Suchan v. Suchan
| Decision Date | 11 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | 15512 and 15143,Nos. 15460,s. 15460 |
| Parties | Carmen Estelle SUCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George A. SUCHAN, Defendant-Respondent, and Frank Suchan and Myra Suchan, Intervenors-Respondents. Carmen Estelle SUCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank SUCHAN and Helen Joyce Suchan, husband and wife, and Minidoka County Sheriff, Ray Jarvis, and George Suchan, Defendants-Respondents. Carmen Estelle SUCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George A. SUCHAN, Frank Suchan, and Myra Suchan, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Charles H. Creason, Jr., Rupert, for Sheriff Jarvis.
Roger D. Ling, Rupert, for George Suchan.
Alan C. Goodman, Rupert, for Frank and Myra Suchan.
The magistrate court entered a judgment and decree of divorce on March 22, 1982 dissolving the twenty-eight year marriage of George and Carmen Suchan. After a hearing in which George and Carmen proposed George was awarded personal property, including farm equipment, plus all the community real property. George was directed to assume all community debts, including the outstanding mortgages on the real property. The order stated explicitly the magistrate court's intent that George have immediate possession of all the real property so he could continue farming.
[113 Idaho 104] distributions of the property, the magistrate entered a document entitled "Partition Order" on March 10, 1982. Carmen's attorney had drafted the order which awarded each party a value of $445,844.40.
The order awarded Carmen various items of farm equipment and other personal property and directed George to pay Carmen $373,739.40 essentially representing the value of Carmen's community property interest in the farm land awarded to George. George was to pay Carmen $100,000 within forty-five days of the order and to pay the balance of $273,739.40 in twenty annual installments with twelve percent annual interest. The order required George to execute a promissory note for this balance secured by a mortgage on all the real property awarded him by the order. 1
After contacting various lenders, George could not obtain a loan to make the $100,000 payment within the forty-five day limit. The magistrate court, on July 8, 1982, issued an order to show cause as to why the court should not hold George in contempt for his nonpayment of the $100,000, and why immediate payment should not be ordered, even if that would require immediate sale of the real property. George filed a motion to stay further proceedings upon the judgment and partition order. He argued a sale would irreparably injure him.
The magistrate court, on July 22, 1982, granted a stay of execution pending George's appeal of the judgment and partition order. However, the court required that George post a supersedeas bond of $150,000 to cover the amount of the judgment, costs of appeal and any damages resulting from the appeal. At Carmen's request, the magistrate court issued a supplemental order to the order granting stay of execution which provided Carmen's money judgment would accrue interest at eighteen percent per year from the date of the partition order to the date of the $100,000 payment.
On August 30, 1982, the district court affirmed the judgment, divorce decree and partition order. George appealed to this Court, which affirmed the district court in Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 682 P.2d 607 (1984).
On November 8, 1982, Carmen, having received no money from George (or his promissory note or mortgage), obtained a writ of execution for the sale of George's real and personal property. Carmen sought payment of the initial $100,000 plus eighteen percent annual interest on the entire award of $373,739.40 from the May 10, 1982 date of the partition order to the date of payment of the $100,000. Notice of the execution sale was published with the sale date set for December 15, 1982. On that date, the sale took place in the face of George's inability to show cause why the sale should not proceed and his inability to post the supersedeas bond.
The sale brought in $60,552.50 for George's farm machinery and his 868 acres. George directed the sheriff to sell the land in seven parcels. George's brother, Frank Suchan, bought 820 acres in six parcels for a total of $13,500, subject to outstanding mortgages. Amalgamated Sugar Company bought the seventh parcel for $28,000, subject to its assumption of certain indebtedness. The sheriff returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
Within forty-eight hours of the sale, George quitclaimed his right of redemption in the real property executed upon to his brother, Frank, and his mother, Myra Suchan, for a total of $2,000.
About a week later, on December 23, 1982, Carmen presented to George a promissory note, mortgage and other security instruments for his signature. George refused to execute them on the grounds the execution sale divested him of any mortgageable interest he had in the property. In response, Carmen sought to have George held in contempt of the partition order and to obtain a court order requiring his execution of the documents. The magistrate court, in an order dated February 4, 1983, held George was not in contempt and refused to require him to sign the instruments.
Meanwhile, on January 24, 1983, Carmen also began proceedings for vacation of the execution sale for inadequacy of price coupled with alleged irregularities in the sale. On April 1, 1983, the magistrate court denied Carmen's motion.
On January 25, 1983, Carmen brought an independent action in district court. She alleged George fraudulently conveyed his statutory right of redemption in the property sold at execution to his brother, Frank, and his mother, Myra. The district court held (both initially and again on reconsideration) Carmen could have no interest in George's right of redemption and therefore lacked standing to allege its fraudulent conveyance. The appeal designated Supreme Court No. 15143 arose from that decision.
Carmen then appealed to the district court from the magistrate court's refusal to vacate the execution sale and its refusal to order George to execute a note and mortgage. The district court affirmed the magistrate court ruling that the partition order immediately conveyed Carmen's undivided one-half community real property interest to George and awarded a money judgment to Carmen. The court also held Carmen had no interest in the real property sold at execution and that the sale divested George of any mortgageable interest in the real property awarded him under the partition order. Because George had no mortgageable interest, the court could not require George to execute a mortgage after the execution sale. The district court also refused to vacate the sale on grounds of law or equity. Appeal No. 15460 arose from that decision.
Before the district court entered the latter opinion, Carmen filed a petition for writ of mandate and an alternative complaint for quiet title and moved for summary judgment with respect to each. The district court held the prior ruling that the partition order conveyed Carmen's one-half community property interest to George was dispositive of this issue in favor of George. With respect to the quiet title action, the decision from which case No. 15460 arose held Carmen had no mortgage interest in the property sold at execution. The district court ruled that it therefore followed that Carmen could therefore not be a redemptioner under I.C. § 11-401(2). Finally, the district court held Carmen had no subsequent judgment lien for the $273,739.40 remaining due after she had executed upon George's land for the initial $100,000 payment. Appeal No. 15512 arises from those rulings.
This case presents the issues of whether the lower courts erred in: (I) interpreting the partition order as itself immediately conveying certain real property to respondents and in ruling Carmen had no judgment lien in the real property after its execution sale; (II) refusing to vacate the execution sale of that property based on an allegedly inadequate price coupled with irregularities in the sale; (III) ruling appellant had no equitable mortgage in the property sold; (IV) ruling appellant held no mortgage interest in respondent's statutory right of redemption; and (V) determining appellant was not a redemptioner with respect to the property sold.
In Supreme Court No. 15460, Carmen argues the magistrate court misinterpreted the partition order as immediately conveying Carmen's community real property interest to George. The standard of our review of the magistrate courts'...
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