Suarez v. S. Carlson

• Docket Number: 7:22-CV-21-D
• Decision Date: 27 October 2023
• Parties: JOAQUIN SUAREZ, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERNCARLSON, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

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JOAQUIN SUAREZ, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERNCARLSON, INC., Defendant.

No. 7:22-CV-21-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division

October 27, 2023

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge.

On March 11, 2022, Joaquin Suarez (“Suarez” or “plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint against SouthemCarlson Inc. (“SouthemCarlson” or “defendant”) alleging national origin and age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VIT'), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C §§ 621 et seq. [D.E. 1, 2, 5-7]. On June 9, 2023, SouthemCarlson moved for summary judgment [D.E. 42] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 43], a statement of material facts [D.E. 44], and an appendix [D.E. 45]. On June 23, 2023, the court notified Suarez of SouthemCarlson's motion for summary judgment, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline [D.E. 46]. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). On July 17, 2023, Suarez responded in opposition to SouthemCarlson's motion [D.E. 47] and filed a memorandum of law [D.E. 48], an opposing statement of material facts [D.E. 49], and an appendix [D.E. 50]. On July 31, 2023, SouthemCarlson replied [D.E. 51], moved to strike Suarez's statement of material facts and appendix [D.E 52,54], and filed memoranda in support of both motions to strike [D.E. 53,55]. As explained below, the court grants in part and denies in part SouthemCarlson's motions to strike and grants SouthemCarlson's motion for summary judgment.

I.

SouthemCarlson distributes fastening and packaging machines. See Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”) ¶ 1.^[1] On December 20, 2018, SouthemCarlson hired Suarez, a 52 year old Hispanic male, as a service technician at its Wilmington, North Carolina store (“the Wilmington store”). See Id. at ¶¶ 2.4; [D.E. 7-3] 2. SouthemCarlson later transitioned Suarez into a regular, full-time customer retail role. See DSMF ¶ 8; [D.E. 45-3] ¶ 7.

In 2018, Oscar Zeno (“Zeno”) managed the Wilmington store. See DSMF ¶ 6. Suarez reported directly to Zeno. See id. at ¶ 7. In September 2019, Zeno took a leave of absence from SouthemCarlson. See Id. at ¶ 9. In response, SouthemCarlson's Area Branch Manager Zach Cook (“Cook”) assigned Zeno's job duties to the remaining employees at the Wilmington store until SouthemCarlson could hire a temporary manager. Compare Id. at ¶ 10, with PSMF ¶ 10.^[2] In November 2019, SouthemCarlson assigned the Wilmington store's managerial duties to Joseph Arena (“Arena”), a white male over age 40, who served as the branch manager of SouthemCarlson's Myrtle Beach, South Carolina store (“the Myrtle Beach store”). See DSMF ¶ 11; [D.E. 45-3] ¶ 9. Arena divided his time between the Wilmington and Myrtle Beach stores. Compare DSMF ¶ 12, with PSMF ¶ 12. Suarez reported directly to Arena once Arena became manager of the Wilmington store. See DSMF ¶ 13.

In April 2020, SouthemCarlson engaged Darrell Vicks (“Vicks”) to provide temporary technician services in response to Suarez's requests for additional assistance with warehouse and tool repairs at the Wilmington store. Compare Id. at ¶ 14, with PSMF ¶ 14; see [D.E. 45-3] ¶ 13. SouthemCarlson also engaged Cody Arena, a former contractor at the Myrtle Beach store, to provide temporary service technician services to the Wilmington store. Compare DSMF ¶ 15, with PSMF ¶ 15. At no time during Suarez's employment with SouthemCarlson did SouthemCarlson grant Suarez the authority to hire, terminate, or manage other employees or offer Suarez a management position. See DSMF ¶ 16. During Arena's tenure as manager of the Wilmington store, Suarez refused to accept Arena as manager, refused to perform certain job duties, and often created conflict within the Wilmington store. Compare Id. at ¶ 19, with PSMF ¶ 19. SouthemCarlson reprimanded Suarez for his behavior. Compare DSMF ¶¶ 18-19, with PSMF ¶¶ 18-19.

On April 24, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, SouthemCarlson furloughed Suarez. Compare DSMF ¶ 20, with PSMF ¶ 20. Ultimately, SouthemCarlson permanently reduced its workforce. See [D.E. 45-3] ¶ 18; compare DSMF ¶ 21, with PSMF ¶ 21. On July 1, 2020, SouthemCarlson terminated Suarez's employment as part of the reduction in force. See DSMF ¶ 24; [D.E. 45-3] ¶ 18. SouthemCarlson did not hire anyone to replace Suarez. Compare DSMF ¶ 33, with PSMF ¶ 33. On January 7, 2021, Suarez filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See [D.E. 7-3]. On November 5, 2021, the EEOC notified Suarez of his right to sue. See [D.E. 7-1].

II.

SouthemCarlson contends that Suarez's Statement of Material Facts and Appendix violate Local Civil Rule 56.1(a)(4) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) by lacking “citations to the record, controlling authority, sworn affidavits, or other [admissible] evidence.” [D.E. 53] 2-3; see [D.E. 55] 2. Moreover, SouthemCarlson argues Suarez's Appendix “contains copious amounts of inadmissible evidence.” [D.E. 55] 2. Accordingly, SouthemCarlson moves to strike these documents entirely. See [D.E. 52, 54].

A court may “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Although granting a motion to strike is generally disfavored, the court has such discretion. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc, v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001); F.D.LC. v. Willetts, 882 F.Supp.2d 859, 870 (E.D. N.C. 2012).

“Each statement by the [summary judgment] movant or opponent... must be followed by citation to evidence that would be admissible, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).” Local Civ. R. 56.1(a)(4). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” with citations “to particular parts of materials in the record” which are “admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). “A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2).

The court assumes without deciding that a party may move to strike filings other than pleadings.^[3] “In resolving a motion to strike, the [c]ourt should use ‘a scalpel, not a butcher knife' to strike portions of an affidavit that do not satisfy” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Dove v. Johnson, No. 4:20-CV-154, 2022 WL 11282218, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 19, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 593 (6th Cir. 2009)); see, e.g., BlackRock Eng'rs, Inc., 2019 WL 4267863, at *4-5 (striking only parts of an affidavit that contained inadmissible evidence). Thus, the court denies SouthemCarlson's motions to the extent SouthemCarlson moves to strike Suarez's entire Statement of Material Facts and Appendix.

The remaining portions of SouthemCarlson's motions seek to strike the portions of Suarez's filings that rely on unsupported allegations or inadmissible evidence. The court agrees with SouthemCarlson and declines to consider such portions of Suarez's filings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); Local Civ. R. 56.1(a)(4); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248-49 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986); Howard, 262 F.Supp.3d at 329 n. 1. Accordingly, the court grants in part SouthemCarlson's motions and considers only the admissible evidence Suarez produces to support his claims.

III.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. The party seeking summary judgment must initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis and quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position [is] insufficient . . . .” Id., at 252; see Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The nonmoving party, however, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.”). Only factual disputes that affect the outcome under substantive law properly preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Suarez alleges SouthemCarlson failed to promote him, harassed him and terminated his employment because of his national origin in violation of Title VH. See Compl. 2.^[4]SouthemCarlson responds that Suarez lacks direct evidence of national origin discrimination and has not established a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. See [D.E. 43] 7-18. ...