Subhan v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3869.
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
| Writing for the Court | Posner |
| Citation | 383 F.3d 591 |
| Parties | Mohammed SUBHAN, Petitioner, v. John D. ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. |
| Docket Number | No. 03-3869. |
| Decision Date | 07 September 2004 |
v.
John D. ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
Petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
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Guy Croteau (argued), Immigration Law Center, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.
George P. Katsivalis, Department of Homeland Security Office of the District Counsel, Chicago, IL, Barry Pettinato (argued), Department of Justice Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before POSNER, ROVNER, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
This challenge to a removal (deportation) order requires us to mesh two immigration statutes. One of them, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), captioned "denials of discretionary relief," is a door-closing statute. It provides, so far as bears on this case, that "notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review — (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1255 of this title, or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General." The other statute, which happens to be referred to in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), quoted above, is 8 U.S.C. § 1255, which in its subsection (i) authorizes a removable alien to adjust his status to that of a permanent legal resident if he is certified to be entitled to be employed in the United States. This subsection, which is section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and known as the LIFE Act, sunseted in 2001, but certain aliens, including Mohammed Subhan, a Pakistani who had become removable after his tourist visa expired, were grandfathered. 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(B); Lasprilla v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2004).
Subhan sought to adjust his status under the LIFE Act, and this required him to obtain certificates from both the Illinois and federal departments of labor. At an initial hearing in the removal proceedings, Subhan asked the immigration judge for, and the judge granted him, a six-month continuance to enable him to obtain the necessary certificates. He endeavored — with all due diligence, so far as appears — to obtain them; but the wheels of bureaucracy grind slow, and at the end of the six months he had not succeeded in obtaining them and so he sought and was granted a further six-month continuance. Again through no laxity or other fault on his part, the labor departments did not act on his application within the further six-month period. But when, therefore, he applied for a third continuance, the immigration judge turned him down with no explanation beyond saying that while Subhan "may be able to eventually acquire lawful permanent resident status by virtue of employment," not having done so as yet he was "not eligible for this form of relief at this time."
This was not a reason for denying the motion for a third continuance, but merely a statement of the obvious: that the labor departments hadn't yet acted. If the immigration judge had said that Subhan had dragged his feet or that it was obvious from the nature of his employment skills that he would not be granted the necessary certificates, or that he should have filed his application for adjustment of status before his tourist visa expired, or that he was a danger to the security of the United States, or that he was engaging in criminal activity or otherwise misbehaving,
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or even that an illegal alien should not be allowed to delay his removal beyond a year, the denial of the third continuance would have been reasoned, and we may assume would have been consistent with the adjustment-of-status statute. Hassan v. INS, 110 F.3d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir.1997); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir.1998); Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir.1993); Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir.2004). But to...
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Sharkey v. Quarantillo, Docket No. 06-1397-cv.
...Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as precluding review, in relevant part, only of "a judgment denying a request for adjustment of status." 383 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.2004). This accords with our decision in Sepulveda v. Gonzales, in which we held that "8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not strip courts ......
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Sutton v. Napolitano, No. 13–cv–173–wmc.
...to request relief inherently implies a corresponding obligation to respond.” Saleem, 520 F.Supp.2d at 1054 (citing Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir.2004)); see also Lindems v. Mukasey, 530 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1046 (E.D.Wis.2008) (same). Without such an obligation, “defendants coul......
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Saleem v. Keisler, No. 06-C-712-C.
...from Congress's statutory authorization to noncitizens to submit an application. As the court of appeals recognized in Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2004), it is "unlikely that Congress, intending, as it clearly did, to entitle ... aliens to seek an adjustment of status ........
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Succar v. Ashcroft, No. 03-2445.
...judicial review. So here the challenge goes to the Attorney General's statutory authority and not his discretion. See Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.2004) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) as preserving jurisdiction when the decision is not "a judgment denying a request......
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Succar v. Ashcroft, No. 03-2445.
...judicial review. So here the challenge goes to the Attorney General's statutory authority and not his discretion. See Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.2004) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) as preserving jurisdiction when the decision is not "a judgment denying a request......
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Sharkey v. Quarantillo, Docket No. 06-1397-cv.
...Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as precluding review, in relevant part, only of "a judgment denying a request for adjustment of status." 383 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.2004). This accords with our decision in Sepulveda v. Gonzales, in which we held that "8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not strip courts ......
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Sutton v. Napolitano, No. 13–cv–173–wmc.
...to request relief inherently implies a corresponding obligation to respond.” Saleem, 520 F.Supp.2d at 1054 (citing Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir.2004)); see also Lindems v. Mukasey, 530 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1046 (E.D.Wis.2008) (same). Without such an obligation, “defendants coul......
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Samirah v. Holder, No. 08-1889
...the plaintiff's application for adjustment of status was resolved. Afzal v. Holder, 559 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir.2009); Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir.2004); cf. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 831-33 (7th Cir.2005); but see Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 437-39 (5th C......