Suggs v. State, No. 780S220

• Docket Nº: No. 780S220
• Citation: 428 N.E.2d 226
• Case Date: December 02, 1981
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

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428 N.E.2d 226 William L. SUGGS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee. No. 780S220. Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 2, 1981.

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Robert F. Hellman, Barbara Coyle Rennolet, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

The appellant, William L. Suggs, was charged by an information with murder, a felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, and robbery, a class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1. The State sought the death penalty pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9. After a jury trial, he was convicted on the murder charge and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. This appeal follows the denial of the motion to correct errors.

I.

The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of his arrest. Appellant claims that this was error because the arrest was unlawful since it was made in the absence of a warrant, and without probable cause. The evidence obtained was a mug-shot of him which was the basis, he claims, of an in-court identification, and a newspaper clipping found on him which reported the killing with which he was charged.

Appellant contends that the information that the police relied upon to arrest him did not amount to "facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer (which) would warrant a man of reasonable caution and prudence in believing that the accused had committed ... a criminal offense." Gaddis v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 100, 368 N.E.2d 244. The arresting officer, Basham, had overheard part of a conversation between Lance DeBouse, who was a suspect in the killing, and another officer investigating the case, in which DeBouse stated that appellant had done the killing. Basham reported DeBouse's statement to his superior officer, Lt. Presnell, who then ordered Basham to make the arrest. Appellant argues that there was no basis for evaluating the reliability of the information and the credibility of the informant as required by our cases.

Whether there is probable cause for police to make an arrest without a warrant depends not upon the knowledge of the arresting officer alone, but upon the collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole. Benton v. State, (1980) Ind., 401 N.E.2d 697, 699. Lieutenant Presnell testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he had participated in the investigation to the extent of dispatching officers on different assignments, including assigning two officers to look for Lance DeBouse who was a suspect.

For the purpose of establishing probable cause to arrest without a warrant, the reliability of the information provided by an informant whose statements may be self-serving must be established by reference to facts and circumstances which indicate that the information is trustworthy. Pawloski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 350, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1233. The collective knowledge of the police included the facts that Lance DeBouse was a participant in events leading up to a point shortly before the shooting,

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and that in making his statement he exposed himself to charges for serious crimes.

"People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search." United States v. Harris, (1971) 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723.

DeBouse's admissions against penal interest and the fact that he was a direct participant in events leading to the shooting were sufficient to establish his trustworthiness for the purpose of probable cause to arrest. There was no error in denying the motion to suppress.

II.

Appellant made a motion to dismiss the case against him on the ground that the Vigo Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over criminal cases. This motion was denied and he claims error, citing Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for the Vigo Superior Court, Vigo Circuit Court, and Vigo County Court which provides:

"(A)ll cases-civil, criminal, probate or other, except juvenile-shall be filed in the Vigo Superior Court...."

The contention that this case came before Vigo Circuit Court in violation of this rule has no merit. Rule 1 also provides the following:

"The Vigo Superior Court shall be comprised of three (3) divisions as follows:

Division 1-Judge Harold J. Bitzegaio, presiding.

Division 2-Judge Charles K. McCrory, presiding.

Division 3-Judge Hugh D. McQuillan, Vigo Circuit Court, presiding as Judge of the Vigo Superior Court, Division 3."

And it also provides that "(t)he Court Administrator shall assign criminal cases to one of the three divisions of Superior Court." Judge McQuillan, Judge of Vigo Circuit Court, sitting as Judge of Vigo Superior Court, had jurisdiction of the case and did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.

III.

The trial court, over defense objection, permitted State's witness, Floyd Reeves, to testify that on the same night as the killing, he observed a whispered conversation between appellant and Lance DeBouse. He did not hear what was said. This testimony served to corroborate testimony by DeBouse that appellant told him that in the course of robbing the occupants of a car, his shotgun discharged.

Appellant claims that a...