Sulkowska v. City of New York

Decision Date24 January 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99 CIV. 4228(AGS).,99 CIV. 4228(AGS).
Citation129 F.Supp.2d 274
PartiesStanislawa SULKOWSKA, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Police Commissioner Howard Safir, Police Officer Charles Daskalakis, and Police Officers "A", "B", and "C", Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

John W. Cobb, Tuxedo, NY, for Plaintiff.

City of New York Law Department, Laura Eberstein, Jennifer Rossan, Susan Halatyn, New York City, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stanislawa Sulkowska ("Plaintiff") commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and New York state law seeking compensatory and punitive damages arising out of her arrest on charges of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, forgery in the second degree, criminal simulation, and resisting arrest. Specifically, plaintiff asserted claims against the City of New York, former Police Commissioner Howard Safir ("Safir"), Police Officer Charles Daskalakis ("Daskalakis"), and Police Officers "A", "B", and "C" pursuant to (i) Section 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights arising out of her allegedly false arrest and purported abuse while in custody, and (ii) New York state law for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, prima facie tort, negligence and gross negligence. By Memorandum Order dated October 19, 2000, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, but granted that portion of plaintiff's motion requesting leave to amend the Complaint to exclude defendants Safir and Police Officers "A", "B", and "C". Following entry of a Joint Pretrial Order dated August 28, 2000, the Court conducted a bench trial on December 12, 13 and 14, 2000. This Opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a).

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Plaintiff's Background and Her Relationship to the Oasis Bar, its Ownership, and its Liquor License

Plaintiff is a 75-year old woman residing in New York County. Born in Poland in 1925, she earned a master's degree in economics from a Polish university, married, and had two daughters. (Tr. 354, 356, 359, 390.) She also worked as economic director for a construction company. (Tr. 390.) In 1971, she fled then-Communist Poland with her daughters, traveling to Germany and, in 1973, to the United States. (Tr. 355-58; Plaintiff's Brief Life Story, Pl.Ex. 23.) According to plaintiff, her husband, who remained in Poland when she departed, was subject to aggressive questioning and torture concerning the whereabouts of his family. (Tr. 358, 383; Pl.Ex. 23.) Plaintiff later learned in the 1980s that her husband, whom she had hoped would join her in the United States if and when the Communist government permitted him to leave, had been "murdered" in Poland, which caused plaintiff to suffer depression and related symptoms. (Tr. 291, 382-83; Def. Exs. B-12, B-13.)

When she arrived in the United States, plaintiff spoke no English, and initially worked as a cleaning woman in an office building in Manhattan. (Tr. 358-59; Pl. Ex. 23.) With money she saved, plaintiff went into business for herself, opening a candy store in Queens, which she operated for two years, concurrently with her job as a cleaning woman. (Tr. 360-61, 391.) Following the sale of the candy store, plaintiff operated a Polish restaurant called the Baltic Restaurant, which had locations both in Manhattan and in Queens. (Tr. 361-63, 391-92.) Following the closing of that restaurant, plaintiff operated a bar on First Avenue in Manhattan called the Downtown Beirut bar, or "DBB." (Tr. 393.)

In 1986, plaintiff and her daughters formed a corporation called New Statford Restaurant, Inc. ("New Statford")1 to serve as owner of a liquor license and lease for a bar establishment called the Oasis ("Oasis"). (Tr. at 365, 396.) That same year, they obtained a liquor license in the corporation's name. (Tr. 242, 394.) The Oasis first was located in Ozone Park, Queens and then on Houston Street in Manhattan. (Tr. 399, Def.Ex. NN.) The bar apparently was closed during 1992 and 1993; however, in 1994, plaintiff and her family found a new location, and the Oasis reopened at 121 St. Mark's Place in Manhattan.2 (Tr. 365, 396, 399-400.)

At its inception, plaintiff owned 60 percent of the New Statford, and each of her daughters owned 20 percent. (Tr. 246; Def. Ex. OO.) After the bar located on Houston Street was closed in 1992, plaintiff and her daughter Bozina resigned from the corporation, leaving her daughter Barbara with 100 percent ownership of New Statford and the Oasis. (Tr. 248-49, 262-63, 401-02; Def. Ex. L.) However, the bar's liquor license continued to remain in the corporation's name, was the license used by the Oasis when it opened in 1994, and was subsequently renewed, for three years, in 1996. (Tr. 89, 400; Pl.Ex. 20.) Although plaintiff had no ownership interest in the bar after it moved to St. Mark's Place, she continued to assist in its operation. She was frequently on the premises and at times performed managerial duties. (Tr. 36, 225.) Barbara hired a manager, Avi Aharon ("Aharon"), in early 1997, but fired him after one year because he was stealing money from the corporation. (Tr. 229-31, 253; Def. Ex. U.) After being fired, Aharon refused to leave his job, continued to sell liquor from the bar, and caused substantial physical damage to the premises. (Tr. 231; Def. Ex. K-1.)

