Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC

• Decision Date: 21 March 2013
• Docket Number: Cause No. 1:12-cv-1517-WTL-MJD
• Citation: Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, Cause No. 1:12-cv-1517-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. Mar 21, 2013)
• Parties: MARK SUESZ, individually and on behalf of a class, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

MARK SUESZ, individually and on behalf of a class, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant.

Cause No. 1:12-cv-1517-WTL-MJD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SO ORDERED: March 21, 2013

ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This cause comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion to dismiss.Dkt. No. 18.The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, rules as follows.

I.STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.The complaint must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and there is no need for detailed factual allegations.However, the statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633(7th Cir.2007)(quotingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007)).

II.BACKGROUND

In the instant action, PlaintiffMark Suesz brings this putative class action,¹ alleging that DefendantMed-1 Solutions, LLC, ("Med-1") violated the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") when it attempted to collect a health care debt from him by filing suit in Pike Township small claims court.Suesz alleges that filing collection lawsuits in township small claims courts located other than in the township where the debtor lives or signed a contract is a violation of the Act.Suesz does not live in Pike Township, nor did he sign the contract giving rise to the debt in Pike Township.Med-1 moves to dismiss on the ground that, as a matter of law, filing in such a township is not a violation of the Act.It contends that it is sufficient to file in the county where the debtor resides or where the contract was signed.

III.DISCUSSION

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector must bring an action to collect a debt "only in the judicial district or similar legal entity in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action."15 U.S.C. § 1692i.The issue here is the meaning of the term "judicial district."Med-1 contends that the applicable "judicial district" is Marion County as a whole, while Suesz contends that the applicable "judicial district" is narrower - it is each township small claims court.

A. Newsom

The Seventh Circuit addressed the same question with respect to the Illinois courts in Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813(7th Cir.1996).In Newsom, a debt collector had filed suit against the debtor in the first municipal district of the Circuit Court of Cook County, but thedebtor resided in the third municipal district of the same county.The debtor filed suit, alleging a violation of the FDCPA.On motion by the debt collector, the district court found that the FDCPA required the debt collector to file in the appropriate Circuit Court, but did not further require him to file in any particular subdistrict within the Circuit Court.The debtor's claim was therefore dismissed; the debtor appealed.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The Court found the term "judicial district" unambiguous and defined it by reference to the definition in Black's Law Dictionary in effect at the time the FDCPA was enacted:

One of the circuits or precincts into which a state is commonly divided for judicial purposes; a court of general jurisdiction being usually provided in each of such district, and the boundaries of the district marking the territorial limits of its authority; or the district may include two or more counties, having separate and independent county courts, but in that casethey are presided over by the same judge.

76 F.3d at 817(citing Black's Law Dictionary 848 (6th ed. 1990)).It then went on to assess the Illinois judicial structure before determining whether the term "judicial district" encompassed Circuit Courts, municipal districts, or both.

In the first part of its analysis, the Court focused on the structure of the Illinois Circuit Courts before finding that a Circuit was a judicial district.The Court noted that each judicial Circuit has one Circuit Court presided over by one chief judge.It explained that the Circuit Courts possess original jurisdiction and, even when divided into various divisions, the divisions are not jurisdictional; rather, the divisions are for administrative purposes only.

In the second part of its analysis, the Court turned to whether a municipal department district may also constitute a judicial district.Of importance to the Court was the fact that, although local rule appeared to restrict venue to the defendant's place of residence or the place of transaction, another local rule provided for the trial of a proceeding in any Circuit Court of thecounty, regardless of department, district, or division.Likewise, actions were not subject to dismissal for being filed, tried, or adjudicated in the wrong department, division, or district.In the Court's eyes, such a scheme was evidence of the "administrative" purpose of the divisions.The Court therefore concluded,

[r]ather than dividing itself into legally distinct judicial districts, the rules governing the administration of the First Judicial Circuit indicate that the Circuit has promulgated administrative rules to facilitate its own administration.The Circuit continues to have one Chief Judge, the Circuit as a whole is the court of original jurisdiction for all of Cook County, and the boundaries between the Municipal Department administrative subdistricts do not set any territorial limits to the subdistrict's authority within the Circuit.Therefore the Municipal Department districts are neither defined as judicial districts, nor under the rules governing their operation do they function as judicial districts.Based upon the structure and function of municipal department districts, we therefore conclude that they do not fit within the definition of "judicial district" as employed by the FDCPA.

Id. at 819.Because the Court held that a municipal district is not a judicial district under the FDCPA, the debt collector was not required by FDCPA to file in a particular municipal district.Therefore, his failure to file in the municipal district in which the debtor resided was not a violation of the Act.

With this analysis in mind, the Court now turns to the analysis of Indiana courts.

B.Indiana Judicial Structure

Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish.Under Section 7 of that Article, the state is divided into judicial circuits, and a judge for each circuit is elected by the circuit's voters.Section 8 provides that the Circuit Courts have civil and criminal jurisdiction as prescribed by law; accordingly, by statute, Circuit Courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases, and de novo appellate jurisdiction of appeals from city and town courts.Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2(a)(1)-(2).

The Indiana General Assembly has established additional courts, "Superior Courts," by statute.E.g., Ind. Code 33-33-49-6(a).The specific jurisdictional limits of a Superior Court are unique to each county.Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1(applying to "standard superior courts");§ 33-33-49-1(providing that provisions regarding "standard superior courts" do not apply to Marion County Superior Court);§ 33-29-1.5-1(applying to "nonstandard superior courts").However, generally speaking, Superior Courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and appellate jurisdiction of appeals from city and town courts.Ind. Code §§ 33-29-1-2; 33-29-1.5-2.

The county at issue here, Marion County, constitutes the 19th Judicial Circuit.Ind. Code § 33-33-49-2.By local rule, the Marion County Circuit Court hears only civil matters, while the Marion County Superior Court hears civil and criminal matters.The Marion County Circuit Judge may transfer a case filed in the Circuit Court to the Superior Court with the presiding Superior Court Judge's consent.Ind. Code § 33-33-49-24.Likewise, the presiding Superior Court Judge may, with the Circuit Court Judge's consent, transfer a case filed in the Superior Court to the Circuit Court.Ind. Code § 33-33-49-25.In Marion County, the Circuit Court also conducts de novo appellate review of appeals from township small claims courts.Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2(a)(3).

Township small claims courts in Marion County are created by statute, Ind. Code § 33-34-1-2, and such courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit and Superior Courts in all civil cases sounding in contract in which the debt claimed does not exceed $6,000, not including interest or attorney's fees.Ind. Code §§ 33-34-3-2.However, the small claims courts are not courts of record, Ind. Code § 33-34-1-3, nor may claims be tried to a jury, Ind.Code § 33-34-2-10.If trial by jury is desired, the cause is tried in the Marion County Superior Court.Ind. Code § 33-34-3-11.

With one exception inapplicable here, a case within the jurisdiction of a small claims court may be venued, commenced, and decided "in any township small claims court in the county."Ind. Code § 33-34-3-1(a).However, venue may be changed if, on motion by the defendant, the township small claims court determines that "required venue" lies with another small claims court in the county where the action was filed.Ind. Code § 33-34-3-1(a)."Required venue" exists where any debtor has consented to venue in a signed writing, where a transaction or occurrence giving rise to the any part of the claim took place, or where the greater percentage of individual debtors...