SueAnn A.M., Matter of
| Decision Date | 08 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-0885,92-0885 |
| Citation | 176 Wis.2d 673,500 N.W.2d 649 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Termination of Parental Rights to SUEANN A.M. ANN M.M., Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, v. ROB S., Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
There are three issues presented in this case. First, whether sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., 1 denies a father standing to appear and contest a petition to involuntarily terminate his parental rights under sec. 48.415 when his daughter was conceived as a result of the father's sexual assault of the mother, who was a child under the age of 16 at the time, contrary to sec. 948.02(2). We conclude that sec. 48.42(2m) denies such standing.
Second, whether the record in this case is sufficient to establish that the father failed to assume parental responsibility under sec. 48.415(6)(a)2, Stats. We conclude that the record is sufficient.
Third, whether sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions by denying a father the opportunity to contest a petition to terminate his parental rights under sec. 48.415(6)(a)2. We conclude that application of sec. 48.42(2m) to the facts of this case does not violate due process or equal protection.
On August 7, 1991, the petitioner, Ann M.M., gave birth to a daughter, SueAnn A.M. Ann was 15 years old when she gave birth to SueAnn and was 14 years old when SueAnn was conceived. The respondent, Rob S., is the biological father of SueAnn and was 21 years old at the time of SueAnn's conception.
Because Rob had sexual intercourse with Ann when she was under the age of 16, he was charged with second degree sexual assault. He pleaded no contest to this charge and was sentenced to one year in jail and probation. 2
On August 27, 1991, Ann filed a petition to terminate Rob's parental rights and also to terminate her own parental rights. Ann believed that Rob would voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. Instead, Rob filed a motion requesting a determination of paternity under sec. 48.423, Stats., and motions to dismiss and for summary judgment requesting that the petition to terminate his parental rights be dismissed.
Pursuant to sec. 48.415(6), Stats., Ann then filed a second petition alleging that Rob's parental rights should be involuntarily terminated on the ground that Rob had failed to establish a parental relationship with or assume responsibility for SueAnn. Ann also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that pursuant to sec. 48.42(2m), Rob did not have standing to contest the termination petition because SueAnn was conceived as a result of a sexual assault as defined in sec. 948.02(2).
The Outagamie County Circuit Court, the Honorable Dennis C. Luebke, granted Ann's motion for summary judgment, concluding that under sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., Rob S. did not have standing to contest the petition to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court entered a written order declaring that the termination of parental rights proceedings could be conducted without Rob's participation.
The trial court then conducted a hearing on Ann's request to terminate Rob's parental rights. Following the hearing, the trial court entered findings that Rob was SueAnn's biological father, that Rob had failed to assume parental responsibility for SueAnn as defined in sec. 48.415(6)(a)2, Stats., and that termination of Rob's parental rights was appropriate and in the best interest of SueAnn and her mother. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order terminating Rob's parental rights to SueAnn.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, concluding "that sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., is addressed only to notice and does not affect the putative father's standing to contest the alleged grounds for termination of his parental rights." In Matter of Termination of Parental Rights to A.M., 170 Wis.2d 685, 691, 489 N.W.2d 719 (Ct.App.1992). Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court, directing it to conduct a second termination proceeding where Rob would be allowed to contest Ann's allegations.
Subsequently, Ann petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals decision. We granted the petition.
To resolve the first issue, whether Rob has standing to contest Ann's petition to terminate his parental rights, we interpret sec. 48.42(2m), Stats.:
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. In determining legislative intent, first resort is to the language of the statute itself. If the meaning of the statute is clear on its face, this court will not look outside the statute in applying it. If the statutory language is ambiguous, this court attempts to ascertain the legislature's intent by the scope, history, context, subject matter and object of the statute. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either two or more senses.
In Interest of P.A.K., 119 Wis.2d 871, 878-79, 350 N.W.2d 677 (1984) (citations omitted).
Section 48.42(2m), Stats., states as follows:
(2m) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED. Notice is not required to be given to a person who may be the father of a child conceived as a result of a sexual assault if a physician attests to his or her belief that a sexual assault has occurred. 3
We conclude that this language is ambiguous. As demonstrated by the conflict between the decisions of the trial court and court of appeals, sec. 48.42(2m) can reasonably be interpreted as denying a putative father standing to contest termination of his parental rights, the trial court's reading, or it can be interpreted as merely not requiring notice of the termination proceeding, the court of appeals reading.
Accordingly, to determine the intended meaning of sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., we look to the applicable rules of statutory construction. First, "we attempt to find the common sense meaning and purpose of the words employed [in the statute]." State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis.2d 662, 677, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976). Common sense indicates that sec. 48.42(2m) prohibits Rob from contesting the termination of his parental rights. If Rob had the right to appear at the hearing, he certainly had the right to notice of the hearing. The fact that he became aware of the hearing in this case was incidental and did not give him the right to participate in it.
Second, statutes must be interpreted in a way that avoids absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Pham, 137 Wis.2d 31, 34, 403 N.W.2d 35 (1987). Interpreting sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., as merely relieving the duty of notice, but still giving the father an opportunity to appear at the termination hearing, leads to absurd or unreasonable results. This construction would allow the mother of a child conceived as a result of a sexual assault to terminate the father's parental rights without notice to him. Thus, even though the father has standing to contest the termination of his parental rights, he does not have the opportunity to exercise that right unless he fortuitously learns of the termination proceedings. This result could not have been the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute.
Third, construction of a statute that would result in any portion of the statute being superfluous should be avoided wherever possible. County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 164, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980). Interpreting sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., to eliminate only the need to give notice, but to still give the assailant father the right to appear at the termination hearing, would render this section superfluous. The only logical purpose of this section would be to eliminate notice to an unknown assailant. However, statute sec. 48.42(4)(b)3 already allows a petitioner to move the court for an order waiving the requirement of constructive notice where the identity of the father is unknown. Section 48.42(4)(b)3, provides as follows: "At the time the petition is filed, the petitioner may move the court for an order waiving the requirement of constructive notice to a person who, although his identity is unknown, may be the father of a nonmarital child."
In addition to the cannons of statutory construction, we look to the purpose of sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., to discern the legislature's intent. P.A.K., 119 Wis.2d at 878, 350 N.W.2d 677. Examination of sec. 48.42, which sets forth the procedure for termination of parental rights, and sec. 48.415, which sets forth the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights, reveals the purpose of sec. 48.42(2m): to relieve sexual assault victims from having to face their assailants at termination proceedings. Sexual assault is not a ground for termination of parental rights. Section 48.415. If sexual assault was merely a ground for termination, victims of sexual assault would have to face their assailants at contested termination hearings. To avoid this confrontation, the legislature denied perpetrators of sexual assault standing to contest termination of their parental rights.
Interpreting sec. 48.42(2m), Stats., to deny perpetrators of sexual assault the right to contest termination of their parental rights also comports with public policy. It promotes the policy of protecting victims of crime by assuring that victims of sexual assault will not have to face their assailants at termination of parental rights proceedings. In addition, because a child's parental rights must be terminated before he or she can be adopted, sec. 48.81, this interpretation of sec. 48.42(2m) facilitates the adoption of children born as a result of sexual assault when appropriate. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that sec. 48.42(2m), denies a father standing to appear and contest a petition to involuntarily terminate his parental rights under sec. 48.415(6)(a)2.
As to the second issue presented, we conclude that the record in this case is...
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