On March 2, 1998, because of Aharon's activity, Barbara placed the liquor license in the custody of the New York State Liquor Authority ("SLA") for safekeeping.3 (Tr. 231, 252; Def. Exs. U, SS.) However, Barbara subsequently learned that Aharon had removed the license from safekeeping at the SLA and had reopened the bar without Barbara's consent.4 (Tr. 231, 254.) On April 1, 1998, at Barbara's request, an SLA inspector accompanied by a police officer of the 9th Precinct of the New York Police Department ("NYPD") went to the Oasis and took custody of the license. (Tr. 22, 232, 254.) Barbara, who was produced by plaintiff, testified that she went to retrieve the original license from safekeeping in late April 1998, but the license had been misplaced. (Tr. 239.) She requested a duplicate license and later received a letter from the SLA dated April 24, 1998 (the "20-day letter") that served as a valid license until the original license was replaced.5 (Tr. 239, Pl.Ex. 19; Def. Ex. BB.) Barbara further testified that she retrieved the new liquor license from the SLA on an unspecified date in early June 1998.6 (Tr. 239-40.) She testified that she hung the original liquor license in the Oasis' "service area," an enclosed space in back of the bar, because of concerns that Aharon might try to remove it. (Tr. 234, 241, 258.) All parties agreed at trial that the original license was at the premises when plaintiff was arrested there in the early morning of June 13, 1998.7 (Tr. at 8, 14, 146, 431.)

II. NYPD Conditions Unit and MARCHS Task Force

At all times relevant to the instant action, defendant Charles Daskalakis was employed by the NYPD, and was working out of the Department's 9th Precinct as a member of a specially formed unit known as the Street Conditions, or Conditions, Unit (the "Conditions Unit").8 (Tr. 114, 465.) The Conditions Unit was formed by the NYPD as part of the City's efforts to remove so-called undesirable elements and conditions that had the effect of offending the community at large.9 Each police precinct apparently has officers assigned to Conditions. The premises targeted by the 9th Precinct's Conditions Unit are "cabaret" locations, meaning "clubs, bars, anywhere there was some kind of liquor sold or any kind of dancing." (Tr. 199.) Officer Rosado, who was called as a witness by defendants, testified that certain premises are identified as community "hot spots" and that the NYPD has a list of such "hot spots." (Tr. 467.) The "hot spots" are locations which have been the subject of complaints or are premises not performing in ways the City deems to be satisfactory, in terms of conditions, in the community. (Tr. 467.) If a location is a "real problem," the goal is to close them down or expel them from the community. (Tr. 468.)

The officers of the Conditions Unit never act on their own with respect to designated "hot spots"; rather, they act in response to two types of directions. (Tr. 467.) The first, and most common, type of direction is a "a call over the radio, or ... at the station house directing [officers] to a certain location." (Tr. 466-67, 468.) The second type of direction is a call to action as part of a joint task force formed by the Mayor's office named the Multi-Agency Response to Community Hot Spots, or "MARCHS." (Tr. 32, 456, 469-70.) The MARCHS Task Force is comprised of representatives from various New York City agencies such as the Buildings Department, Consumer Affairs Department, Health Department and Environmental Protection Department, working together with numerous police and vice officers and the SLA. (Tr. 30-31, 470.) The MARCHS Task Force specifically focuses on establishments that have or should have a liquor license, (Tr. 31), and examines the conditions of such establishments, including general cleanliness, food safety, and fire safety. (Tr. 470.) The Task Force works precinct-by-precinct, on the basis of the same lists of community "hot spots" or targets as those held by the Conditions Units alone, lists which were drawn up by the Commanding Officers of each local precinct. (Tr. 29-30, 71, 470; Def. Ex. AA.)

The Conditions Units frequently conduct visits related to a premises' liquor license, so-called "SLA investigations." On investigations triggered by a radio call, the Unit responds with the members of their team from the precinct, which for the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
106 cases
  • Donovan v. Briggs
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 26 Febrero 2003
    ...probable cause to initiate a proceeding "`so totally lacking' [that] malice [may] reasonably be inferred." Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13, 17, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 364 N.E.2d 1304 Defendants' motion for summ......
  • Durr v. Slator
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • 2 Septiembre 2021
    ...such injuries as impairment of reputation ... personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’ " Sulkowska v. City of New York , 129 F. Supp. 2d 274, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) ). "......
  • Lankford v. City of Clifton Police Dep't
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • 29 Junio 2021
    ...and battery, regardless of whether the force would be deemed reasonable if applied during a lawful arrest." Sulkowska v. City of New York , 129 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Third Circuit precedents, particularly Groman and Edwards, go no farther than to hold that excessive force re......
  • Cunningham v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 23 Enero 2007
    ...for assault and battery may arise." L.B. v. Town of Chester, 232 F.Supp.2d 227, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 294 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (stating "[i]f an arrest is determined to be unlawful, any use of force against a plaintiff may constitute an assau......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT