Succession of Hopkins

• Decision Date: 01 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 4849,4849
• Citation: 114 So.2d 742
• Parties: SUCCESSION of John L. HOPKINS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 742

114 So.2d 742

SUCCESSION of John L. HOPKINS.

No. 4849.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Oct. 1, 1959.

Scallan E. Walsh, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

White & May, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER and TATE, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a suit by Rosetta Williams Hall, who intervenes herein on behalf of herself and her four minor children, alleging that, as putative wife of the deceased John L Hopkins, she and her said children, should be sent into possession of a share of the property left by the deceased. The defendants are Sarah Bostic Hopkins, the wife of said John L. Hopkins, and Lillie Mae Hopkins, the daughter of Sarah and the deceased. The Lower Court awarded judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has appealed.

The record discloses that John L. Hopkins, deceased, and Sarah Bostic were married in the state of Arkansas during the year 1913. Of said marriage one child, Lillie Mae Hopkins, was born. Sometime during the 1920's John L. Hopkins and Sarah Bostic Hopkins separated from each other, and they continued to live separate and apart until the death of John L. Hopkins in 1947.

Subsequent to the said separation John L. Hopkins moved to the Parish of East Baton Rouge, where he lived with another woman named Bertha. John and Bertha were never married to each other, although they lived together as man and wife for some period of time. On October 31, 1941, while John Hopkins was still living with Bertha, he married petitioner Rosetta Williams in the Parish of East Baton Rouge

Approximately two months prior to the marriage of John and Rosetta, John purchased a certain lot of ground in the city of Baton Rouge for which lot of ground he paid $100 cash prior to his marriage to Rosetta, and the remainder of said purchase price, or the sum of $300, was paid subsequent to his marriage to Rosetta. In the said Act of Sale, which is authentic in form, it is declared that John L. Hopkins, is a married man, whose wife is Sarah Bostic, from whom he has been separated for thirteen years.

Subsequent to the death of John L. Hopkins, Sarah and her daughter were sent into possession of the said lot of ground by judgment of possession rendered by the 19th Judicial Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge on July 11, 1955. It is this judgment which is contested by petitioner in this suit which was filed on July 19, 1955.

The Lower Court, as aforesaid, awarded judgment in favor of the defendants dismissing the petitioner's suit. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and it was subsequently transferred here because of lack of Jurisdictional amount.

There is no dispute to the fact that the marriage between John Hopkins and Sarah Bostic was a legal one, and that Lillie Mae Hopkins was legitimate issue of the said marriage. There is furthermore no evidence in the record which would tend to show that John and Sarah were ever divorced. Therefore, under the laws of this state, Sarah and John remained legally married to each other, until the time of John's death in 1947.

The record discloses that, after the separation between John and Sarah, John moved to the City of Baton Rouge where he lived as a next door neighbor to Rosetta for a period of several years. The evidence discloses that Rosetta lived on one side of a doubt house and John lived on the other side. A witness by the name of Bud Brown was the neighbor of John on the other side.

While the parties were living as neighbors, John 'took up' with a woman named Bertha, and lived with her for a period of time. While he was living with Bertha, he courted Rosetta for a period of about one year prior to their marriage. Apparently John was still living with Bertha when he married Rosetta. The marriage between John and Rosetta was surrounded by the necessary formalities to produce a legal marriage.

The record discloses that Rosetta was aware of the fact that John had been previously married in Arkansas. She had read letters which had been written to John by his daughter, and Bud Brown and Ollie Brown, both witnesses for defendants, testified that they had told Rosetta before her marriage that John had a lawful wife and daughter. There is no question in our minds that Rosetta was aware of this prior legal marriage, although she does claim that John had told her that he was divorced. Rosetta had also questioned John relative to his status with Bertha, and John told her that he and Bertha had never been married.

A short time after the marriage between John and Rosetta, they visited with Sarah and Lillie Mae, the defendants, who were then living in Monroe. In introducing the parties, John introduced Rosetta as his wife and he introduced Sarah as Lillie Mae's mother, or words to the effect that she used to be his wife.

The petitioner takes the position that she is an innocent victim of circumstances; that she contracted a 'good faith' marriage with John under the impression that there was no legal impediment to the said marriage. She therefore claims that she should be declared a putative wife of John, and, as such, entitled to a share in his Succession, under the provisions of Articles 117 and 118 of the LSA-Civil Code.

Article No. 117 of the LSA-Civil Code provides as follows: 'The marriage, which has been declared null, produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties and their children, if it has been contracted in good faith.'

Article No. 118 of the LSA-Civil Code provides as follows: 'If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children born of the marriage.'

There is no question in our minds but that if Rosetta was in legal good faith in entering into the marriage with John, she should be entitled to the civil effects flowing from the putative marriage as set forth in the Civil Code. These civil effects would continue so long as her good faith remained. However, they would terminate upon her gaining knowledge to the effect that her marriage was invalid. Howard v. reka Grand Lodge, F. & A.M., La.App., Ingle, La.App., 180 So. 248; Evans v. Eu-149 So. 305.

What constitutes good faith is a relative quality and depends upon the facts and circumstances in each individual case. Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860, 862. In the cited case the court said that the term 'good faith' means an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage is valid, and that no legal impediment thereto exists. The court further stated 'It may well be that unconfirmed rumors or mere suspicions may reach a party and such as may even cause some question or doubt to arise as to the validity of a marriage, yet it would appear under our jurisprudence that under certain conditions a party may be in 'good faith' so long as no certain or authoritative knowledge of some legal impediment comes to him or her, but to just what extent a party is called upon to make an investigation to ascertain whether there exists any legal impediment to his or her marriage in order to establish his or her status as a putative spouse, will depend ultimately upon the facts and circumstances in each individual case. Our courts have simply said that 'a party alleging good faith can not close her ears to information or her eyes to suspicious circumstances. She must not act blindly or without reasonable...