Suarez v. United States
| Decision Date | 16 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-cv-2981 (RJS),No. 11-cr-839 (RJS),13-cv-2981 (RJS),11-cr-839 (RJS) |
| Parties | ANGEL SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANGEL SUAREZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Angel Suarez ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, brings this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the "Petition"), challenging the sentence imposed by the Court after Petitioner pleaded guilty to the use and possession of a firearm in relation to and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 921(a)(6), 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(c)(1)(B)(i). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied.
On September 8, 2011, an officer from the New York Police Department ("NYPD") "observed Angel Suarez walk from the second floor of the stairwell [in a building] holding a shotgun and a black plastic bag." (Doc. No. 19, Ex. A ("Pre-Sentence Report" or "PSR") at 4.) The police later determined that the shotgun was a Remington Model 870 and that the black plastic bag contained 90 small clear plastic bags filled with crack cocaine. (Id.) On December 22, 2011, the Grand Jury returned a two-count Superseding Indictment (Doc. No. 12 ("Indictment")), charging Petitioner with (1) the intentional and knowing distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, a controlled substance in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841 (a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and (2) the use and possession of a firearm in relation to and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 921(a)(6), 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and 924(c)(1)(B)(i). On January 18, 2012, Petitioner reached an agreement with the government to plead guilty to Count Two of the Indictment. (Doc. No. 17, Transcript of Proceedings, dated January 19, 2012 ("Plea Tr."), at 3:5-7.) The following day, Petitioner, represented by counsel, appeared before this Court and pleaded guilty to Count Two. (Id. 45:4-7.)
At the plea conference, Petitioner stated that he was not under the influence of drugs, a mental illness, or anything else that might prevent him from understanding the plea (id. 5:12-6:16), had read the Indictment and discussed it with his attorney (id. 2:22-25), had the opportunity to discuss his case with his attorney (id. 6:20-25), and was satisfied with his counsel's representation(id. 7:5-7).2 The Court advised Petitioner of his rights both orally and in writing and made sure he understood them (id. 7:8-18:6), described the charges (id. 19:4-22:1), reviewed the range of penalties for Count Two, including the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years (id. 23:17-24:23), and explained that Petitioner could not receive anything less than the ten-year minimum sentence unless Petitioner cooperated with the government and the government made a motion for a reduced sentence as a result of Petitioner's substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of others (id. 23:17-33:4). When asked by the Court to describe what he had done that made him guilty of the crime charged in Count Two, Petitioner admitted to being in the apartment with the shotgun, touching it on at least one occasion, knowing that the gun was there to protect a drug dealing business, and being involved in the crack distribution operation based within the apartment. (Id. 37:23-39:14.) Finally, after determining that Petitioner understood his rights and knowingly waived them, that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an independent basis in fact for each of the elements of the offenses charged in Count Two of the Indictment, the Court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea. (Id. 45:22-46:5.)
On May 2, 2012, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of ten years - the mandatory minimum - on Count Two. (Doc. No. 22, Transcript of Proceedings, dated May 2, 2012, at 20:14-15.) Thereafter, the Court dismissed Count One of the Indictment. (Id. 24:14-15.) The Court also notified the Petitioner at sentencing that he had the right to appeal the sentence by filing a notice of appeal within fourteen days after the final judgment. (Id. 24:15-24.) Fed. R. App. P. 4. The right to appeal expired on May 16, 2012, and Petitioner never filed a direct appeal.
On April 29, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. In it, Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for (1) "not competently representing Petitioner," (2) "not adequately advising him on the plea offer," (3) "abandoning his cause during the plea negotiating process," and (4) "not seeking a downward departure based on his mentally diminished capacity." (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner also alleges that his plea was "unintelligent, resulting in it being unknowingly and involuntarily entered." (Id. at 6.)
Section 2255 enables a prisoner who was sentenced by a federal court to petition that court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence on the grounds that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under Section 2255 is generally available "only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Because collateral challenges are in tension with society's strong interest in the finality of criminal convictions, the courts have established rules that make it more difficult for a defendant to upset a conviction by collateral, as opposed to direct, attack." Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, is one permissible basis for bringing a Section 2255 petition.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. When challenging the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, a party must demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation "fell below anobjective standard of reasonableness" measured against "prevailing professional norms," and (2) this "deficient performance prejudiced the defense" in the sense that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). A court must reject a petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim if it fails to meet either prong. Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013).
With respect to Strickland's first prong, a court "must judge [counsel's] conduct on the basis of the facts of the particular case, 'viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct,' and may not use hindsight to second-guess his strategy choices." Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The court starts from the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "Actions and/or omissions taken by counsel for strategic purposes generally do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). Because there are many different ways to provide effective assistance in any given case, and "[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client the same way," there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690.
With respect to Strickland's second prong, a petitioner who has pleaded guilty "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In addition, a petitioner may show prejudice by demonstrating that he would have received and accepted a guilty plea with a lower sentence but for counsel's errors. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,1409 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (). In the plea bargaining context, a defendant must show that "the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice." Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. And as a general rule, "defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal [plea] offers from the prosecution." Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 ()
Finally, "the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings" because "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Any "subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible." Id. at 74.
A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is done...
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