Sudduth v. Lowndes Cnty.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-51-SA-DAS |
| Parties | MOSE LEE SUDDUTH, JR. PLAINTIFF v. LOWNDES COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ROGER COLEMAN, and NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY COMPANY DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
On March 19, 2018, Mose Lee Sudduth, Jr., filed his Complaint [1] in this Court, asserting claims against Lowndes County, Mississippi; North Atlantic Security Company, the security company hired by Lowndes County to provide security at its Justice Court building; and Roger Coleman, one of North Atlantic's security guards. On February 28, 2019, the Court entered an Order and Memorandum Opinion [40], explaining the deficiencies of the Plaintiff's Complaint [1] and directing the Plaintiff to file a more definite statement in the form of an amended complaint within fourteen days. On March 14, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [42]. Coleman then filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [66], arguing that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [42] still falls to satisfy the applicable pleading standard. The Motion [66] has been fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
The factual allegations contained in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [42] are largely unchanged from those contained in his original Complaint [1]. Although the Court previously set forth the relevant facts in its earlier Order and Memorandum Opinion [40], it will nevertheless recite them again below.
Lowndes County contracts with a private company, North Atlantic Security, to provide security at its Justice Court building. On May 24, 2018 Sudduth entered the Lowndes County Justice Court building wearing shorts, a t-shirt, flip flops, and a baseball hat. The entrance to the building consists of two sets of double glass doors that open into a hallway. In the hallway just inside the double doors is a small security guard office. A metal detector stands on the opposite side of the hallway with an unobstructed pathway between the metal detector and the security office door. Further down the hall is a glass bank-teller style window that opens into the Justice Court Clerk's office.
Sudduth entered the building carrying a single piece of paper in one hand. As he entered the building, the security guard on duty, Coleman, stepped out of the office and directed Sudduth to pass through the metal detector. Sudduth waved him off saying "I'm an attorney." Sudduth proceeded to the Clerk's office window and passed his paper beneath the glass, asking the Clerk to file it for him. Coleman followed Sudduth to the Clerk's window and insisted that he pass through the metal detector. Sudduth refused, but did surrender a pocketknife that he was carrying in the pocket of his shorts. The two men continued to argue, even after the Clerk confirmed that Sudduth was indeed an attorney. Sudduth continued to refuse to pass through the metal detector, or to leave the building, and demanded that Coleman return his knife. After Sudduth refused to comply with Coleman's demands that he leave the building, Coleman told Sudduth, "I'm asking you one more time to leave," and Sudduth again refused. Coleman tackled Sudduth to the floor and dragged him by one arm through both sets of double doors. Coleman left Sudduth on the sidewalk in front of the building and then locked the front doors to the building.
Because Sudduth's original Complaint [1] constituted a "shotgun pleading" that failed to comply with the applicable pleading standard, the Court entered an Order and MemorandumOpinion [40] directing the Plaintiff to file a more definite statement in the form of an amended complaint within fourteen days.
Sudduth thereafter filed his Amended Complaint [42]. In his Amended Complaint [42], Sudduth alleges that Coleman acted under color of state law and is therefore liable, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also alleges that Lowndes County is liable for these violations because it, in accordance with its well-settled policy, improperly delegated its duty to protect the Justice Court building to North Atlantic, a company which did not have employees who were qualified to properly protect the building. He ultimately alleges that Lowndes County and North Atlantic's inadequate policy of permitting untrained personnel to provide security at the Justice Court building was the driving force behind the purported violations of his constitutional rights. Finally, Sudduth asserts a myriad of state law claims against the Defendants, including assault, battery, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, outrageous conduct, negligence, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Coleman and North Atlantic.
In his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [66], Coleman avers that Sudduth's Amended Complaint [42] still falls below the applicable pleading standard. The other Defendants later filed Joinders [79, 80] to Coleman's filings. The Motion [66] is ripe for review.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to assert by motion the defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the reviewing court must "liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Colony Ins. Co. v.Peachtree Const., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2005)).
"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). "While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions." Smith v. Michael Jedynak Substitute Trustee Morris & Assoc. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2015 WL 13015997 at *2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 28, 2015) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[A]nd a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Studdard v. Carlock Nissan of Tupelo, Inc., 2008 WL 11342893 at *1 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 7, 2008) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Coleman argues that the Plaintiff's federal claims, as well as his state law claims, should be dismissed. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
As to Sudduth's federal claims, Coleman asserts that "Plaintiff's Amended Complaint specifically acknowledges that Coleman is not a state employee, but a private actor . . . And while it is true that a private actor may be held liable under § 1983 if they are 'willing participants in joint activity with the State or its agents,' Plaintiff has wholly failed to allege this necessary element in support of how Coleman's private actions are attributable to the state." [67, p. 3] (citations omitted). In response, Sudduth points to specific factual allegations in his Amended Complaint [42], wherein he asserts that North Atlantic contracted with Lowndes County to providesecurity at the Justice Court building. Sudduth contends that North Atlantic's contractual agreement with the County, wherein North Atlantic agreed to provide security at the Justice Court building, is sufficient to impose liability against North Atlantic and Coleman under Section 1983.
"[M]ere private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is excluded from § 1983's reach." Cornish v. Correctional Services Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2003)); Ballard v. Wall, 413 .3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Private individuals generally are not considered to act under color of law[.]"). Where the defendant is a private actor, "the challenged 'conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right' must be 'fairly attributable to the State' for Section 1983 to apply." Doe v. U.S., 831 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982)). In other words, if there is no conduct "fairly attributable to the State," the Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims must fail. Id.
The Supreme Court has utilized several tests for deciding whether a private actor's conduct can be "fairly attributable to the State." Cornish, 402 F.3d at 549 (citing Richard, 355 F.3d at 352; Bass v. Parkwood, 180 F.3d 234, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1999)). In Cornish, the Fifth Circuit summarized the various tests:
The "public function test" examines whether the private entity performs a function which is "exclusively reserved to the State." Under the a private actor's conduct is attributable to the State when it exerts coercive power over the private entity or provides significant encouragement. The "nexus" or "state action test" considers whether the State has inserted "itself into a position of interdependence with the private actor, such that it was a joint participant in the enterprise." And, under the "joint action test," private actors will be considered state actors where they are "willful participants in joint action with the State or its agents."
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff, recognizing that North Atlantic and Coleman are private actors—unless one of the exceptions applies, makes clear that he is pursuing his Section 1983 claims under the "public function test." See [73, p. 5] (). Sudduth contends that the County had a duty to...
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