Styren Farms, Inc. v. Roos

• Decision Date: 29 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 11–0164.,DA 11–0164.
• Citation: 2011 MT 299,265 P.3d 1230,363 Mont. 41
• Parties: STYREN FARMS, INC., and Riley Styren, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Sherry Ann ROOS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2011 MT 299

265 P.3d 1230

363 Mont. 41

STYREN FARMS, INC., and Riley Styren, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.Sherry Ann ROOS, Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 11–0164.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 12, 2011.Decided Nov. 29, 2011.

For Appellants: Dale L. Keil, Keil Law Firm, P.C., Conrad, Montana.

For Appellee: William J. Gregoire, Steven J. Fitzpatrick, Smith, Walsh, Clarke & Gregoire, PLLP, Great Falls, Montana.

Justice MICHAEL E. WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[363 Mont. 42] ¶ 1 Plaintiffs Styren Farms, Inc. (the “Farm”) and Riley Styren (“Riley”) (collectively “Styren”), appeal from various rulings of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Pondera County, and a subsequent jury verdict finding Defendant Sherry Ann Roos (“Roos”) not negligent after an automobile collision with Riley. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On the morning of May 8, 2006, both Roos and Riley were on their way to school. Roos was driving, with her younger brother, Brandon, and younger sister, Tamara, from their home in Conrad, Montana, to school in Power, Montana, an approximately 30 minute drive. The car Roos was driving was owned by her mother, Julia Roos (“Julia”) and Curtis Stordahl (“Stordahl”). At the time of the collision, Roos was heading east on Midway Road (part of Highway 91). Riley was driving to school in Conrad. The car Riley was driving was owned by the Farm. Riley was traveling north on the Brady Frontage Road (also part of Highway 91). The Brady Frontage Road meets Midway Road southeast of Conrad, forming a T intersection. There is a stop sign on the Brady Frontage Road at this intersection. Midway Road does not have a stop sign. See diagram below.¹

Image 1 (5.03" X 2.75") Available for Offline Print

¶ 3 The parties do not agree on whether Riley stopped at the stop sign before turning left onto Midway Road toward Conrad. After the collision, at the hospital, Riley told a sheriff's deputy that he did not stop at the stop sign. At trial, Riley testified that he did stop, as did another witness, Ozzy Samsal. Roos and her brother, Brandon, testified that Riley did not stop.

¶ 4 The parties do agree that Riley's vehicle was struck by Roos' vehicle in the westbound lane of Midway Road, at the approximate location of the “X” in the above diagram. Riley's car ended up facing northwest in the ditch on the north side of Midway Road, represented by the “Y” in the above diagram. Roos' car ended up facing east, in the westbound lane of Midway Road, represented by the “Z” in the above diagram. The rear driver's side passenger door and rear quarter panel of Riley's vehicle were damaged, and the front end of Roos' car was damaged.

¶ 5 In October 2007, Styren filed a complaint against Roos, Julia, and Stordahl. The complaint alleged claims of negligence against Roos, and negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine against Julia and Stordahl. Styren sought damages for personal injury, property damage, and punitive damages.

[363 Mont. 44] ¶ 6 Julia and Stordahl sought summary judgment on the claims against them, which was granted. The case proceeded to trial on the negligence claim against Roos. The jury trial began on December 6, 2010. The jury returned its verdict on December 9, 2010, finding Roos was not negligent. Judgment against Styren was entered on December 17, 2010. Styren filed a motion for a new trial; however, the District Court failed to rule within 60 days, thus the motion was deemed denied. This timely appeal followed. We will discuss further facts, as necessary, below.

¶ 7 We restate the issues as follows:

¶ 8 Issue One: Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment to Julia?

¶ 9 Issue Two: Did the District Court err when it did not grant a new trial?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same M.R. Civ. P. 56 criteria used by the district court. PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, 2010 MT 64, ¶ 84, 355 Mont. 402, 229 P.3d 421. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. PPL, ¶ 84. Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must present substantial evidence essential to one or more elements of the case to raise a genuine issue of material fact. PPL, ¶ 84. Conclusory statements are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. PPL, ¶ 84.

¶ 11 When the basis of a motion for a new trial is insufficiency of the evidence, we review the denial of the motion de novo. Fish v. Harris, 2008 MT 302, ¶ 8, 345 Mont. 527, 192 P.3d 238; Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 27, 338 Mont. 19, 162 P.3d 134 (announcing the de novo standard and overruling a host of cases that stated the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was for a manifest abuse of discretion). We determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. Fish, ¶ 8. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it may be less than a preponderance of the evidence, but must be more than a “mere scintilla.” Fish, ¶ 8.

