Sullins v. Moreland, CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:20-cv-0530-ECM

• Decision Date: 06 January 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:20-cv-0530-ECM
• Citation: 511 F.Supp.3d 1220
• Parties: Charles SULLINS, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey MORELAND, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

511 F.Supp.3d 1220

Charles SULLINS, Plaintiff,

v.Jeffrey MORELAND, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:20-cv-0530-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

Signed January 6, 2021

Brandon Marcellus Price-Crum, Charles James, II, Johnna K. Ingalls, Serious Injury Law Group, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Michael Jeremy Dotson, Porterfield Harper Mills Motlow & Ireland PA, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants Jeffrey Moreland, J & J Martin Inc.

Joshua Jonathan Jackson, Kevin W. R. Bufford, Samford & Denson, LLP, Opelika, AL, for Defendant Geico Casualty Company.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

The idea "that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint" is central to federal question jurisprudence. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 399, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). What goes hand in hand with this understanding is a plaintiff is held responsible for strategic decisions he makes when crafting his complaint through the addition or subtraction of parties or claims. Id.; See also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche , 546 U.S. 81, 88–91, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005) (citing 16 J. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 107.14[2][c], p. 107–67 (3d ed. 2005)). But the Plaintiff here requests that this Court depart from this understanding by finding no jurisdiction exists. Charles Sullins ("Plaintiff") asks this Court to remand his suit against Jeffery Moreland ("Moreland"), his employer J & J Martin, Inc. ("J & J Martin"), and Geico Casualty Company ("Geico") (collectively "Defendants") back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have failed to show by the preponderance of the evidence that the required amount in controversy exists. This is after the Plaintiff added his insurance carrier Geico for an underinsured motorist ("UIM") claim that is only triggered if the damages for his various other claims exceed $1,000,000. It seems like the Plaintiff wants to have his cake (potentially recovering against his insurer if his damages exceed $1,000,000) and eat it too (proceed in state court). Upon consideration of the motion and for reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the motion to remand (doc. 14) is due to be DENIED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore possess only the power authorized by the Constitution or statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Courts should presume that a case lies outside of this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary should be upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Although a defendant has the statutory right to remove in certain situations, the plaintiff is still the master of his claim. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). For that reason, the defendant's right to remove and the plaintiff's right to choose his forum are "not on equal footing." Id. Accordingly, the defendant's removal burden is a heavy one. Id.

A defendant may remove a case based on diversity jurisdiction under two circumstances. First, a defendant may immediately remove a case to federal court within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleadings if it is apparent that complete diversity and the required amount in controversy exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (2012) (formerly called paragraph one removal). Second, if the amount in controversy was not apparent from the initial pleading, a defendant has the opportunity to remove the case within thirty days of receiving a document later establishing the requisite amount in controversy. To prove that the amount in controversy is later discernible, the defendant must provide "an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." § 1446(b)(3) (formerly called paragraph 2 removal). In this instance, "other paper" under subsection (b)(3) is "information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery ...." § 1446(c)(3)(A).

When the plaintiff does not specify the amount in controversy, the importance of these two removal opportunities is not just that they provide defendants two discrete windows when removal is appropriate, but they also require courts to apply two different standards to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists. Under both standards, a defendant desiring to remove a case to federal court must file with a district court a "notice of removal ... containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders" served on the defendant. § 1446(a). If a plaintiff does not specify damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc. , 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). But how a court is to determine this and what evidence it is permitted to consider depend on when the case was removed to federal court.

Based on the circumstances under which the defendant removed the case to federal court, the Eleventh Circuit has set forth two different standards to evaluate whether a plaintiff's claims satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction prerequisites. When the Circuit first examined this question, it taught, a "court considers the document received by the defendant from the plaintiff—be it the initial complaint or a later received paper—and determines whether that document and the notice of removal unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction." Lowery v. Alabama Power Co. , 483 F.3d 1184, 1213 (11th Cir. 2007). Relying on the fact Lowery was a later § 1446(b)(3) removal, a subsequent Circuit panel cabined the document received by the plaintiff and unambiguously establish language to only apply to second paragraph removal actions. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc. , 608 F.3d 744, 763 (11th Cir. 2010). And it also cautioned courts against "[i]mplicitly reading the language into the first paragraph of that subsection, where it does not exist ...." Id.

By distinguishing first and second paragraph removal, Pretka identifies a less demanding path for removal under § 1446(b)(1). The Circuit explained, "[w]hen the complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, removal from state court is [jurisdictionally] proper if it is facially apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement." Pretka , 608 F.3d at 754 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc. , 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) ). And if the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the complaint, the court should look to "the notice of removal and may require evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was removed." Id. The Circuit also expanded the types of evidence defendants could use to show the existence of the required amount in controversy. Pretka , 608 F.3d at 755 ("Defendants may introduce their own affidavits, declarations, or other documentation ....").

Pretka also clarifies how courts are to discern whether the required amount in controversy exists based on the notice of removal and any attendant evidence. The Pretka court reframed Lowery as a case about "how to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in the ‘fact-free context’ of that particular case." Pretka , 608 F.3d at 753. In that fact-free context, the amount in controversy could only be determined "by the looking at stars" and that, of course, would be impermissible. Id. at 753–54. So when a moving defendant actually makes specific factual allegations and can support those allegations, a court may make "reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations" from the pleadings to aid in its determination whether the required amount in controversy exists. Roe , 613 F.3d at 1061–62 (citing Pretka , 608 F.3d at 754 ). Essentially, the court is not required to "suspend reality or shelve common sense" to determine whether the complaint or other documents establish the jurisdictional amount. Pretka , 608 F.3d at 770 (citing Roe v. Michelin , 637 F.Supp.2d 995, 999 (M.D. Ala. 2009) ). Rather, courts are to use their "judicial experience and common sense" to evaluate whether the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional requirement. Roe , 637 F.Supp.2d at 999. It is important to keep in mind "a removing defendant is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it." Jones v. Novartis Pharm. Co. , 952 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (citing Pretka , 608 F.3d at 754 ). While the court may not speculate to the exact dollar amount, it can conclude, for example, without speculating "from the egregious conduct alleged that the amount, whatever it is, far exceeds $75,000." Pretka , 608 F.3d at 754 (citing Roe , 637 F.Supp.2d at 999 ). But if the defendant's evidence is insufficient, the court may not "speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice's failings." Pretka , 608 F.3d at 752 (quoting Lowery , 483 F.3d at 1214–15 ).

To summarize, before determining—when not clear from the pleadings—if the amount in controversy exists, courts must first determine which of the two removal provisions apply based on when in the life of the case it was removed. After a court determines which applies, it is to consider the evidence appropriate under each removal action. When a defendant removes a case within the first thirty days after receipt of the initial complaint, the court may determine whether, by the preponderance of the evidence, the required amount in controversy exists based on both the initial complaint and other evidence introduced by the defendant with the notice of removal. But if diversity...