Sullivan Elec. Co. v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 26 July 1976
• Citation: 541 S.W.2d 112
• Parties: SULLIVAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellant, v. Malcolm C. McDONALD, and wife, Shelby J. McDonald, Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 112

541 S.W.2d 112

SULLIVAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellant, v. Malcolm C. McDONALD, and wife, Shelby J. McDonald, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 26, 1976.

Jerry W. Carnes, Branstetter, Moody & Kilgore, Nashville, for appellant.

Stephen C. Baker, Dearborn & Ewing, Nashville, for appellees.

OPINION

HENRY, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case in which the primary issue for our determination is whether the stepmother of a deceased workman is a member of the class of dependents entitled to receive death benefits under Section 50--1013, T.C.A. The trial judge determined that she was properly entitled to receive compensation benefits. We are in full accord with that determination.

I.

On September 6, 1974, the deceased, Bradley McDonald, age eighteen, was electrocuted while working in the course and scope of his employment as an electrician's helper with Sullivan Electric Company. At the time of his death he was living with his natural father, stepmother, and two younger stepsisters, as a family unit, in an apartment in Nashville.

The appellees, Malcolm and Shelby McDonald, are the natural father and stepmother of the deceased employee. For many years prior to June 1974, the deceased's stepmother had been disabled as a result of contracting poliomyelitis as a child. Her disability was such that her right arm was completely paralyzed, although it could be physically moved with the aid of her left arm. In addition, her left arm was paralyzed from the shoulder to the elbow, thereby limiting movement to her left forearm and hand.

For many years previously, Shelby McDonald had been treated for her paralysis and had undergone several operations performed by Dr. Don Eyler, a Nashville orthopedic surgeon. In order to continue these treatments, and in anticipation of further orthopedic surgery, the appellees moved to Nashville in the early part of June, 1974 from their previous residence in Indiana.

At the time of their move, the decedent was seventeen years of age, had been graduated from high school, and was desirous of leaving his natural mother's home, also in Indiana, where he had resided since his parents' divorce in 1971. As a result of discussions with his father concerning the increased financial burdens occasioned by the appellees' recent move to Tennessee, the decedent agreed to move to Nashville. In the latter part of June 1974, the decedent joined the appellees in their apartment, where he resided until his death on September 6, 1974.

The decedent began working for Sullivan Electric on September 4, 1974, at a gross weekly wage of $123.70. The appellees' income for a reasonable period prior to the decedent's death, exclusive of any contributions from him was $176.00 per week. This amount reflects, in substantial part, the earnings of the deceased employee's father, a long haul truck driver.

Pursuant to the previous agreement with his father, the decedent voluntarily contributed between thirty ($30.00) and forty ($40.00) dollars per week for the family finances. In addition, he also contributed cash from his savings, bought gas for the family car, purchased groceries on various occasions, and purchased some school supplies for his two stepsisters. The decedent also performed numerous household chores and duties which his invalid stepmother was unable to accomplish.

Furthermore, since his father's occupation required considerable overnight travelling, the deceased was called upon to provide nursing care for his invalid stepmother. Such care included, among other things, helping her to dress, lifting her out of bed, taking her to the doctor, giving her medicine, feeding her, taking her shopping, and otherwise caring for her general needs.

Appellees insist that they are entitled to workmen's compensation benefits by virtue of their being 57% Dependent upon the deceased employee at the time of his death. In addition, they seek the $750.00 medical and funeral expense benefits authorized by Section 50--1004, T.C.A.

The trial court determined that the appellees were 46% Dependent on the monetary contributions and services provided by the deceased workman. A judgment was thereby awarded to appellees in the amount of $19.91 per week, not to exceed $28,000.00, in addition to $750.00 medical and funeral expense benefits.

II.

The statutory dependents of a deceased workman are enumerated in Section 50--1013(a)(3), T.C.A., and specifically include the following relationships:

Wife, child, husband, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, sister, brother, mother-in-law, and father-in-law . . ..

Subsection 50--1013(b), T.C.A. applies this same classification in determining Partial dependency benefits:

Any member of a class named in subdivision (a)(3) who regularly derived part of his support from the wages of the deceased workman at the time of his death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto shall be considered his partial dependent, and payment of compensation shall be made to such dependents in the order named.

