Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman

• Decision Date: 01 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 340,340
• Citation: 599 A.2d 875,89 Md.App. 741
• Parties: SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND v. Wayne EHRMAN, et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 741

89 Md.App. 741

599 A.2d 875

SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND v. Wayne EHRMAN, et al.

No. 340, Sept. Term, 1991.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 2, 1992.

Lawrence P. Fletcher-Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Sophia L. Swope and George E. Barrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Towson, on the brief), for appellant.

Herbert J. Arnold (Arnold, Beauchemin & Tingle, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee, Ehrman.

Wilbert L. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Michels, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), Towson, for appellee, Injured Workers' Ins. Fund.

Argued before FISCHER, CATHELL and DAVIS, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

The trial court in this workers' compensation case fashioned a decision that was unsatisfactory to all parties. Not surprisingly, all the parties subsequently appealed. The statement of facts contained in the claimant's brief best establishes the process by which the matter reaches us. We paraphrase it with certain omissions and addendums as is necessary.

Wayne Ehrman (Claimant) injured his back during the course of his employment while working for Culligan Water Conditioning Company (Employer). ¹ Ehrman filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Annotated Code article 101. ² The Commission, on July 20, 1982, found that Claimant had sustained an accidental injury on May 6, 1982, arising out of and in the course of his employment and that he was temporarily totally disabled. Insurer was ordered to pay temporary total disability benefits and did not contest the findings in any manner. Almost four years later, Insurer was directed to furnish vocational rehabilitation to Claimant. Again, Insurer took no appeal from the Commission's determination.

On June 14, 1985, Claimant again filed issues with the Commission and, for the first time, impleaded the Subsequent Injury Fund as a party. He requested that the Commission determine the extent of his permanent disability resulting from both the 1982 accident and certain alleged pre-existing conditions. When impleaded, the Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund) responded by filing issues which included: (1) whether Claimant had sustained an accidental injury in 1982 arising out of or in the course of his employment and (2) whether there was a causal connection between the accidental injury of 1982 and Ehrman's claimed disability. Insurer raised no issues with respect to the 1985 filing.

The Commission reopened the proceeding and conducted a hearing on February 4, 1988, on the issues filed in 1985. On March 14, 1988, the Commission determined that Claimant had not suffered an accidental injury in 1982 arising out of or in the course of his employment and, accordingly, his disability was not a result of that injury.

Ehrman appealed to the circuit court and ultimately filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in which he contended that the Commission erred when it permitted the Fund to raise the issues of accidental injury and causal connection at the 1988 hearing. He further asserted that the Fund and Insurer should be estopped from denying the claim. The trial court incongruously found that Claimant was not entitled to a judgment on his motion but then, nevertheless, granted it based on its conclusion that it had the power to fashion an equitable remedy.

On appeal, the Subsequent Injury Fund raises one question to which it presents three arguments:

Can the Subsequent Injury Fund be estopped from asserting a defense to its liability based on procedural defaults of another party, the insurer, which occurred before the Fund was made a party?

It argues:

1. The Fund has the full authority of a party before the Commission.

2. There is no basis for estoppel in the Fund's conduct.

3. The lower court abused its discretion in fashioning what it viewed to be an equitable result.

Insurer presents the question differently:

Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Claimant as a matter of law?

It posits four arguments:

1. The trial court exceeded its statutory appellate authority.

2. Even if authorized Claimant waived the issue by failing to raise the procedural issue before the Commission.

3. Even if authorized Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment was procedurally deficient.

4. Even if authorized Claimant's motion was insufficient on the merits.

Claimant also presents the questions somewhat differently. We list his questions in reverse order:

1. Does the Subsequent Injury Fund, a legislatively created entity, possess the power to assert the issues of accidental injury and causal connection upon being impleaded into a proceeding, when it was delegated neither the express nor implied authority to do so in its enabling act or subsequent amendments thereto?

2. Is the Subsequent Injury Fund equitably estopped from contesting the issues of accidental injury and causal connection because it is in the same equitable shoes as the employer and its insurer where inequitable voluntary conduct induced the Claimant's reliance?

Claimant's Issues

We have determined that the case sub judice can best be resolved by first addressing the issues presented by Claimant.

The Law

In Subsequent Injury Fund v. State Roads Commission, 35 Md.App. 353, 355, 370 A.2d 597 (1977), we were faced with a matter of statutory interpretation relating to whether the Fund's liability may be satisfied when an employer furnishes certain pension benefits. We were charged with interpreting the provisions of Section 33. This Court then quoted from the Court of Appeals' decision in Mazor v. Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 369 A.2d 82 (1977), six principal guidelines of statutory interpretation "[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature....

The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself....

And in construing a statute we accord the words their ordinary and natural signification....

If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless....

Similarly, wherever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences....

Moreover, if the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature."

The Court of Appeals, in Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 311, 242 A.2d 506 (1968), held that the Fund did not have the authority to appeal a Commission order. It emphasized that portion of Maryland Annotated Code article 101 which permitted an appeal to the courts by a "person" and framed the issue before it as: "[W]hether the Fund is a 'person'." Id. at 311, 242 A.2d 506. The Court then held that the Fund was not a person and thus had no right to appeal. The Court opined that the Fund was "nothing more than a glomerate of money"; that it was not supervised by a governing board with authority to appeal; and that it was not an artificial person, i.e., corporation. Id. It further opined, however, that if the Legislature intended for the Fund to have the right to appeal, it could have given it that right. Id.

The Legislature responded with Chapter 394 of the Acts of 1969, passed as an emergency measure, specifically providing that the Fund would have the right to appeal to the circuit court and to this Court. This was primarily accomplished by expanding the definition of "person" to include the Fund in the appeal section of Article 101 of the Code.

In Subsequent Injury Fund v. Howes, 11 Md.App. 325, 333, 274 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 261 Md. 725 (1971), we opined that until 1969 the Fund could not be a party in any proceeding and then emphasized that the 1969 Act merely permitted the Fund to appeal. We concluded that even after the enactment of Chapter 394 of the Acts of 1969 the Fund had no standing to be a party before the Commission. Because the Commission's findings in Howes had predated the modification of the statute, we held the Fund had no standing in the circuit court. Howes, 11 Md.App. at 333, 274 A.2d 131. We did, however, "assume" that the Fund was properly before us under Chapter 394 and, accordingly, disposed of the issues presented on appeal. In discussing the incongruous situation as to the Fund's status, we said: "However, this dilemma is for legislative, not judicial correction." Id.

Again, the Legislature responded by enacting Chapter 551 of the Laws of 1974. The Act stated that its purpose was to provide that no award could be made against the Fund by the Commission or by any court unless the Fund is a party to the proceeding. The body of the statute complied with the stated purpose and required the Fund to be a party to any proceeding in which an award was rendered against it. Act of April 30, 1974, Ch. 551, 1974 Md. Laws 1882. Even more importantly, it added to section 66 of Article 101 a provision that reads:

The Fund may be impleaded at any stage of the proceedings, either before the Commission, or on appeal; but if impleaded on appeal from the decision of the Commission or on further appeal to the Special Court of Appeals [Court of Special Appeals], the court shall suspend further proceedings and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings in order to afford the fund an opportunity to defend the claim.

Act of April 30, 1974, Ch. 551, 1974 Md. Laws 1882.

It is clear that by directly specifying that the Fund was to be a party the Legislature did not intend that the Fund's status as a party was to be in any way limited in its ability to act as a party, i.e., to raise and assert defenses. The last phrase of the 1974 Act requires that, when the Fund is impleaded during a court stage, the proceedings must be suspended and remanded to the Commission so that the Fund can...