Sullivan v. American Bridge Co.

• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: Keller, J.
• Citation: Sullivan v. American Bridge Co., 115 Pa.Super. 536, 176 A. 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935)
• Decision Date: 04 January 1935
• Docket Number: 452-1934
• Parties: Sullivan v. American Bridge Company, Appellant

176 A. 24

115 Pa.Super. 536

Sullivan v. American Bridge Company, Appellant

No. 452-1934

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

January 4, 1935

Argued October 10, 1934

Appeal by defendant from judgment of C. P., No. 5, Philadelphia County, December T., 1933, No. 9917, in the case of Esther Sullivan v. American Bridge Company.

Appeal from award of Board of Workmen's Compensation. Before Lamberton, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Appeal dismissed and judgment entered against defendant. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was judgment.

Affirmed.

Philip L. Leidy, and with him William C. Bodine, for appellant.

Frank H. Warner, and with him Catherine A. Donahue, for appellee.

Before Trexler, P. J., Keller, Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld Parker and James, JJ.

OPINION

Keller, J.

This is a workmen's compensation case. The only real question involved is whether the claimant was the lawful wife of John Sullivan, an employee of defendant who was killed on April 7 1933 while in the course of his employment.

The facts in the case may be stated as follows: On December 1, 1925 while claimant and John Sullivan were living in Camden, N. J., they decided to get married and went to the court house at Camden to get a marriage license. They were told that they must have two witnesses and wait forty-eight hours after the issuance of the license before they could get married. They wanted to be married at once, so decided to go to Elkton, Maryland, for that purpose. When they got there they were told they would have to have a witness and as they did not have any, Sullivan said to claimant, "Will you marry me without a ceremony?" and she said "Yes." Thereupon he said "Well, I am your husband," and she said, "Yes, and I am your wife," and they went "back home" to the house of Mr. Sullivan's sister, in Camden, where they lived together as husband and wife. They stayed there two weeks and then moved to 220 State Street, Camden, and afterwards to Red Bank, N. J., and Allentown, Pa., and various other places where they always lived together as husband and wife and were so known and recognized by their associates. They lived together until July 1932, when by reason of his having no work she had to go to her parents' home, while he secured such work as he was able to do, but they corresponded with each other, his letters to her being addressed to Mrs. John Sullivan or Mrs. Esther Sullivan; one letter written to her on April 1, 1933, six days before his death, was most affectionate, calling her "My dear wife" and enclosing $ 20 of his wages and promising to send more at the next pay day, and signing himself "Hubby"; his Union book had written in it, in his handwriting, a reference to her as 'Mrs. John Sullivan'; his application for membership in the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, contained a notation in his handwriting that in case of his death notice should be given 'Esther Sullivan,' 2012 Green St. -- where they then resided --, and his insurance policy in the Prudential Insurance Co. was payable to "Mrs. Esther Sullivan"; and in the application he called the beneficiary, his 'wife.' The exhibits in the case, -- which, by the way, are not printed in the record furnished us, as they should have been -- make it clear that he recognized and regarded her as his wife. She was so introduced by him, in February 1930, to the landlord when he rented the apartment in which they lived until July, 1932.

It seems to have been decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland (See Richardson v. Smith, 80 Md. 89, 30 A. 568; Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117; Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263, 131 A. 329) that a marriage is not valid in that State unless in addition to the civil contract some religious ceremony is performed. On the other hand, common law marriages, without any ceremony, are valid in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

Appellant relies on the general rule that a marriage, if valid in the State where it is contracted, is valid everywhere; and its corollary, which is not so well established, that if the marriage is invalid in the State where it is contracted, it is invalid everywhere; and contends that as the attempted marriage in Maryland was invalid under the laws of that State, and there was no proof of any subsequent contract of marriage, in verba de praesenti, entered into between the parties, either in New Jersey or Pennsylvania (See Murdock's Est., 92 Pa.Super. 275, and cases therein cited), there never was a valid marriage between them and claimant never became his lawful wife. But the corollary above-mentioned to the general rule, viz., that if the marriage is invalid in the State where it is contracted, it is invalid everywhere, was held by our Supreme Court to be subject to exceptions (See Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158, 168), saying "But our courts have not established, e converso, that marriages of citizens not good according to the place where celebrated, are universally and under all possible circumstances to be disregarded. The best course unquestionably is, to be married according to the laws of the country where the marriage takes place, for then no question can arise. But if this cannot be done on account of legal or religious difficulties, the law does not say, 'that citizens shall not marry abroad according to the forms and ceremonies recognized as valid and binding in their own country.' The common law, under which we live, considers marriage in no other light than a civil contract; such a marriage as has been celebrated between these parties would be clearly good."

It is unquestioned that the claimant and John Sullivan had no intention of entering into a meretricious relation. They went to the courthouse at Camden, N. J. and to Elkton, Md. for the express purpose of getting married. They intended to marry each other then -- at that present time, not at some time in the future -- and believed they had done so. They were under the impression that in using the words which they did they were entering into a valid marriage. They intended to do so and believed that they had contracted a valid marriage. There were no disabilities existing which prevented their contracting a valid marriage; and when they came back to New Jersey they believed they were lawfully married and from that time on acted towards each other as husband and wife. Had they done in New Jersey or Pennsylvania what they did in Maryland, it would have been a valid marriage anywhere. The words spoken were in the present tense and uttered with the intent of establishing the relation of husband and wife. The parties did not afterwards make a new contract in verba de praesenti in New Jersey, because they thought they had lawfully married each other in Maryland and never knew otherwise.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in very nearly the same circumstances, held that the subsequent conduct of the parties was equivalent to a declaration by each that they did, and during their joint lives were to, occupy...