Sullins v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 30 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17642.,17642.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ontwon SULLINS v. Neftali RODRIGUEZ et al.

913 A.2d 415

281 Conn. 128

Ontwon SULLINS v. Neftali RODRIGUEZ et al.

No. 17642.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 27, 2006.

Decided January 30, 2007.

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Ann E. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Henri Alexandre, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant Larry Myers).

Joshua D. Lanning, New Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Antonio Ponvert III, Bridgeport, filed a brief for Friends and Families Who Care as amicus curiae.

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SULLIVAN, Js.

BORDEN, J.

The defendant Larry Myers,¹ the former warden of Northern correctional institution, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Ontwon Sullins, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff's claims.² Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly: (1) applied federal, not state, sovereign immunity law; and (2) rejected the defendant's position that the state is the real party in interest, despite the plaintiff's allegations naming the defendant in his individual capacity. The plaintiff counters that: (1) state sovereign immunity law does not govern the court's inquiry when the vindication of a federal right is at issue; and (2) the facts alleged in his complaint are sufficient to defeat the defendant's sovereign immunity defense. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a former inmate of Northern correctional institution, brought this action in two counts—the first count against the named defendant, Neftali Rodriguez, and the second count against the defendant. See footnote one of this opinion. The complaint stated that the defendant "is sued in his individual capacity." The plaintiff sought compensatory damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³ In his answer, the defendant pleaded, as a special defense, that "[g]iven the facts and holding in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308 [828 A.2d 549 (2003)], Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568 (1975), and Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 480 (1956), the facts as alleged by [the] plaintiff against [the] defendant . . . indicate that the state is the real defendant at issue in this case. . . . As this matter is against the defendant . . . in his official capacity, this action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity."⁴ The plaintiff then moved to strike the defendant's special defenses, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense.⁵ The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

"A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Moreover, [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "As we must in reviewing a motion to dismiss, we take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 305, 828 A.2d 549.

In his complaint, the plaintiff accused the defendant of violating the plaintiff's rights under the eighth⁶ and fourteenth⁷ amendments to the United States constitution, namely, the rights "to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to be free from arbitrary and callous governmental behavior that shocks the conscience." In support, he alleged the following facts: On July 11, 2002, Rodriguez, a correction officer at Northern correctional institution, and his subordinates, placed the plaintiff in a small recreational chamber with another inmate, William McClease, and then left the area, "leaving [the] plaintiff and the other inmates without supervision. . . . Shortly thereafter, without provocation . . . McClease violently attacked [the] plaintiff, shattering his eye socket and causing him other serious physical injury, severe shock and mental anguish." The plaintiff further alleged that "[o]n many occasions prior to July 11, 2002, [the] plaintiff informed . . . Rodriguez in writing that . . . McClease had repeatedly threatened to harm [the] plaintiff." He also alleged that the plaintiff's injuries "were caused by the grossly negligent conduct and deliberate indifference of [the] defendant," namely, by his failure: (1) "to institute adequate policies and procedures to protect inmates threatened by other inmates"; (2) "to train Northern [correction] officers to protect inmates threatened by other inmates"; and (3) "to institute adequate policies and procedures to enable inmates to protect themselves from other inmates posing a known risk." The complaint specifically names the defendant "in his individual capacity."

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that federal sovereign immunity law, rather than state sovereign immunity law, applies to actions under § 1983.⁸ We conclude, to the contrary, that when sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law.

The United States Supreme Court has asserted that "[f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts . . . because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983. Id.; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). Nevertheless, "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). "The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." Howlett v. Rose, supra, at 375, 110 S.Ct. 2430.

We have embraced these principles in our decisions as well. As we said in Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 128, 38 A.2d 592 (1944), a federal statute, "though of federal origin, is just as much the law of this state as a statute enacted by our own legislature . . . ." In Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 549, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984), for example, we concluded, pursuant to Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to her § 1983 claim. We refused to construe Patsy as limited to actions brought in federal court because "[t]he incongruous result . . . would be to allow plaintiffs instituting federal court actions to do so without exhausting state administrative remedies, while requiring plaintiffs suing in Connecticut courts to first exhaust such remedies. Since it is clear that claims for liability for deprivation of federal constitutional rights under § 1983 are claims as to which there is concurrent jurisdiction . . . we think that such a limitation on the court's holding is inappropriate." (Citations omitted.) Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, supra, at 549, 473 A.2d 1176. Although ultimately we employed state common-law sovereign immunity in Fetterman, we did so only after first concluding that federal law permitted its application. Id., at 551, 473 A.2d 1176, citing Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, reh. denied, 446 U.S. 993, 100 S.Ct. 2979, 64 L.Ed.2d 850 (1980), for the proposition that § 1983 incorporated common-law sovereign immunity, which was well established at the time of the statute's enactment.

In Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 304-305, 310, 828 A.2d 549, we considered whether the defendants could employ a sovereign immunity defense to defeat several state law claims as well as one count brought under § 1983. As a threshold matter, we examined the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff had brought the action against the individually named defendants in their individual capacities as well as in their official capacities. Id., at 307-308, 828 A.2d 549. Although the inquiry was relevant to both federal and state sovereign immunity analyses; see, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 374, 802 A.2d 814 (2002); we dealt with the § 1983 claim separately and concluded, pursuant to Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at 365, 110 S.Ct. 2430, and Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), that "[a]lthough it would have made sense . . . for the plaintiff to have sued the defendants only in their individual capacities in [the § 1983 count] . . . he did not do so."⁹ Miller v. Egan, supra, at 311, 828 A.2d 549.

In ruling on...