Since the term 'stepmother' is not specifically included within this statutory enumeration, the initial question for our determination is whether the term 'mother', as used in the statute, was intended by the Legislature to include 'stepmother'.

This Court has consistently followed the policy of giving the Workmen's Compensation Law a liberal construction in order to accomplish the beneficent objects and purposes intended by the compensation statutes. Curtis v. Hamilton Block Co., 225 Tenn. 275, 466 S.W.2d 220 (1971); Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 505, 226 S.W. 215 (1920). See also Section 50--918, T.C.A. Professor Larson, in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation Law, at section 62.21 of volume two (1976), candidly expresses such liberality of construction in the following manner:

(B)ecause of the beneficient character of the (workmen's compensation) legislation, established definitions and rules will usually be stretched as far as precedents will allow, to take care of meritorious cases of dependency.

In the present case, however, it is unnecessary that we 'stretch' any established definitions. This Court has, on numerous prior occasions, extended workmen's compensation benefits to persons not otherwise included under the precise language of Section 50--1013(a)(3). For example, the term 'child', as used in this statute, has been held to include a stepchild, Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn.1975); grandchildren, Cherokee Brick Co. v. Bishop, 156 Tenn. 168, 299 S.W. 770 (1927); an illegitimate child, Portin v. Portin, 149 Tenn. 530, 261 S.W. 362 (1923); unrelated children, Atkins v. Employers Mutual Ins. Co., 208 Tenn. 539, 347 S.W.2d 49 (1961); Wilmoth et al. v. Phoenix Utility Co. et al., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48 (1934); and even a nephew, Southern Motor Car Co. v. Paterson, 168 Tenn. 252, 77 S.W.2d 446 (1935).

In determining eligibility for workmen's compensation benefits with respect to dependent children we have repeatedly concluded that mere relationship is not the test, but 'support and actual dependency; are the determinative criteria. Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 285; Atkins, supra; Wilmoth, supra. The rationale in support of such a test was expressed by this Court in Portin v. Portin, supra, through the following language:

The Wokman's Compensation Act is not a statute of descent or distribution. It was intended to relieve society of the burden of caring for injured wokmen or the dependents of deceased workmen, and to place that burden upon the industry employing the wokman. In case of the workmen's death, the lawmakers were concerned for the care of his dependents, not about the devolution of the workman's property. The Dependency of the claimant is the true basis of his right to compensation rather than blood or marriage. Relationship is really only evidence of dependency. (Emphasis supplied). 149 Tenn. at 535--36, 261 S.W. at 363.

We see no reason why this same rationale should not also be applied in determining eligibility with regard to partially dependent stepmothers.

Appellant cites Milne v. Sanders, 143 Tenn. 602, 228 S.W. 702 (1920), as holding by dictum, that a stepmother is not a dependent under the statute. However, in Milne this Court sustained a compensation award made jointly to the natural father and stepmother of a deceased workman. Reasoning that since the father alone would have been entitled to the entire amount of the award, the Court concluded that Even if it was error to name the stepmother as a dependent, it was 'a harmless one.' 143 Tenn. at 626--27, 228 S.W. 702. We do not interpret Milne as excluding a stepmother from the class of compensable partial dependents.

Appellant also relies upon Gray Eagle Marble Co. v. Meek, 159 Tenn. 577, 21 S.W.2d 625 (1929), a case wherein workmen's compensation benefits were denied to a dependent aunt of the deceased employee, because she did not fall within a class specifically enumerated by the statute. Distinguishing earlier cases which had awarded compensation benefits to various categories of individuals included within the enumerated class of 'children', the Court concluded that:

While we have given the act a liberal construction with respect to those Coming within the classes enumerated, we cannot extend its provisions to Classes not named therein. (Emphasis supplied). 159 Tenn. at 581, 21 S.W.2d at 626.

In the present case we are concerned with a term (i.e., stepmother) which is logically includible with the broader, statutorily enumerated class of 'mothers'. ¹ We are not here concerned with an entirely separate and distinct class of dependents, as was the case in Gray Eagle Marble Co., supra.

It should also be noted that in our present Compensation Law the term 'parent' is occasionally used interchangeably with the terms 'mother' and 'father'. Section 50--1013(c)(7), for example, employs the term 'parent' in...