Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate
| Decision Date | 09 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 2224,2224 |
| Parties | SUFFOLK PARENTS OF HANDICAPPED ADULTS; Irene Hoops; Frank Gatland; Frances Sensale Lenzo; Joyce B. Aron; Lillian Melville Hamid; Margaret Devoe; Jane Doe; Rachel Roe; Lora Hoops; Andrew Gatland; James Sensale; Lourdes Aron; Glenna Hamid; Karen Devoe; Richard Roe, as parents and guardians of, respectively, Lora Hoops; Andrew Gatland; James Sensale; Lourdes Aron; Glenna Hamid; Karen Devoe; John Doe, and Rachel Roe, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John B. WINGATE, as Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services and Suffolk County; George Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York; Robert J. Gaffney, as County Executive of Suffolk County; Thomas A. Maul; James L. Stone and Brian Wing, Defendants-Appellants. ockets 96-7421, 96-7470, 96-7630. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
William J. Burke, New York City, Thomas Coval, Willow Grove, PA (Lisa K. Friedman, New York City, Robert M. Freedman, Freedman & Fish, New York City, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Amy L. Abramowitz, Assistant Attorney General, New York City (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara G. Billet, Deputy Solicitor General, New York City, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellants Pataki, Maul, Stone, and Wing.
James M. Catterson, Deputy County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY (Robert J. Cimino, Suffolk County Attorney, Theodore D. Sklar, Thomas M. Merritt, Assistant County Attorneys, Hauppauge, NY, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellants Gaffney, Wingate, and Suffolk County.
Before: MINER, JACOBS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Trager, J.) entered a preliminary injunction which provided, inter alia, that (1) defendant Suffolk County must pay for the out-of-state residential care of four severely disabled adults for up to six months, or until they complete an
orderly transition to appropriate in-state care; and (2) if any of these four individuals remain in out-of-state facilities after six months, defendant state officials must assume responsibility for their care until such an orderly transition is completed. In light of our recent decision in Brooks v. Giuliani, 84 F.3d 1454 (2d Cir.1996), reh'g denied, No. 95-9178 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 480, 136 L.Ed.2d 375 (1996), and our rulings in this opinion, we vacate the injunction and remand.
The plaintiffs are the guardians of four severely disabled individuals over the age of 21 who are residents of Suffolk County, New York; and Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults, an unincorporated association which includes plaintiffs' guardians as members. 1 (For ease of reference, "plaintiffs" hereinafter refers to the four disabled individuals on whose behalf the named plaintiffs brought this suit.) The defendants are Suffolk County and two of its officials (collectively, "Suffolk County") and certain officials of New York State (the ). 2
When the plaintiffs were children, Suffolk County's local school boards placed them in out-of-state facilities for residential care, because no appropriate in-state facilities were available. These placements, made in each instance with State approval, were arranged for the purpose of complying with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (formerly the Education of the Handicapped Act) and New York State Education Law ("Education Law") §§ 4001-4006, 4401-4410 (McKinney 1995). Collectively, these statutes entitle all physically and mentally disabled children in New York to a free education, suitable to their needs, and require localities to contract with residential facilities in other states if facilities appropriate to a particular child's needs are not available in-state. See, e.g., Education Law §§ 4002(1), 4407(1)(a).
Although plaintiffs' out-of-state placements were fully supported by federal and state funding, that funding ended once the plaintiffs turned 21 and "aged out" of the IDEA-mandated regime. Suffolk County, like other New York State counties, voluntarily assumed responsibility for the costs of plaintiffs' out-of-state care when they turned 21; this provision of funding is known as "Transitional Care Funding" ("TCF"). State agencies paid, and continue to pay, 100% of the costs of care for individuals who reside at facilities in-state.
From 1982 through 1994, New York State reimbursed counties for 50% of the costs of TCF. In the absence of substantive legislation addressed to this need, the State's 50% contribution was provided each year through an earmarked appropriation in the State's Aid to Localities Budget. In 1994, New York State enacted a statute, effective January 1, 1995 (the "TCF Statute"), that placed these arrangements on a different footing. The TCF Statute increased the State's reimbursement of TCF costs to counties from 50% to 60%; mandated an eventual phase-out of all out-of-state placements; and provided that (if the phase-out was not accomplished) the State would assume 100% of the costs of out-of-state placements by 1999 for those still remaining in such placements.
See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 466(2), (5), (6) (McKinney Supp.1996).
Prior to 1996, Suffolk County provided TCF for the plaintiffs and other individuals. However, the county executive had repeatedly tried to omit TCF from the county budgets for the years 1989 through 1995; each time, that effort was thwarted by the county legislature. But in November 1995, the county legislature voted to omit TCF from the 1996 county budget; soon after, the County notified the State that it would not provide TCF for 1996. Since State assistance is a reimbursement mechanism for expenditures made by the counties, Suffolk County's refusal to provide TCF meant that the State would also cease to contribute to the plaintiffs' TCF costs.
On January 23, 1996, the plaintiffs commenced this § 1983 action in the district court alleging violations of procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection, and other "constitutional dut[ies]," and seeking restoration of TCF until the plaintiffs effect an orderly transition into appropriate in-state facilities. On February 21, 1996, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. In an opinion issued April 4, 1996, the district court granted a preliminary injunction providing that, inter alia, (1) Suffolk County must resume payment of TCF for six months (of which the State would reimburse 60%, pursuant to its statutory undertaking), during which time the State Defendants are ordered to "use all good efforts, using professional judgment," to assist the plaintiffs in transferring to appropriate in-state facilities in an orderly manner; and (2) if any of the plaintiffs remain in out-of-state placements after six months, the State Defendants must assume the full burden of funding those placements until the transfers are completed. See Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Pataki, 921 F.Supp. 970, 986 (E.D.N.Y.1996). In an opinion issued May 2, 1996, the district court granted in part and in part denied Suffolk County's motion for a stay of the injunction pending appeal, 3 but clarified the injunction in one crucial respect: the court ordered that, following the six-month period for which the County is responsible for TCF, or should the County prevail on appeal, the State Defendants must "take all necessary steps"--including providing 100% of TCF for the plaintiffs still residing in out-of-state placements--until appropriate transfers are made to in-state facilities. Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Pataki, 924 F.Supp. 431, 443 (E.D.N.Y.1996).
On May 14, 1996, this Court granted Suffolk County's motion for a stay of the district court's injunction as to the County. On May 17, 1996, consistent with its previous ruling, the district court ordered the State Defendants to assume responsibility for 100% of TCF until the plaintiffs are transferred to appropriate in-state facilities. No. CV-96-0288 (DGT), 1996 WL 285423, at * 2 .
Generally speaking, a court should not grant a preliminary injunction unless the party seeking the injunction demonstrates (1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) "sufficiently serious questions" on the merits and a balance of hardships that "tip[s] decidedly" in the movant's favor. Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam). We have held, however, that "[w]here the moving party seeks to stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme," the district court should not apply the less stringent "serious questions" standard, but should instead require the movant to satisfy "the more rigorous 'likelihood of success' standard...." Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 131, 132 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Plaza Health Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1989) (internal quotations omitted)); see also, International Dairy Foods Assoc. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir.1996). Judge Trager recognized that "the more demanding standard of 'likelihood of success on the merits[ ]' We review for abuse of discretion a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir.1994). An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the injunction is based on an error of law. County of Seneca v. Cheney, 12 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir.1993). For reasons explained below, we hold that the district court committed such an error of law in granting the injunction, thereby abusing its discretion. We therefore vacate the preliminary injunction and remand.
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