Suits v. Taylor

Decision Date04 January 1886
Citation20 Mo.App. 166
PartiesRUFUS SUITS, Respondent, v. EDWARD G. TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

APPEAL from Jackson Circuit Court, HON. F. M. BLACK, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Statement of case by the court.

This is an action to recover for services alleged to have been rendered defendant by plaintiff. The petition contained two counts. The first alleged that in January, 1882, the plaintiff made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors to the defendant, as assignee, of a lot of goods in Kansas City. That defendant took possession of the goods as such assignee, and employed the plaintiff to assist him in disposing of the same, and agreed to pay him for such services at the rate of two hundred dollars per month. That plaintiff performed such services for two months, amounting to four hundred dollars, for which he asks judgment. The second count was for a quantum meruit for said services, asking judgment for the same sum.

The answer was a general denial.

The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the defendant employed him on the terms alleged in his petition, and that he performed the services. He also made proof of the value of the services.

The defendant's evidence tended to show the following state of facts: The plaintiff stated to defendant that he proposed making an adjustment with his creditors, by offering a certain per cent. He proposed to have the claims assigned to himself, and then have the assignee sell the property through an order of the court, and have it bid in for his benefit and thereby get his property back into his own hands. In order to keep the property and the business in good condition for him he proposed to stay with plaintiff to aid in the sales, " and keep the stock in shape." Defendant agreed to keep him, with the understanding that if plaintiff effected the settlement, as expected, so as to get the property back, defendant was not to pay him anything. If no compromise was effected, so that the whole property would have to be disposed of in the usual way under the assignment the plaintiff was to receive from defendant, as assignee, the sum of two hundred dollars per month for his services provided such amount should be approved by the court. That plaintiff stayed there only a part of the time claimed for being absent in New York trying to effect a settlement with his creditors. The plaintiff did succeed in making such settlements, and buying up the claims, and had defendant to obtain an order of court for the sale of the goods, under which they were sold, and were bought in by one Saltsman, at plaintiff's instance, and for his benefit.

Saltsman furnished no money, but acting for plaintiff turned the goods over to him. Sometime during plaintiff's stay in the store defendant paid him, at different times, the sum of one hundred dollars. When defendant went to make his settlement with the court as assignee, he applied to plaintiff and obtained from him a receipt for this money, on account of services.

There is some uncertainty, from the evidence, as to whether this money was loaned by defendant to plaintiff, or was advanced to him on account of his services. The plaintiff denied all knowledge of the transaction. The defendant testified that on taking plaintiff's receipt, after the goods were all disposed of, the plaintiff made no claim whatever for any services, although he knew defendant was making his final settlement with the court as assignee.

The plaintiff in rebuttal testified that the goods were bought in at the sale by Saltsman for the benefit of plaintiff's wife, and were turned over to her and not to plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that he had obtained from his wife money with which to effect said settlements with his creditors and paid her off in this transfer.

Plaintiff also testified that he did not succeed in making an adjustment with two of his creditors, who attacked the purchase of the goods made through Saltsman for his wife, and were defeated, so that the goods remained with her.

The court of its own motion gave the following declarations of law:

" 1. In order for the plaintiff to recover in this case, he is bound to show that there was a contract, either expressed or implied, on the part of the defendant to pay him for the services rendered."
" 2. Though the court should find from the evidence that there was an implied contract between plaintiff and defendant that defendant should pay plaintiff for his services, still, if the court further believes from the evidence that the defendant gave to the plaintiff one hundred dollars, and that at the end of said service when the receipt for said one hundred dollars, read in evidence, was given, it was agreed that the said one hundred dollars should be in settlement for said services, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything more."
" 3. If the court find from the evidence that the receipt for one hundred dollars, read in evidence, was given by the plaintiff to defendant as a voucher for money previously given by defendant to plaintiff, and that said money was not regarded at the time it was given as for services, and said receipt was not given till after said services had ended, then the giving or receiving said receipt, or the giving said money, is not to be regarded as evidence to raise a presumption that there was a contract on the part of the defendant, expressed or implied, to pay for the services."
" 4. The court, sitting as a jury, in considering the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant, as to whether there was a contract on the part of the defendant to pay plaintiff for the services rendered, may take into consideration the motive the defendant would have had in withholding from the plaintiff anything due to him, and if the defendant, simply acting as assignee, had no motive or personal interest in withholding from plaintiff anything due by him as such assignee, then this may be taken as a circumstance corroborating defendant's testimony that he was not to pay plaintiff for said services, and as to what his contract was with plaintiff."

The defendant asked, and the court refused to give, the following declarations of law:

" 2. If the court, sitting as a jury, shall find that at the time the plaintiff entered the service of the defendant the defendant was in possession of the stock of goods assigned to him by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff stated to the defendant that he wished to make a settlement with his creditors, so that he should again get said stock of goods under his control, and that he wished to remain in the store so as to keep the stock of goods in as good shape as possible for himself, in case he should effect such a settlement, and that thereupon the plaintiff and defendant made an agreement whereby the plaintiff was to remain in charge of said goods for the defendant, and in case he made such settlement with his creditors, then the defendant was to pay him nothing; and if the court shall further find that the plaintiff did effect such settlement with his creditors, so that on March 4, 1882, said stock of goods was transferred to one Saltsman, for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that said stock of goods thereby came under the control of the plaintiff and that this was regarded by the parties at the time as such a settlement as was contemplated by them in the agreement aforesaid, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the court further declares that, though this transfer of the stock of goods was made to the said Saltsman, and not to plaintiff directly, still if it was made to Saltsman for the benefit of plaintiff, then for the purposes of this suit it was a transfer to plaintiff; and if, after the transfer to Saltsman, the stock was transferred by him to plaintiff's wife, at the direction of the plaintiff, to satisfy debts owing by plaintiff to his wife, then this is evidence that plaintiff regarded the transfer to Saltsman as a transfer for his own benefit, and for the purposes of this suit, it was a transfer for the benefit of the plaintiff."
" 3. To entitle the plaintiff to recover upon an implied contract, the action of the plaintiff and defendant must have been such that the law will imply that it was the intention of the defendant to pay plaintiff such a sum for his services as they were reasonably worth; and if the court believe from the evidence that the plaintiff agreed to render the services upon the terms testified to by defendant, then, though said contract should be void, still the fact that a contract of that sort was made by the parties, shows that neither plaintiff nor defendant had a contract of a different kind in his mind, and this negatives the idea that there was an implied contract."
" 4. If the court believe from the evidence that the plaintiff and defendant entered into such a contract, as that testified to by the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit."

The court, sitting as a jury, found the issues for the defendant on the first count, and found for plaintiff on the second count, in the sum of three hundred dollars. Defendant has brought the case here on appeal.

WOODSON & SLAUGHTER, for the appellants.

I. The...

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