¶ 12 When the basis of a motion for a new trial is an irregularity in the proceedings or surprise, we review the denial of the motion for a manifest abuse of discretion. Westmark International Corp. v. Gold Hill Placers, Inc., 2003 MT 119, ¶¶ 7, 14, 315 Mont. 492, 70 P.3d 731. A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is obvious, evident, or unmistakable. Benefis Healthcare v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2006 MT 254, ¶ 11, 334 Mont. 86, 146 P.3d 714. The manifest abuse of discretion standard requires that the abuse of discretion be so significant as to materially affect the substantial rights of the complaining party. Cooper v. Hanson, 2010 MT 113, ¶ 28, 356 Mont. 309, 234 P.3d 59.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Issue One: Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment to Julia?

¶ 14 Julia moved for summary judgment on the only claims against her—negligent entrustment and vicarious liability via the family purpose doctrine. ² The District Court granted Julia's motion, finding “there is no evidence to indicate that Julia Roos should have known Sherryann was not a competent driver.” Further, the District Court found “[t]here is similarly no evidence of an agency relationship [regarding the family purpose doctrine].” In reaching this ruling, the District Court disregarded “[m]ost of the affidavit of Delbert Styren ... because no foundation of personal knowledge for the statements is set forth.”

¶ 15 Styren argues on appeal that, based upon the “facts” in Delbert Styren's (Delbert) affidavit, Julia was negligent in sending Roos and her siblings “down the highway” in her (Julia's) car.

A. Negligent Entrustment

¶ 16 Generally, a parent is not liable for the tortious acts of his or her child, except under limited statutory circumstances. Crisafulli v. Bass, 2001 MT 316, ¶ 16, 308 Mont. 40, 38 P.3d 842. That said, a parent can be liable, not for the tortious acts of his or her child, but for the parent's own failure to exercise reasonable care. Crisafulli, ¶¶ 22, 27 (emphasis added). In other words, the parent is not liable for the alleged tortious act of the child—negligent entrustment is a standalone tortious act of the parent. For liability to be imposed under this limited circumstance, the parent must (1) “know that he or she has the ability to control the child [;]” (2) “the parent understands the necessity for doing so[;]” and (3) the parent's failure to exercise reasonable care “under these circumstances create[s] an unreasonable risk of harm to a third person.” Crisafulli, ¶ 22 (emphasis in original).

¶ 17 Negligent entrustment requires more than simply allowing a young person to operate a vehicle. McGinnis v. Hand, 1999 MT 9, ¶ 29, 293 Mont. 72, 972 P.2d 1126; Smith v. Babcock, 157 Mont. 81, 88–89, 482 P.2d 1014, 1018 (1971). In McGinnis, we concluded that even evidence showing that a driver was “underage for driving purposes or that she was not licensed to drive” would “be insufficient[,]” without more, “to establish lack of competence” as a reasonable and prudent driver. McGinnis, ¶ 29. In McGinnis, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the driver was not competent, or that she had a reputation for driving negligently, or that the defendant (for the negligent entrustment claim) should have known the driver was not competent to drive or would drive in a manner creating an unreasonable risk to others. McGinnis, ¶ 29. Because the plaintiff did not meet his burden, summary judgment against him was upheld.

¶ 18 Similarly, in Smith, we found the record devoid of any indication the minor driver (16 years old) was incompetent or that Smith (the minor driver's uncle) should have “foreseen the accident.” Smith, 157 Mont. at 89, 482 P.2d at 1018. The minor driver was “duly licensed by the State of Montana to operate a vehicle after fulfilling the various legal requirements, and there is no evidence on the record to indicate he was other than a competent driver.” Smith, 157 Mont. at 89, 482 P.2d at 1018. Based upon these facts, we held, as a matter of law, that Smith was not negligent in entrusting his vehicle to his minor nephew.

¶ 19 In this case, the undisputed facts compel the same conclusion as in McGinnis and Smith. There is absolutely no evidence that Julia knew, or should have known, that Roos was an incompetent driver, or that Julia knew Roos would drive in a manner that created an unreasonable risk to others. At the time of the collision with Riley, Roos had a valid Montana driver's license, had received no traffic citations, and was involved in no accidents as a driver.

¶ 20 To refute these facts, Styren relies on Delbert's affidavit. However, as the District Court correctly pointed out, nowhere in Delbert's affidavit does it state Delbert had...