two other factors relevant on the facts of this case-that the tribe exercised criminal jurisdiction over Stymiest and that Stymiest held himself out to be an Indian." United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764 (internal citations omitted). The evidence at trial showed that Stymiest was prosecuted three times in the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court for tribal offenses. "Each time, Stymiest pleaded no contest, did not appeal, and received a suspended sentence or spent time in the tribal jail." United States v. Stvmiest, 581 F.3d at 765.

Stymiest has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303, the enforcement provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"), Pub. L. 90-284, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. He challenges the three tribal court convictions on the basis that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him because he was not an Indian. He also seeks a ruling that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe does not have jurisdiction to prosecute him in the future for the conduct comprising his federal assault conviction even though his federal crime took place on the Rosebud Indian Reservation.

Petitioner filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner is indigent Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), petitioner is nonetheless required to pay the statutory filing fee of $5.00 for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

DECISION

A. Indian Civil Rights Act

Section 203 of the ICRA provides that the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303.¹ The ICRA prohibits Indian tribes from deprivingany person of liberty without due process of law. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8). "[I]f a tribal court acts outside the scope of its jurisdiction, that action may constitute a due process violation." DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1989). Stymiest's claim is thus cognizable under the ICRA habeas corpus provision.

B. Sovereign Immunity.

"Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,498 U.S. 505, 509,111 S.Ct. 905, 909 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief. Moreover, since the respondent in a habeas corpus action is the individual custodian of the prisoner, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the provisions of § 1303 can hardly be read as a general waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity. In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978).

"Congress clearly has power to authorize civil actions against tribal officers, and has done so with respect to habeas corpus relief in § 1303." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,436 U.S. at 60, 98 S.Ct. at 1678. The appropriate respondent in this case is not the Tribe. Stymiest is not in tribal custody so the appropriate respondent is not his tribal custodian. Instead, the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court is the appropriate respondent. See Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969) (the appropriate respondent in a case where there is no actual physical custodian is the court which imposed the criminal penalty) (abrogated on other grounds, Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791-792 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that imposition of a fine was not sufficient custody for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2241).

C. Detention.

"'Detention' by order of an Indian tribe is the sole jurisdictional prerequisite for federal habeas review." Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 922 (9th Cir. 2010). The United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]he 'detention' language in § 1303 is analogous to the 'in custody' requirement contained in the [other] federal habeas statute[s]." Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199,1203 (10th Cir. 2012). "As with other statutory provisions governing habeas relief, one seeking to invoke jurisdiction of a federal court under § 1303 must demonstrate, under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,243, 83 S.Ct. 373, 377, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963), and its progeny, a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty." Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2nd Cir. 1996).

The detention requirement is designed to limit the availability of habeas review "to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate." Henslev v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973). Therefore, the inquiry into whether a petitioner has satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisite for habeas review requires a court to judge the "severity" of an actual or potential restraint on liberty.

Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d at 923 (Wilken, District Judge, dissenting).

Petitioner is not in custody as a result of his tribal court convictions. Generally, service of a sentence makes habeas relief moot, divesting the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to decide the claim on its merits. Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d at 1204-05. A federal petitioner may challenge a federal court conviction and sentence by seeking a writ of coram nobis pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, when the defendant is no longer in custody for the applicable conviction. United States v. Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168, 1171 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1996). "Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights may be affected." United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13, 74 S.Ct. 247, 253, 74 L.Ed. 248 (1954). The United States Supreme Court held in Morgan that the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists by way of a writ of coram nobis and such writ should be available even though the sentence has been served. Id.

Likewise, a habeas case under the ICRA is not moot if the petitioner suffers "collateral consequences" arising out of the tribal court convictions. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 2d L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). The question is whether "disabilities or burdens" flow from petitioner's conviction such that "he has 'a substantial stake in the judgmentof conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.'" Id. (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211,222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 230, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946)). "The mootness question presents difficult issues such as whether tribal court convictions are entitled to a presumption of collateral consequences and whether federal courts have authority under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 to vacate tribal court convictions." Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d at 1205 (deciding to "avoid these difficult issues by disposing of Mr. Valenzuela's appeal on a threshold issue without reaching the merits").

In this case, Stymiest's tribal court convictions provided a basis, at least in part, for determining that he was an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and the resulting federal criminal conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury. In this case, the government was required to prove that Stymiest was recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe. Evidence was presented that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe recognized Stymiest as an Indian by...