Sule v. Kloehn Co., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 95-1090(HAA).,CIV. A. 95-1090(HAA). |
| Citation | 149 F.Supp.2d 115 |
| Parties | Akos SULE and Neptune Research & Development, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. KLOEHN COMPANY, LTD., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
C. Stephen Barrett III, C. Stephen Barrett III, P.A., Newark, NJ, for plaintiffs.
Arnold B. Calmann, Saiber, Schlesinger, Satz & Goldstein, Newark, NJ, for defendant.
This matter comes before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56. The plaintiffs have moved for entry of summary judgment on their patent infringement claim. The defendant has moved for a determination of non-infringement and entry of summary judgment dismissing Count III of the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. This court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. For the reasons discussed below, the plaintiffs' motion is denied and the defendant's motion is granted.
This patent litigation arises from the production by two corporations of "solenoid valves," or "isolation valves."1 On March 2, 1995, plaintiffs Akos Sule ("Sule") and Neptune Research & Development, Inc. ("Neptune") filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that defendant Kloehn Company, Ltd. ("Kloehn") infringed plaintiffs' U.S. Patent No. 34,261 (the "'261 Patent").2 In addition, on November 26, 1996, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Kloehn infringed plaintiffs' U.S. Patent No. 5,546,987 (the "'987 Patent").3 The plaintiffs contend that Kloehn has literally infringed claims 32-40 of the '261 patent and claims 18-20 of the '987 patent.
The solenoid valves at issue are small cylinders—usually between 1 and 1½ inches in diameter—used to control the flow of liquids or gases in, among other things, medical diagnostic instruments. The particular valves at issue in this case are 3-way solenoid valves. See Hintz Aff. at Exh. 5. A 3-way valve is comprised of three ports, or openings, in the body of the valve. One port is "normally open," another is "normally closed," and the third port is a "common port." When the electricity to the valve is off, the solenoid is deenergized so that the "normally open" port is open and the "normally closed" port is closed. When this occurs, fluid is able to pass through the normally open port to the common port, but is prevented from passing through the normally closed port to the common port. When the electricity to the 3-way solenoid valve is turned on, the solenoid is activated, which forces a plunger to move within the valve, causing the normally closed port to open and causing the normally open port to close. In this condition, fluid may pass through the normally closed port to the common port, but not through the normally open port to the common port. When the electricity is turned off, the solenoid is de-energized, and the valve returns to its original state.
Specifically at issue in this motion are the means by which the ports are opened and closed in the respective Sule and Kloehn valves. Claims 32-40 of the '261 patent and claims 18-20 of the '987 patent each require, among other things, that the claimed solenoid valve have the following: (1) a "first poppet means formed as part of said first diaphragm means with said first poppet means operative to close said first orifice"; and (2) a "second poppet means separable from said first poppet means and formed as part of said second diaphragm means with said second poppet means operative to close said second orifice." Hintz Aff. at Exh. 1. The plaintiffs contend that Kloehn's valves contain each and all of the elements set forth in claims 32-40 of the 4 cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of literal infringement.
At the outset, it must be noted that the standard for summary judgment in a patent case is the same as in any other type of action. See Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984); Katz v. AIWA America, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 730, 735 (D.N.J.1993). Indeed, with respect to patent cases, the Federal Circuit has instructed that:
[w]here no genuine issue of material fact remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court should utilize the salutary procedure of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 to avoid unnecessary expense to the parties and wasteful utilization of the jury process and judicial resources.
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835 (Fed.Cir.1984).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, supporting papers, affidavits, and admissions on file, when viewed with all legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir.1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.1987). In other words, "[s]ummary judgment may be granted only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party." Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1988).
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of production, i.e., of making a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This may be done either by demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of fact and that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law, or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has not produced sufficient evidence relating to an essential element of the case for which it bears the burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once either showing is made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party who must demonstrate facts supporting each element for which it bears the burden, as well as establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 322-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The substantive law will identify which facts are "material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could possibly hold in the nonmovant's favor with regard to that issue. Id. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, "`the [summary judgment] opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,' but simply must exceed the `mere scintilla' standard." Id. (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). "Although a `scintilla of evidence' supporting the nonmovant's case is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, it is clear that a district court should not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter itself, but instead should determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Country Floors, Inc. v. Country Tiles, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061-62 (3d Cir.1991). Indeed, at the summary judgment stage, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations; these tasks are left to the factfinder. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993).
Only if the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, may summary judgment be granted.
There are two steps in a patent infringement analysis. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). First, the meaning and scope of the patent claims alleged to be infringed must be determined. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 116 S.Ct. 1384. This step is commonly referred to as "claim construction" or "claim interpretation." Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. Second, the accused device must be compared to the properly construed claims to determine whether the device infringes the patent. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454; Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
Patent claims are the numbered paragraphs at the end of a patent's specification that define the scope of the patent. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373, 116 S.Ct. 1384. As such, a "claim provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention." Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.Cir.1989). Construing the claims of a patent is closely akin to construing other written documents, such as contracts or statutes. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978; Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 2000 WL 1765358 at *2 (S.D.Ind. Nov.29, 2000). However, some special considerations apply, based on...
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